Israel's Syria spy cameras tracked Russian navy

A photo released by the Syrian official news agency SANA shows devices resembling rocks found northwest of Damascus, March 7, 2013.

Spying equipment uncovered by Syria earlier this month was used by Israel to monitor the movements of Russian warships, The Sunday Times reports.

Israel used spying equipment it planted off the Syrian coast to monitor Russian naval movements in the Mediterranean, The Sunday Times reported.

Earlier this month Syria’s state television reported that Israeli spy equipment was uncovered monitoring a “sensitive site” on its Mediterranean coast. The footage showed a camera, six large batteries, cables and transmitters, along with fake rocks used to camouflage the equipment.

The equipment was planted, the report says, on an uninhabited island in the Mediterranean, opposite to the Syrian port city of Tartus, near a Russian naval base. Citing a report on Lebanon’s pro-Syrian Al-Manar television station, the Sunday Times said that the gear could be used to track the movements of Russian warships and relay the pictures in real time.

The Tartus base was leased by the former Soviet Union in 1971.

The equipment, the Times report suggested, was planted on the island by Israel’s elite naval commando unit, Flotilla 13. Transported by a submarine, the concern wasn't that the force would be spotted by Syria, rather that Western forces patrolling and monitoring the coastline would discover the activity.

The report speculates that the commandos had visited the island at least twice, once to obtain terrain samples for the manufacture of the fake rocks and a second time to plant the equipment. Installing the gear, concealing it and making sure it was operational could take several hours, the report said.

It is unknown how long the equipment was operated before it was uncovered.

The spying gear was “highly intricate,” a senior Syrian security official told the Times, who also added that it could have been used to track the Syrian military.

The cameras and the artificial rocks used to disguise it resembled eqipment seized in Lebanon in recent years, which Lebanese authorities said were used by Israel to monitor activity in Lebanon.

The report earlier this month on Syrian television quoted an official accusing Israel of playing a role in the uprising against President Bashar Assad, claiming that the spying equipment was also used in the service of rebels fighting to topple to government.

At the time, Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor refused to comment on the report, saying: "We will not be dragged into the Syrian civil war. Not on the verbal or propaganda battlefield, nor on the real one."

Syria is engulfed in a civil war that erupted nearly two years ago, initially with peaceful protests against Assad. The United Nations says more than 70,000 people have been killed in the fighting since then.

Haaretz.com

'Chinese military publicly assertive under new leadership'

BEIJING: Chinese defence forces, shedding reticent style of functioning, are highlighting their military activities since the change of leadership, a move analysts say is intended to send a strong message to China's neighbours.

Motor boats carrying marine commandos head towards the "target" ship during a maritime exercise conducted on March 28, 2013, by a contingent of China's South Sea Fleet that is on a patrol mission in South China Sea.[Photo:Xinhua]

Besides state-run CCTV, official organs of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, PLA Daily and state-run news agency Xinhua have been highlighting the navy's activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where China is locked in disputes with neighbouring nations.

The official media specially highlighted the open-ocean training mission led by the amphibious landing ship Jinggangshan in the South China Sea, close to the coast of Malaysia and Brunei, who along with Vietnam and the Philippines contests China's claims over the South China Sea.

The fully equipped PLA amphibious naval task force created flutter conducting exercises near James Shoal or Zengmu Reef some 80-km from Malaysia, less than 200 kilometres from Brunei and 1,800 kilometres from the mainland coast.

The PLA navy website posted high-profile oath-taking ceremony performed by the crews of a fully equipped four-ship fleet, near the outer limits of the country's controversial "nine-dash line".

The line, the basis for China's claim to virtually all of the South China Sea, encompasses territory also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

The pictures showed marines and sailors pledging to "defend the South China Sea, maintain national sovereignty and strive towards the dream of a strong China".

"The intended message by the PLA Daily and other official reports was to tell the world that, no matter what speculation was made by neighbouring counties involved in territorial disputes with us in the South China Sea, our navy will still conduct patrol and training missions there. It's a move to show our determination to defend our ocean territory," Li Jie, a Chinese naval expert told Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

Shanghai-based naval expert Professor Ni Lexiong said the navy had also sent more ships to the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also claimed by Japan, which calls them the Senkakus, since Xi Jinping became chairman of the Central Military Commission in November.

New Chinese President Xi's "call to make China a maritime power, and the dream of a strong China, told us that he wants to make some difference from his predecessors Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao, who were criticised by the public as being too soft and weak when dealing with territorial disputes," Ni said.

"As someone from a princeling background, Xi is more assertive than Hu and will certainly take a tougher stance on the issues over the East and South China seas.

The Economic Times

12 Ospreys headed to Japan in July, bound for Futenma

Japan and the United States are arranging to ship a second batch of 12 MV-22 Osprey aircraft in July, likely to a Marine Corps base in the Chugoku region before their deployment in Okinawa, sources close to bilateral relations revealed Saturday.

Hybrid transport: Three Osprey MV-22 transport aircraft depart U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture on March 8. | KYODO

As with the first group of 12 tilt-rotor MV-22s that arrived last year, the new aircraft are likely to be stationed temporarily at U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, and then transported to the U.S. Futenma base on Okinawa Island after undergoing test flights and maintenance, the sources said.

Tokyo and Washington will expedite talks on when to move the hybrid transport planes to U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in the city of Ginowan. The Marine Corps plans to deploy a total of 24 Ospreys at the facility by 2014 to replace aging CH-46 Sea Knight transport helicopters.

The first batch of MV-22s arrived at Iwakuni last July and remained grounded for around two months while Tokyo reviewed U.S. investigations into two overseas crashes that year involving Ospreys to determine whether they were fit to fly in Japan. In spite of persistent local concerns about the aircraft’s safety record, the 12 Ospreys, which take off and land vertically, were deployed at the Futenma air station last October.

The U.S. government proposed shipping the second batch directly to Okinawa but Tokyo expressed reluctance, fearing the move would further roil local sentiment against the deployment, according to the sources.

Washington then agreed to first send the Ospreys to the Iwakuni base, they said. Like the first batch, the aircraft are expected to be shipped from California.


CCTV/ Japan Times

China stepping up drone deployment: Dirty Secrets

China’s military is expanding its unmanned aerial vehicle forces with a new Predator-like armed drone and a new unmanned combat aircraft amid growing tensions with neighbors in Asia, according to United States intelligence officials.

New unarmed drone deployments include the recent stationing of reconnaissance and ocean surveillance drones in Northeast Asia near Japan and the Senkaku islands and along China’s southern coast. Drones also are planned for the South China Sea where China has been encroaching on international waters and bullying nations of that region in asserting control over international waters, said officials familiar with intelligence reports.

“Unmanned aerial vehicles are emerging as critical enablers for PLA long range precision strike operations,” said Mark Stokes, a former military intelligence official now with the Project 2049 Institute. “A general operational PLA requirement appears to be persistent surveillance of fixed and moving targets out to 3,000 kilometers of Chinese shores.”

Japan, meanwhile, is developing and purchasing military drone capabilities to counter what it regards as Chinese aggression and Beijing’s growing military capabilities as Tokyo’s dispute with China over the Senkaku islands intensifies, the officials said.

After Chinese aircraft intruded into Japanese airspace over the Senkakus undetected late last year, Tokyo stepped up efforts to seek drone capabilities. The efforts include building an indigenous missile-tracking drone and high-altitude U.S. drones.

So far, unlike Beijing, Tokyo asserts its drone will be unarmed, the officials said.

“China has started deploying UAVs for reconnaissance and oceanic surveillance purposes in the vicinity of disputed maritime territories, such as the Senkaku Islands,” said one military source.

Of particular concern to U.S. intelligence agencies are two new missile-equipped drones known as the CH-4 and Yi Long. The aircraft were shown off along with six other military drones at a major Chinese arms show last November in Zhuhai.

Photos of the drones reveal the designs appear to be copied from the U.S. Predator armed drone that has been leading the Obama administration’s war on al Qaeda in Pakistan and elsewhere. Photos of the CH-4 show it armed with Blue Arrow-7 anti-tank missiles that appear similar in size to the U.S. Hellfire fired from Predators.

Even more of a concern, according to the officials, are intelligence reports from Asia indicating that China is well along in building a large stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)—an upiloted jet—that was revealed recently in an online Chinese military video.

The drone combat jet is nearly identical in shape to the experimental batwing-shaped U.S. Air Force X-47B currently under development. The X-47B was tested on an aircraft carrier in December.

The Chinese UCAV is expected to have enough range to reach the U.S. island of Guam, some 1,800 miles from the Chinese coast and the hub of the Pentagon’s shift to Asia, officials said.

Video and photos of the Chinese UCAV were posted on Chinese military enthusiast Internet sites recently. Also, a model of the drone combat jet was on display at Zhuhai. The aircraft is being built by the China Shenyang Aerospace Institute and could be deployed on China’s new aircraft carrier, officials said.

Richard Fisher, a China military analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the first prototype flying wing UCAV was completed at China’s Hongdu Aircraft Corp in mid-December. The drone weighs 10 to 14 tons and could be carrier based.

“This means that the U.S. attempt to ‘outrange’ an emergent PLA anti-access systems, like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, could soon be outflanked by a new PLA carrier-based UCAV,” Fisher said.
Japan, alarmed at fierce Chinese reaction to its efforts to solve the Senkakus dispute by nationalizing several of the uninhabited but oil-rich islands last year, is bolstering its military forces with both missile-detecting and maritime surveillance with drones.

Japanese Defense Ministry officials, quoted in press reports, have called the purchase of several long-range U.S. Global Hawk surveillance drones an urgent priority.

Tokyo is seeking up to three Global Hawks by 2015 but could speed up purchases in response to what it regards as growing Chinese aggressiveness toward Japan over the Senkakus.

The U.S. military currently has Global Hawks deployed at Guam.

The Japanese do not plan to develop armed drones and plan to limit initial purchases to the Global Hawk, which fly nearly 60,000 feet for extended missions. It is able to track vessels using sensors and radar.

Japan also is developing an unmanned drone aircraft that will be used to detect North Korean nuclear missile attacks and to counter the Chinese military buildup, the officials said.

The anti-missile drone program is being developed over the next four years with the first drone deployed by 2020. It will use infrared sensors designed to detect missiles shortly after launch.

China’s drone program is believed to have benefitted from its aggressive economic and cyber espionage operations against the United States. Those efforts have included breaking into both government and defense industry networks and stealing valuable drone technology.

Officials also said China’s drone program is receiving a boost from an unlikely source: Taiwan.

The largest Chinese drone production center is being built at Wuhan in Hubei province, site of a joint construction project by China’s Wuhan Visiontek Inc. and Taiwan’s Carbon-Based Technology, Inc.
Officials said China launched a crash program to develop military drones beginning around 2007. Beijing is planning a range of unmanned aircraft capabilities, including high-altitude, long-endurance drones, integrated air and sea warfare drones, sea-based drones and UCAVs.

More than 60 drones were on display in Beijing last June, including a drone helicopter, and a drone with simulated birds’ wings.

Additionally, officials have said drone bases are being set up in the South China Sea to monitor Scarborough reef, which is claimed by Philippines and China; Macclesfield Bank; the Paracel Islands; and the Spratly Islands. China also is using drone to monitor the Socotra Reef claimed by South Korea.
A report made public March 11 by the Project 2049 Institute on Chinese drones estimated that China has more than 280 military drones.

“The PLA has developed one of the largest and most organizationally complex UAV programs in the world,” the report stated.

For the immediate future, the Chinese drones are monitoring disputed maritime and land boundaries that are likely to “increase tensions” since other states in the region lack the same capabilities.
“Like any new capability, UAVs may encourage the inexperienced to overreach and engage in risk taking,” the report said. “There could be a sense that because human pilot lives are not at stake, operators can push farther than they otherwise might.”

An isolated UAV attack during a crisis also could lead to a major conflict. “In the future, PRC decision-makers might feel compelled to order ‘plausibly deniable’ UAV attacks as a means of sending a political signal only to inadvertently wind up escalating tensions,” the report said.

Over the long term, Chinese drones will support the expansion of Chinese military operational areas by pushing the ability to hit targets further into the western Pacific. The report said China likely will use its UAV force for targeting and guidance of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile designed to strike U.S. aircraft carriers more than a thousand miles from China’s coast.

“While the potential for a large scale conflict in the region currently appears low, the lack of adequate preparation for worst case scenarios could encourage and invite adventurous adversary behavior, ultimately increasing risks to peace and stability,” the report stated.

U.S. intelligence agencies reported earlier this month that China plans to build 11 drone bases along its coastline by 2015, with each base deploying at least one unmanned aircraft.

The People’s Liberation Army currently has two drone bases in northeast Liaoning province. A third base was disclosed further south at Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province, also on the Bohai Sea.

The bases were announced in August by the State Oceanic Administration, which has been used as a proxy by the Chinese military to lay claim to international waters and islands as part of a strategy of pushing Chinese maritime control hundreds and eventually thousands of miles from the coast through what Beijing calls its two Asian island chain strategy. The island chains stretch from Northeast Asia through Southeast Asia.

The two bases in the Bohai Sea are located at Yingkou and Dalian to provide surveillance of the Bohai and Yellow Seas.

China called U.S. aircraft carrier exercises held in the Yellow Sea three years ago “a threat to China” even though the carrier maneuvers were carried out in international waters.

The maritime surveillance drones provide high-definition remote imagery and will be used by China to respond to emergencies in the region and also to identify what China claims are illegal resource extraction from undersea gas and oil deposits.

U.S. officials regard recent highlighting of attack drones as a sign that Beijing remains intent on taking control of the Senkakus.

The increased use of drones by both China and Japan is expected to increase tensions over the Senkakus, the officials said.

According to Fisher, China is also exporting two of its armed drones, the Yi Long and CH-3, to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.

The UAE government purchased the Yi Long, and a smaller CH-3 was sold to Pakistan and repackaged by Islamabad as the Shahpar.

Fisher said he is concerned China will sell the new and larger CH-4 to Iran.
“Because it is not connected to the Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC) which wants to do business in the United States, the CH-4 stands a better chance of being sold to Iran,” he told the Free Beacon.
“China’s willingness to sell UCAV technology to terrorist-linked states means that terrorists may soon have another deadly tool with which to attack the United States.”

Data from The Washington Times

Taiwan deploys large patrol vessel

Taiwan has commissioned a large patrol ship to monitor waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The islands are controlled by Japan but also claimed by Taiwan and China.

The newly-deployed 2,000 ton vessel is equipped with 40-millimeter machine guns and long-range water cannons.

A ceremony to mark the deployment was held on Saturday at the southern city of Kaohsiung. President Ma Ying-jeou said tension is escalating in waters around Taiwan.

He revealed plans to cope with the situation by deploying 35 more patrol ships over the next 6 years, which will include a 3,000 ton vessel.

Ma pledged that he will stand firm on Taiwan's territorial claims. However, he also stressed that all parties involved should set aside their claims and jointly develop resources in the area.

Taiwanese Coast Guard officials carried out a drill on the ship in waters near Kaohsiung. They used water cannons to protect fishermen from obstructions by foreign patrol boats. Part of the exercise was open to the media.

The drill was carried out in waters far from the disputed islands, in an apparent effort to avoid raising tensions with Japan.

Taiwan and Japan are currently in talks aimed at resuming negotiations for a fisheries agreement around the Islands.


NHK

Japanese Study: Rising China Disregarding Neighbors

TOKYO — The rising might of China is causing it to act with increasing disregard towards its neighbors, a Japanese government-funded study said Friday.

“China, against the backdrop of its rising national power and improvement in its military power, is increasingly taking actions that can cause frictions with neighboring countries without fear,” said the East Asian Strategic Review.

The study, published Friday by the National Institute for Defence Studies, is an annual venture commissioned by Japan’s Defense Ministry and influences national defense policy.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman refuted the claim and said Japan should come clean about its own defense policy.

“We develop our national defense power in accordance with our domestic conditions. That is reasonable and will not pose any threat to any other country,” the spokesman, Hong Lei, told a regular press conference in Beijing.

Beijing and Tokyo have had diplomatic daggers drawn since September, when Japan nationalized some islands it controls in the East China Sea. The Senkakus, which Beijing claims as the Diaoyus, are uninhabited but resource-rich and strategically important islands that have been the scene of confrontations between government ships from both sides over several months.

However, the report noted, China’s preparedness for pushing its territorial claims was on the rise well before Tokyo angered it with the island nationalization. In January last year, Beijing classed the archipelago as a “core interest,” ranking it alongside Tibet and Taiwan as issues over which it would never give ground, the study said.

It is not only China’s relationship with Japan that is becoming complicated, the report said, with Beijing’s ostensible strategic partner Russia also becoming wary of its neighbor’s rising power.

Despite Xi Jinping choosing to take his first foreign trip as China’s president to Russia for a summit with his counterpart Vladimir Putin, the “Russo-Chinese strategic partnership is more complex than it appears”, the study said. “An equal relationship can hardly be maintained with China’s GDP at more than four times Russia’s,” it added, saying that the imbalance was leading Moscow to shore up previously fragile relations with Japan.

“At recent bilateral summit meetings and foreign ministerial conferences between Russia and Japan, Moscow has persistently requested that Tokyo cooperate in security matters, particularly maritime security,” the study said. “Recognition that China’s maritime activities on the high seas will expand in a northerly direction in the near future is a factor motivating Russia to seek cooperation with Japan and the United States.”

Defense News

The Vietnam-made Molniya class Project 1241.1/ 1241.8 Missile Boat

The missile boat of Project 1242.1 is a further development of the Molniya (Lightning) family boats, developed for export. It differs from its predecessor (Project 1241RE boats) in that the outdated P-20 missile system [SS-N-2 Styx] has been replaced by the Moskit-E ( SS-N-22 Sunburn) missile system which fires supersonic antiship missiles, and that the new Garpun-Bal multirole radar system has been installed.


Trials of the first boat of the class have already been completed. The Project 1242.1 Molniya Missile Boat is intended to engage combatant ships, amphibious ships, and other vessels at open sea. It has the variety of weapons with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air capabilities. The unique radar system covers the missile entire effective range, tracing concurrently 15 targets, and assigns six designated targets under intensive EW environment.

The gun fire control system detects air and surface targets, performs automatic tracking, and computes firing data. The radar which is used to detect surface targets provides fire control system with designation data for five targets at a time. The boat is also fitted with active radar jammers and IFF radar. The missile boat is equipped with the full set of navigation and communication equipment, powerful gas turbine power plant , air-conditioning and ventilation systems to provide efficient operation in any climatic conditions.

Russia has tested and put into production a new missile vessel, "Molniya ", armed with four Moskit missiles. The Molniya is a follow-on to the successful Soviet Tarantul-class missile boats. The St. Petersburg-based design company, Almaz, has developed an export version of the Molniya boat. The unique Russian missile boat "Molniya " is available in a tropical modification. The vessel can destroy surface ships, transport and landing facilities in a coastal zone and out at sea.

With its comparatively inconsiderable displacement of 550 tons, "Molniya " is equipped with four "Moskit" supersonic anti-vessel missiles. The first launch of Russia's newest supersonic anti-ship missile, the Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn, was conducted from an export Molniya fast missile boat at the Feodosia test range late in October 1999. The boat has a radar missile target designation complex. It's the latest achievement in radio-electronic systems of this purpose. With its high noise-proof features, it can observe 15 targets simultaneously and define target destinations of six. The complex can reach targets 500 kilometers off. Besides strike missile guns, the boat has anti-aircraft missile weapons and automatic artillery installations. It has 12 portable anti-aircraft missile complexes "Igla" meant to hit air targets in conditions of natural visibility. The on-board rapid-fire artillery guns are meant to destroy air, surface and coastal targets. They can also be used to liquidate floating mines. "Molniya " also has two launchers and combined-interference shells to protect targets from anti-boat weapons with different guidance systems.

The boats' relatively small size enables them to blend in with coastal merchant and fishing traffic, making them difficult to locate and target. With a skilled operator, Russian-built patrol craft armed with Sunburn antiship missiles would be a significant threat to any seagoing adversary. The boat's high navigation characteristics allow it to use weapons in stormy weather with wind force 5 and ensures safety in the sea with wind force 8. Thanks to its sophisticated weapons, high running features, the boat can control a total area of water up to 5 thousand square nautical miles. The boat's speed is up to 38 knots, sailing range up to 2,400 miles, crew 44 members.

The missile boat of Project 1241.8 has been developed on the same basic platform as the Project 1242.1 boat. It differs from the predecessor by the missile armament only: it carries 16 Kh-35 [SSN-X-25 Switchblade] missiles of the Uran-E system instead of 4 missiles of the Moskit-E (SS-N-22 Sunburn) system. The Uran-E missile characteristics are similar to those of American Harpoons, but the missile boats of Project 12418 carry twice more missiles on board. The boats can be delivered to customers one year after signing a contract.

Vympel Joint Stock Shipbuilding Company (JSSC), based in the Volga River city of Rybinsk, is one of central Russia's largest shipyards specialising in series production of various types of river- and sea-going ships boats intended for diverse applications. At present the company serially builds boats up to 1,500 tons displacement intended for domestic and foreign customers both in naval and civil sectors. On of the major types of the vessels built by Vumpel is the Project 1241.8 Molniya Missile Boat.

In addition to the pilot Molniya boat undergoing tests at the Black Sea base of Feodosia, the shipyard has made four others which already have potential buyers. Vympel can only sell its patrol craft to foreign buyers since it is unlikely the Russian navy will procure new equipment in the near future.
In January 1999 it was announed that Vympel and Rosvoorouzhenie were to deliver two Project 1241RE missile boats to Vietnam. The frigate will come in versions which include a powerful gunboat, a patrol ship, a plane shooter and a hunter for submarines.

The pilot ship of the series is already under construction for Vietnam. The frigate's streamlined hull and low-profile superstructure provide an excellent hiding envelope for everything that generates noise or heat, reflects radar pulses or disturbs magnetic fields. Moreover, the superstructure can be coated with stealth materials that make it invisible to radars.

Propelled by two powerful water jets, the ship can race across shallows at over 30 knots. Big fuel tanks and fuel-saving diesel engines allow it to carry out missions at up to 3 thousand nautical miles from home base. Despite the displacement of just 545 tons, the frigate carries a formidable array of weaponry on board. This includes eight Kh-35 [SSN-X-25 Switchblade] anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of over 130 kilometers, two torpedo tubes, several anti-aircraft missile batteries of the VIKHR-K and IGLA makes and a number of large-caliber machine-guns.

Specifications
Designation:	1241.8
Designer	Almaz
Builder	Vympel Joint Stock Shipbuilding Company (JSSC),
Displacement (tons):	550 tons full load
Speed (kts):	38 knots (full) knots (economic)
Dimension (meters):	56.1 meters long 10.2 meters beam 2.65 meters draft
Propulsion:	gas turbine power plant Power, hp 32,000 Propellers 2 x fixed pitch
Crew:	44
Armament:
Airwing:	No
Missiles:	4 Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn Cruise Missiles, 2 x 2 launchers [Project 1242.1] 16 Uran-E SSN-X-25 Switchblade [Project 1241.8] 8 Uran-E SSN-X-25 Switchblade [Project 1241 RE] IGLA -1M AD missile system (12 missiles)
Guns:	76 mm AK-176M Gun Mount 1 x 1 30 mm AK-630M Gun Mount 2 x 6
Antisubmarine:	none
Electronics	HF and UHF radio communication aids navigation radar radio direction-finder satellite navigation set air/surface target detection radar fire-control radar for cruise missiles fire-control radar for gun mounts decoy dispenser system (2 x PK-10)

fas.org, YouTube/saragon1988

Vietnamese People's Navy

The PAVN Navy (The People's Army of Vietnam Navy), begun in 1955 as the PAVN ( The People's Army of Vietnam ) Riverine and Maritime Force, in 1959 became the Coastal Defense Force. Its "tradition day" is celebrated annually on August 5 to mark the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in the Second Indochina War. The PAVN Navy began a buildup in the mid-1960s with the arrival of twenty-eight gunboats from China and thirty patrol torpedo boats from the Soviet Union. At the end of the Second Indochina War, it assumed the normal dual missions of a navy, that is, coastal defense and sea surveillance.

From 1978 to 1990 the PAVN Navy received Soviet assistance and encouragement and was the largest naval force in Southeast Asia, in exchange they allowed the Soviets to use Cam Ranh Bay as a naval base. Including some 1,300 former United States and South Vietnamese naval vessels, naval and civilian junks, and coasters, the PAVN Navy had a total of about 1,500 vessels. Its inventory contained two principal combat vessels, 192 patrol boats, 51 amphibious warfare ships, 104 landing ships, and 133 auxiliary craft.

The command structure of the PAVN Navy originated in Hanoi, where the commander in chief of naval forces was located. His office, the Naval Directorate, reported to the Military general Staff Directorate, i.e., the high command. The top operational Commander was the Commander, Vietnam Naval Forces, headquartered in Haiphong. The two posts were usually held by the same individual. Regulations issued in April 1982 established three flag-rank officers: rear admiral, equivalent to a major general; vice admiral, equivalent to a lieutenant general; and full admiral, equivalent to a colonel general.

Vietnam People's Navy Zone 4 holds military exercise.

Five naval regions made up the operational command. Headquartered at Haiphong, Vinh, Da Nang, Vung Tau, and Rach Gia, each region had two or more naval installations or facilities for which it was responsible. Within this structure were the navy fleets or navy groups, in turn divided into navy brigades. In 1987 the Ham Tu Fleet patrolled the northern Gulf of Tonkin as a strategic deterrent to China; its Chuong Duong Brigade was designed to oppose amphibious landings; its Kiet Brigade was assigned to defend the offshore islands and to perform troop transport duties. The Bach Dang Fleet served in the South. Its Ham Tu Naval Brigade (with 80 percent of its personnel South Vietnamese Navy veterans) operated almost entirely in Cambodian waters.

The Vietnamese People's Navy (VPN) consists of combat and logistic elements having more and more modern vessels, weapons, and equipment which enable it to carry out combat operations in Vietnamese waters. The Vietnamese People's Navy plays an important part in protecting national waters, islands, the continental shelf, and special economic zones and in ensuring the interests of maritime economy. The Vietnamese People's Navy is the lead force in maintaining coordination with other forces such as the police, customs service, border defense force, and maritime police to strictly control national waters and economic activities at sea in compliance with Vietnamese and international laws.

In 2006, the Vietnamese Navy consisted of about 27,000 naval infantry, 9,000 regulars, and 3,000 conscripts. The fleet is arranged into four main regions as follows: Haiphong (headquarters), Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Cân Tho. Ther are also bases in Cam Ranh Bay, Hue and Ha Tou.

Despite Vietnam's significant maritime interests such as its claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a heavily disputed area, the People's Navy is relatively weak. With a short supply of spares and many of its ships barely able to claim operational ability, its operational capability fails to live up to the Navy's Order of Battle. The relationship which began during the Cold War with the Soviet Union is still of great importance, at the very least in order to maintain a minimal operational readiness.

It does not seem likely that Vietnam will invest heavily to improve the navy's operational capabilites, as there is an absence of any recent territorial disputes with China, and a general lack of direct threats. However, the topic of control over the South China Sea and more specifically, the Spratly Islands, may prove to be an incentive for some such investment to take place.

In 2011, the Vietnam People's Navy received two modern Gepard class frigates, these are the largest, most modern warships in Vietnam. In the photo, missile ship HQ-011 Dinh Tien Hoang (source: Newspaper QĐND).

Vietnam became Russia's biggest arms client in 2009, having ordered six diesel-electric submarines and 12 Su-30 fighter jets. In April 2009 the Russian business daily Kommersant reported that Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg will build six Kilo class diesel-electric submarines for delivery to Vietnam. The paper quoted company general director Vladimir Aleksandrov as saying that Russia's state arms exporter Rosoboronexport would soon sign a contract with a foreign state, and that Admiralty Shipyards had been chosen to fulfill this contract. Sources in Rosoboronexport later confirmed that Russia and Vietnam had been negotiating a $1.8 billion deal on the delivery of six Kilo-class submarines to the Vietnamese navy for about a year. The submarine is designed for anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface-ship warfare, and also for general reconnaissance and patrol missions. The vessel has a displacement of 2,300 tons, a maximum depth of 350 meters (1,200 feet), a range of 6,000 miles, and a crew of 57. It is equipped with six 533-mm torpedo tubes. As of November 2006, 16 of the vessels were believed to be in active service with the Russian Navy and eight submarines were thought to be in reserve. Another 29 vessels have been exported to China, India, Iran, Poland, Romania and Algeria.

Russia will start supplying Kilo class diesel submarines to Vietnam in 2014, a representative of state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport said in July 2011. The submarines are equipped with "Club-S cruise missile systems," Oleg Azizov said. Russia and Vietnam signed a $3.2-billion contract on the delivery of submarines in December 2009 during the visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Russia. This is the largest deal in the history of Russian exports of naval equipment.

Two contracts on the supply of Gepard class frigates to Vietnam rank second and third on the list of Russia’s 2011 military contracts made by the Center for the Analysis of the World Arms Trade (TsAMTO). Gepard 3.9 frigate. It is currently in service with the Russian and Vietnamese Navies. The frigate is equipped with a new-generation combined gas turbine power plant and can move at up to 28 knots. Owing to its combat and operational capabilities, the ship can remain at sea for long time, control vast sea areas and operate under any climatic conditions. The Gepard-3.9 has been designed in accordance with the Russian Navy’s survivability requirements for actions in any combat situation. The ship has embodied stealth technology to minimize its signature. To accomplish strike missions, the ship is equipped with the Uran-E anti-ship missile system. Its air defenses include the Palma missile/gun system with two 30mm rapid-fire autocannons and the Sosna-R guided missile. The 76.2mm AK-176M gun mount can destroy surface, coastal and air targets. For antisubmarine warfare, the ship is equipped with two twin 533mm torpedo tubes and rocket-assisted ASW system. All the armaments can be employed at sea state up to 5. For strike and ASW missions, the ship can accommodate a helicopter.

Although Vietnam terminated the lease of Cam Ranh Bay to the Russian Navy in mid-2001, there does not seem to be any clear indication of them making this base available to other countries, even though its size is attractive to the US, China, and India, who would all be able to provide significant funding and training opportunities. US-Vietnam relations hint at improvement over recent years with at least three port visits by US warships since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Namely, the 2003 visit to Ho Chi Minh City, the 2004 visit to Da Nang, and again in 2005 at Ho Chi Minh City marking the 30th anniversary of the end of the war.

Excellent performance of the Su-30MKM and MiG-29 at LIMA 2013

Su-30MKM, MiG-29 of the Malaysian Air Force had excellent performances in Aerospace Exhibition and International Naval LIMA-2013 held in Malaysia on March 26 to 30, 2013.

Hereafter, photos showing the performance of the MiG-29 and Su-30MKM fighters of the Royal Malaysian Air Force:

Soha News

Thales showcased its new TRINITY Integrated Littoral Defence Solution at LIMA 2013

At the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace exhibition 2013, Thales showcased its new TRINITY system. Thales TRINITY is a complete and integrated solution for situational awarness, command and control and fire control, adapted and optimised for any mission in the littoral environment. These include:

» Riverine & Inland Waterway Patrol
» Land Forces Support
» Customs Operations Support
» Special Operations Support
» Visit Board Search and Seize (VBSS) Actions
» Coastal and In-shore Patrol and Interdiction
» Choke Point Control & Defence
» Picket Boat and Harbour Defence Duties
» Fishery Protection

TRINITY is based on standard maritime building blocks, combined with dedicated fire control solution(s), allowing the execution of any kind of Anti-Surface Warfare mission in the littoral environment.

The main building blocks of TRINITY are:
» Surveillance sensors, including GPS and AIS information
» Observation sensors, both TV and IR
» Up to 3x Fire Control subsystems, including tracking sensors and, as an option, a pan and tilt system for small calibre (e.g. 12.7mm) guns (considered as GFE)
» Communications (typicaly VHF/UHF radios)
» Command and Control, including navigation support and evidence gathering

(Navy Recognition)

Syrian rebels claim to have captured key town

Syrian rebels say they have captured a strategic town near the border with Jordan after a day of fierce clashes that killed at least 38 people. Opposition fighters say they are expanding their presence in the south, considered a gateway to Damascus.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 16 rebels were among the dead in the fighting in and around Dael. The town lies less than 15 kilometers from the Jordanian border in Daraa province, where the revolt against the government began two years ago. The battle for Dael came as authorities ordered an investigation into a mortar attack on Damascus University that killed at least 10 students on Thursday.

In other areas, the Observatory said heavy clashes were taking place between government forces and fighters renewing their attempts to storm a strategic military facility. It is known as the 17th Division base, north of the city of Raqqa that was captured by rebels earlier this month.

The division is considered one of the most important remaining government strongholds in the northern province that borders Turkey.

The future of Russia-China military cooperation

Defence deals between Moscow and Beijing continue to be plagued by Russian worries of intellectual property violations.

The potential contract for Su-35s may become the first export contract for this aircraft, which is already being supplied to the Russian Air Force. Source: Sukhoi.org

China will once again start buying arms from Russia, according to Chinese media reports, which claim that a framework agreement has been signed for 24 Su-35 fighter jets and four Lada-class conventional submarines.

A RIR source familiar with Russia's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries was unable to confirm these reports. “During Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow, the issue of military-technical cooperation with Russia was not raised at all,” the source said.

In the meantime, the very fact that these reports appeared in the Chinese media prompts one to ponder over the current and potential Russian-Chinese arms contracts and wonder why many of the previous contracts have ended in scandal and how to avoid new controversy.

Judging by the wording in Chinese media reports (“framework agreement”), it is not a firm contract but rather an expanded version of a memorandum of intent. Nevertheless, the reported figures, 24 Su-35 fighter jets and four Lada-class submarines, are already being actively discussed in the media.

Launch Customer

The potential contract for Su-35s may become the first export contract for this aircraft, which is already being supplied to the Russian Air Force. The notion of ‘a launch customer’ is very important in arms sales since it is often that the success of this deal sets customers' attitude to the product for years to come.

Potentially, the Su-35 may be supplied to a variety of regions. These include solvent countries that used to buy Su-30MK2 aircraft, like China, Vietnam and Indonesia. In addition, Russia has for a long time been seeking an opportunity to get through to less obvious customers too, for instance Brazil. The launch of the Chinese deal will make it much easier to further promote the Su-35 on the foreign markets.

With help from the Far Eastern friend

However, the story with the submarines is more intriguing. To begin with, there is speculation that the deal will involve not Lada submarines (Project 677 conventional submarine) but their export modification known as Amur-class submarines.

In effect, it is not yet a finished product but a set of requirements for its technical characteristics. And this set of requirements has been waiting for a large and moneyed customer that could finalise the terms of reference and pay for moving the concept to a working design and then into production.

That is why the potential Chinese order can be considered important: it will help develop and test new technological solutions for the Russian Navy, with the help of Chinese capital.

Russian weapons return to China

What does it all mean? Ten years ago the Russian defence industry's passionate love affair with China saw if not an abrupt end then a considerable cooling-off, particularly in the area that today is once again coming to the fore, in military aircraft manufacturing.

In 2003 China, taking advantage of the provisions of the existing contracts for the licensed assembly of 200 Su-27SK fighter aircraft (under the name of J-11), severed the existing agreements, thus robbing Russia of half of its expected revenues.

The row was caused by a scandal surrounding the J-11B version of the aircraft. The Russian side maintained that China had begun introducing changes to the model and producing an aircraft of its own, based on Russian intellectual property and without paying anything in compensation. And now Russia is ready to return to the Chinese combat aircraft market. It is therefore fair to wonder: what will be done differently this time round in order to avoid similar problems?

The first thing that one should pay attention to is the number of aircrafts sold. If the supplier is seriously concerned that China will buy the minimum required number of aircraft and then will just end the agreement, then the talks should be about firm supplies of a maximum possible number of fighter jets.

The toughness of China's position in the talks on the number of Su-35s, which have been going on for a long time, is impressive. At first, there were rumours that the number would be as sought by the Russian side, 70-75 aircraft; whereas China wanted not more than 10-12. At the time, some experts said off the record that “there was no point in selling fewer than a hundred.”

A year ago, the figure under discussion was already 48, with the understanding that it was the lowest possible limit. Now it too has been halved. From the formal point of view, victory in this tug-of-war has gone to China.

New format or old mistakes?

It is not yet clear to what degree Russia will be able to protect its know-how in the deals that have been announced. In principle, the issue here is not such much about guarantees of “integrity” (it is clear that the sold aircraft will be studied in detail and, if possible and necessary, reproduced) as about a set compensation for such disrespectful behaviour. That is to say that the amount of the contract should include an assessment of risks associated with unsanctioned copying.

However, of far more interest is another aspect of the deal – what is in effect a joint Russian-Chinese project for developing a conventional submarine. Here Russia is starting to use a method that it has already successfully tested in cooperation with, for instance, India. Compared with purchasing ready models or agreeing licensed assembly, this is a new step in developing military-technical cooperation. The question is whether the possible benefits of the joint development of technologies for conventional submarines will make up for the risks associated with the supply of Russia's newest fighter jets to China. It is not a coincidence that both these deals were announced as a single package. This is probably how they should be viewed: as an integrated compromise.

A lot in the Russian defence industry's future foreign strategies will depend on whether this will develop into a new format of military-technical cooperation or a repetition of old mistakes.

Indrus.in

TKMS Above and beneath the seven oceans: Expertise. Technology. Innovation.

The naval surface vessels, submarines and maritime defence equipment designed and built under ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ flag are widely acknowledged for their superior technological excellence, reliability and longevity.

Today this naval systems house is a powerful, highly specialised global player exclusively acting in the naval shipbuilding field and possessing outstanding expertise in the prime contractor role. Business operations rely on the two German and Swedish subsidiaries ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and Kockums:

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems: is the new nameplate arising from the merger between the renowned Blohm + Voss Naval and HDW shipyards and stands for more than 300 years of combined cutting edge technology above and beneath the seven oceans, as well as for world leading naval assets ‘Made in Germany’. In order to stay abreast of the longstanding tradition and success, the new umbrella of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems preserves former company names as brands for the naval surface (Blohm + Voss Naval) and submarine (HDW) shipbuilding.

MEKO Class OPV. Picture: TKMS

Kockums: The Swedish counterpart of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has an impressive shipbuilding history dating back to the late 17th century. Nevertheless, Kockums does not only stand for tradition and experience, but excels with leading edge technologies in naval and submarine shipbuilding. The reference list of remarkable warships by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems includes the Blohm + Voss Class 123, 124 and 125 frigates for the German Navy, a sizeable fleet of Blohm + Voss MEKO® Class OPVs, corvettes and frigates, the Kockums VISBY stealth corvette as well as the highly dependable Kockums MCMV 36 and SAM 3 minesweepers.

Beneath the sea, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has mapped the way for navies operating non-nuclear submarines with the famous HDW Class 209, 212A and 214 ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems is the world’s only company capable of providing mission proven AIP technologies.

In their premises, engineering and shipbuilding specialists are passionate about the development and production of both non-nuclear submarines and naval surface vessels. But they are also the reliable partners – as proven in numerous cases – for the delivery of engineering services and material packages to building yards for the production, outfitting and testing in the client’s country.

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems: The integrated naval shipbuilding competence centre that meets expectations on the basis of high-end technology and proven designs with highest quality standards.

Navy Recognition

China’s attack on fishing boat is inhuman: law experts

Many Vietnamese law experts have condemned China’s recent pursuit and subsequent firing at a Vietnamese fishing boat in the waters off Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago. They consider the incident to be inhuman and boldly in violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty.

The captain of the fishing boat that was fired at by a Chinese naval ship, Pham Quang Thanh, is seen on board the fired boat

Commenting on the incident, which involved a fishing boat from the central province of Quang Ngai on March 20, lawyer Truong Xuan Tam, a member of the National Lawyers Council and deputy president of the Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province Bar Association, pointed out that China has not stopped at threatening to use force, but it has actually used force in violating Vietnam’s sovereignty.
“We need to consider taking proceedings against China to the International Court of Justice to claim compensation for Vietnamese fishermen for their damage and demand that China respect Vietnam’s sovereignty,” the lawyer said.

Tam condemned the incident as extremely dangerous and a bold, rough and defiant violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty.

Another lawyer, Hoang Ngoc Giao, head of the Research Institute for Policy, Law and Development, said: “No armed conflict has taken place between China and Vietnam, but China has used force towards Vietnamese civilians. As far as I know, no country has behaved as badly as China in this case.”
The former Vietnamese consul general to China’s Guangzhou Province, Duong Danh Hy, also condemned the aggressive action. “The attack on fishermen is a bold escalation by China in violating Vietnam’s sovereignty. Besides the objections made through diplomatic channels, we must pay more attention to protecting the lives of our fishermen.”

Nguyen Ngoc Duc, Chief of the Secretariat of the Vietnamese Fishery Association, said the organization has proposed that relevant Vietnamese agencies take measures to “prevent wrong actions by China, safeguard the life and property of Vietnamese fishermen, and protect Vietnam’s sovereignty over its seas and islands.”

As previously reported, the QNg 96382 TS fishing boat from Quang Ngai was conducting normal fishing activity in the traditional fishing ground around the Hoang Sa archipelago when it was chased and shot at by Chinese vessels on March 20. The assault caused a fire that burned the boat’s cabin.
In answering reporters’ queries regarding Vietnam’s response to the incident, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi said this was an extremely serious act that violated Vietnam’s sovereignty over the archipelago and threatened the lives of, and caused damage to, Vietnamese fishermen.

It also seriously violates the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), breaches the principles of international law and the agreement on the basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam and China, Nghi added.

Meanwhile, at a press conference on March 26, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that China had taken unspecified but "legitimate and reasonable" actions against Vietnamese boats working “illegally in Chinese waters”. He denied that any boats had been damaged.

In a statement released the same day, the Chinese Defense Ministry also refuted the incident and said that a Chinese navy vessel had fired two flares into the air after four Vietnamese fishing boats failing to respond to whistles, shouts and signal flags requesting that they stop fishing and leave the area, which China claims as its territorial waters.

Tuoitre News

US unveils spy massive Jellyfish Robot for underwater surveillance

This five-and-a-half-foot robot jellyfish could be the future of Navy underwater surveillance. Seriously. Maybe. Certainly, if a team of engineers from Virginia Tech gets its way.

Meet the Cyro, an autonomous robot with eight mechanical legs ringing its metal chassis, designed to mimic the unique, efficient underwater propulsion of a jellyfish. Covered in silicone to replicate the jellyfish’s wavy, bioluminescent mesoglea — the jelly, basically — the Cyro weighs a staggering 170 pounds, all thanks to a five-year grant from the Office of Naval Research.

The robot is still a prototype, years away from being in the water. But it represents a new kind of testbed for oceanographic surveillance, the Cyro’s basic application. Like the bird- and insect-shaped drones the Air Force is developing, a jellyfish-like spybot has a natural stealth advantage. “Mimicking a natural animal found in a region allows you to explore a lot better,” says Alex Villanueva, a graduate student at Virginia Tech working on the Cyro.


It’s a much different model for underwater propulsion than the Navy’s used to. Jellyfishes move, uniquely, by flapping themselves about. “It’s not necessarily the best hydrodynamics propulsion mechanism, but the jellyfish has a very efficient metabolism: energy going in comes out as hydrodynamic energy,” Villaneuva says. The Cyro isn’t there yet, but it gets three to four hours of swimming time out of its rechargeable nickel metal hydride battery.

And it’s also a launch-and-forget robot. There’s no remote controls on the Cyro. Place it into the water, and its roll-pitch-yaw sensor package, pressure sensors and software do the rest. That’s something for the Navy to think about as it considers designs for its forthcoming unmanned underwater vehicle fleet.

There’s no saying whether the Navy will purchase the ‘bot, and its inventors are comfortable emphasizing its civilian potential as an oceanographic research testbed. But should the Navy decide it needs a surveillance tool that looks like a massive jellyfish, there’s one on offer.

( Wire )

Zelenodolsk Shipyard To Build Two "Gepard" for Vietnam

Construction of two frigates project 11661E "Gepard-3.9" for the Vietnam People's Navy will be built by Zelenodolsk Shipyard Gorky in Tatarstan. On this, as reported by ITAR-TASS news agency, said the company's CEO Renat Mistahov. According to him, the laying of the first ship in June 2013. Both frigates will be transferred to the customer in 2016 and 2017.

Construction of frigates will be carried out under a contract signed in December 2011. Vietnam then bought two frigates. According to the Deputy Director for International Business Zelenodolsk plant Sergei Rudenko, the party patrol will be built with "ASW characteristics."

The first two ships of the "Gepard-3.9" Vietnam has purchased in 2006. They were handed over to the customer in 2011. The structure of the Vietnamese Navy patrol were named "Dinh Tien Hoang" and "Ly Thai To." Tonnage of ships of 2.100 tons. Patrol armed with cruise missiles, "Uran", 76.2-mm guns and 30-millimeter gun. In the air group of ships includes one helicopter Ka-28 and Ka-31.

Lenta

Vietnam's Su-30MK2V fighters drill air raids exercise

The Air Force Regiment 923 (371 Division, Air Defense - Air Force of Vietnam People's Army) conducts air raids exercise in Sao Vang military airport.

At the end of year 2012, Vietnam People's Air Force armed with 24 Su-30MK2V and 12 Su-27SK/UBK fighters. In a report of Kanwa Asian Defense based in Canada, that the Vietnamese government is planning to purchase 12 more Su-30MKV/MK2 fighters to augment another of its air force regiments.

Russian ships conduct firing practice in South China Sea

MOSCOW, March 28 (Xinhua) -- A group of six Russian navy warships conducted firing exercises in the South China Sea, the country's Pacific Fleet said Thursday.

"A big anti-submarine ship Admiral Panteleyev (in picture) has conducted artillery shooting exercises in the South China Sea. The sea targets were destroyed," Pacific Fleet spokesman Roman Martov told local media.

Ka-27 carrier-born helicopters made several sorties in a simulated enemy submarine search. The crews also tested their ships' survival capabilities, Martov said.

The Russian ships, including one big anti-submarine ship, three landing ships, a tanker and a rescue vessel, are on their way to the Gulf of Aden where they will protect navigation against piracy.

This is the ninth mission by the Pacific Fleet to Somali shores.

US Navy And Its New Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

courtesy General Dynamics

US Navy believes that to face the non-conventional and asymetric threats posed by smaller nation or proxies of other nation , it will ned fast ships which are highly maneuverable even near the coast where the heavier ship cannot go. These ships will exploit the advances in network,robotics and modular design.

This is supposed to become the back-bone of naval strategy of USA in future. To some extent this has come about after watching the success of "Flex" ships of Denmark. The US Navy’s $30+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

The LCS program was announced on November 1, 2001. The LCS is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant that is to be equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages, including unmanned vehicles (UVs). Rather than being a multimission ship like the Navy’s larger surface combatants, the LCS is to be a focused-mission ship, meaning a ship equipped to perform one primary mission at any given time. The ship’s mission orientation can be changed by changing out its mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame.

"1 On November 1, 2001, the Navy announced that it was launching a Future Surface Combatant Program aimed at acquiring a family of next-generation surface combatants. This new family of surface combatants, the Navy stated, would include three new classes of ships: a destroyer called the DD(X)—later redesignated the DDG-1000—for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire mission; a cruiser called the CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission, and a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft, and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas. For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. "

The LCS’s primary intended missions are antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures(MCM), and surface warfare (SUW) against small boats (including so-called “swarm boats”),particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. The LCS program includes the development and procurement of ASW, MCM, and SUW mission packages for LCS sea frames. The LCS’s permanently built-in gun gives it some ability to perform the SUW mission even without an SUW module.

Additional missions for the LCS include peacetime engagement and partnership-building operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, maritime intercept operations, operations to support special operations forces, and homeland defense operations. An LCS might perform these missions at any time, regardless of its installed mission module, although an installed mission module might enhance an LCS’s ability to perform some of these missions.

The LCS displaces about 3,000 tons, making it about the size of a corvette (i.e., a light frigate) or a Coast Guard cutter. It has a maximum speed of more than 40 knots, compared to something more than 30 knots for the Navy cruisers and destroyers. The LCS has a shallower draft than Navy cruisers and destroyers, permitting it to operate in certain coastal waters and visit certain ports that are not accessible to Navy cruisers and destroyers. The LCS employs automation to achieve a reduced “core” crew of 40 sailors. Up to 35 or so additional sailors are to operate the ship’s embarked aircraft and mission packages, making for a total crew of about 75, compared to more than 200 for the Navy’s frigates and about 300 (or more) for the US Navy’s current cruisers and destroyers.

Planned Procurement Quantities

US Navy plans to field a force of 55 LCS sea frames and 64 LCS mission packages (16 ASW, 24 MCM, and 24 SUW). The Navy’s planned force of 55 LCSs would account for about one-sixth of the Navy’s planned fleet of more than 300 ships of all types.

US Navy plans call for procuring 19 LCSs in the five-year period FY2012-FY2016, in annual quantities of 4-4-4-4-3. These 19 ships account for more than one-third of the 55 battle force ships in the Navy’s FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan. The Navy’s FY2011-FY2040 30-year shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in February 2010 in conjunction with the FY2011 budget, shows three LCSs per year for FY2016-FY2019, two per year for FY2020-FY2024, a 1-2-1-2 pattern for FY2025-FY2033, and two per year for FY2034-FY2040. LCSs scheduled for procurement in the final years of the 30-year plan would be replacements for LCSs that will have reached the end of their 25-year expected service lives by that time.



Two LCS Designs

On May 27, 2004, the Navy awarded contracts to two industry teams—one led by Lockheed Martin, the other by General Dynamics (GD)—to design two versions of the LCS, with options for each team to build up to two LCSs each. The LCS designs developed by the two teams are quite different—the Lockheed team’s design is based on a steel semi-planing monohull, while GD team’s design is based on an aluminum trimaran hull (see Figure 1). The two ships also use different built-in combat systems (i.e., different collections of built-in sensors, computers, software, and tactical displays) that were designed by each industry team. The Navy states that both LCS designs meet the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) for the LCS program.



Estimated Procurement Costs for 55 LCS Sea Frames

The Navy’s FY2012 budget submission estimates the average unit procurement cost of the LCSs to be procured at a rate of four ships per year in FY2012-FY2015 at about $468 million in then- year dollars, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs, and the average unit procurement cost of the three LCSs to be procured in FY2016 at about $512 million in then-year dollars, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs. The Navy’s FY2012 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the final 53 LCSs at about $28 billion in then-year dollars, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs. Adding the procurement costs of the first two LCSs would result in an estimated total procurement cost for all 55 LCS sea frames of about $29.9 billion in then-year dollars, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.



Manning and Deployment Concept

The Navy plans to maintain three LCS crews for each two LCSs, and to keep one of those two LCSs continuously underway—a plan Navy officials sometimes refer to as “3-2-1.” Under the 3-2-1 plan, LCSs are to be deployed for 16 months at a time, and crews are to rotate on and off deployed ships at four-month intervals.8 The 3-2-1 plan will permit the Navy to maintain a greater percentage of the LCS force in deployed status at any given time than would be possible under the traditional approach of maintaining one crew for each LCS and deploying LCSs for six or seven months at a time.

SUW Module: 

Griffin Selected as Recommended Replacement for N-LOS. The Navy had planned to use an Army missile program known as the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) as part of the LCS surface warfare (SUW) mission package. The Navy planned for LCSs equipped with SUW mission packages to be nominally armed with three NLOS missile launchers, each with 15 missiles, for a total of 45 missiles per ship. The missiles could be used to counter swarm boats or other surface threats.

In May 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved an Army recommendation to cancel

NLOS-LS Following the cancellation of NLOS-LS, the Navy assessed potential alternative systems for fulfilling the NLOS role in the SUW mission package. On January 11, 2011, the Navy announced that it had selected the Griffin missile as its recommended replacement for NLOS-LS.


The Navy stated that Griffin will be about half as expensive as NLOS-LS, and that it could be
delivered about as soon as NLOS. The Navy stated that an initial version of the Griffin would be
ready by 2014 or 2015, and that a follow-on, longer-ranged version would be ready by 2016 or
2017 One press report quoted an official from Raytheon, the maker of the Griffin, as stating
that the Griffin’s current range is less than 5 kilometers (i.e., less than about 2.7 nautical miles) Another press report stated: “The Griffin’s range has not been officially disclosed.

Anti Submarine Warfare Module: 

Shift to Systems With “In Stride” Capability. The Navy in January 2011 provided information on changes it has decided to make to the systems making up the ASW module. A January 14, 2011, press report stated that the Navy

discovered that while its [originally planned] LCS ASW module was able to do the mission,

the equipment package proved unsatisfactory because the ship would actually have to stop in

the water to deploy the equipment. “The ship could not do it in stride,” says Capt. John

Ailes, Navy mission module program office manager….

As for its ASW defense, the Navy plans to deploy a module that will include three parts: a

variable-depth sonar; a multi-functional towed array; and a lightweight towed array, Ailes

says. The Navy will be testing the ASW module package throughout this and the coming

year, he says, with an eye toward initial operational capability in 2017

Mine Counter Measures Module: 

Possible Replacement of RAMICS by Modified ALMDS

A January 13, 2011, press report stated:

The Navy is looking to terminate an underperforming anti-mine system from the LCS mission package being designed for that mission.

Service acquisition officials have become increasingly frustrated with the testing results of

the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMCS), Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe, head of

the Navy’s surface warfare directorate, said this week.

While testing is still underway on the Northrop Grumman [NOC] system, which is to locate

and destroy mines in shallow waters, the results have fallen short of service expectations, he said during a Jan. 11 speech at the Surface Navy Association’s annual conference in

Arlington, Va.

To remedy the situation, Pandolfe said program officials are looking to modify the Airborne

Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) to carry out the RAMCS mission.

Also manufactured by Northrop Grumman, the ALMDS uses directed energy system mounted on board a MH-60R helicopter to detect mines at the same shallow depth the RAMCS was designed to destroy.

If the modification is successful, Navy decisionmakers plan to axe the RAMCS platform and use the ALMDS variant, Pandolfe said. The surface warfare chief did not go into specifics regarding what kind of development work would be necessary to make such a transition, but he did note the move would also trim costs on the growing costs on the LCS anti-mine package.

However, Pandolfe reiterated that if the Navy opts to go with the ALMDS approach, the mission package itself would be delivered on time. “They will be where they need to be when they need to be there,” he said

2011 Funding Request

The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget requested $1,231.0 million in procurement funding for the

two LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, and $278 million in FY2011 advance

procurement funding for 11 LCSs that the Navy wanted, under the FY2011 budget submission, to

procure in FY2012-FY2014. (The Navy now wants, under the dual-award strategy, to procure 12

LCSs in FY2012-FY2014.) The Navy’s proposed FY2011 budget also requested $9.8 million in

procurement funding to procure LCS module weapons, $83.0 million in procurement funding for

procurement of LCS mission packages, and $226 million in research and development funding

for the LCS program.

2012 Funding Request

Under Navy budget plans, the four LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012 are to receive $79 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding. Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $1,802 million in FY2012 procurement funding to complete the four ships’ combined estimated procurement cost of $1,881 million. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget also requests $79 million procurement funding for procurement of LCS mission packages, and $286.8 million in research and development funding for the LCS program.

Announced Changes in Mission Module Equipment

Potential risks being looked into by American Congress are

1. How will the announced changes in the equipment making up the SUW and ASW modules affect the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates of these modules?
2. How would the replacement of the NLOS-LS missile by the Griffin missile in the SUW module affect the SUW capability of the LCS, particularly in light of the range of the Griffin missile compared to that of the NLOS-LS missile?
3. When does the Navy anticipate announcing its decision on whether to keep the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) in the MCM module or replace it with a modified version of the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)? If RAMICS were replaced by a modified version of ALMDS, how would that affect the IOC date of the MCM module and the MCM capability of the LCS?

Combat Survivability

Another potential risk which is being shown up is the poor combat survivability of these light ships.A December 2010 report from DOD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation stated:

[On LCS-1,] Critical ship control systems essential to support the crew have performed well

in testing; however, several systems required for self-defense and mission package support

have demonstrated early reliability problems….

LCS is not expected to be survivable in terms of maintaining a mission capability in a hostile

combat environment. This assessment is based primarily on a review of the LCS design requirements. The Navy designated LCS a Survivability Level 1 ship; the design of the ship just allows for crew evacuation. Consequently, its design is not required to include survivability features necessary to conduct sustained operations in a combat environment.

The results of early live fire testing using modeling and simulation, while not conclusive,

have raised concerns about the effects weapons will have on the crew and critical equipment.

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program Additional live fire testing and analysis is needed to fully assess the survivability of the LCS class of ships. Additional information is available in the classified LCS 1 Early Fielding Report

Hull Cracking on LCS-1

Another potential grave risk which was discovered and is under investigation is the problem of Hull Cracking. A March 18, 2011, press report states that LCS-1 developed a crack as long as six inches through its hull during sea trials, prompting a U.S. Navy investigation of the design.

The Navy is analyzing the crack to determine if changes are required for future Lockheed Martin hulls, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Christopher Johnson said yesterday in an e-mail. This includes reviewing “the design, construction drawings and welding procedures,” he said.

During a heavy-weather ocean trial on the USS Freedom in mid-February, he said, sailors discovered a six-inch horizontal hull crack below the waterline that leaked five gallons an hour. Inside the hull the crack measured three inches. It originated in a weld seam between two steel plates.

The ship returned to its home port in San Diego, avoiding rough seas, after the commanding officer judged the leak rate “manageable,” Johnson said.

Smaller cracks that indicated welding “defects” showed up in the welds of the vessel’s aluminum structure during sea trials last year, Johnson said in his e-mail.

Operation and Support (O&S) Cost

Another potential problem for the LCS program concerns the ship’s operation and support (O&S) cost. At the request of Senator Jeff Sessions, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzed the impact of O&S cost and other types of costs on the total life-cycle costs of the LCS and (for purposes of comparison) four other types of Navy ships. The results of CBO’s analysis were released in the form of an April 28, 2010, letter to Senator Sessions. CBO estimates in the letter that LCS-1 (the Lockheed Martin LCS design) would have an O&S cost, in constant FY2010 dollars, of $41 million to $47 million per year, depending on how often the ship travels at higher speeds and consequently how much fuel the ship uses each year.

A February 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated:

The Navy estimated operating and support costs for LCS seaframes and mission packages in 2009, but the estimates do not fully reflect DOD and GAO best practices for cost estimating and may change due to program uncertainties. GAO’s analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates showed that the operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate such as (1) analyzing the likelihood that the costs could be greater than estimated, (2) fully assessing how the estimate may change as key assumptions change, and (3) requesting an independent estimate and comparing it with the program estimate. The estimates may also be affected by program uncertainties, such as potential changes to force structure that could alter the number of ships and mission packages required. The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system’s costs, and the lack of an estimate that fully reflects best practices could limit decision makers’ ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long term to support the planned investment in LCS force structure. With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives.

Operational Concepts

People are not really convinced about the operational concept of LCS

The February 2010 GAO report cited above also stated:

The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size. Specifically, the Navy faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel given the time needed to achieve the extensive training required. GAO’s analysis of a sample of LCS positions showed an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy’s maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts and has established groups to address how to implement them. However, these groups have not performed a risk assessment as described in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. The Strategy describes the need to assess and mitigate risks to executing future missions and managing personnel, training, and maintenance. If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building

almost half the class. Having a thorough risk assessment of the new operational concepts would provide decision makers with information to link the effectiveness of these new concepts with decisions on program investment, including the pace of procurement 

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