Lessons from the Battle of the Paracel Islands

Forty years on, the battle has enduring lessons for Vietnam’s naval modernization.

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By Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin
January 23, 2014

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On January 16, 1974, the Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVN) discovered the presence of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Crescent Group in the western Paracel Islands, which was held by South Vietnam. This was an unexpected development, because notwithstanding the reduced U.S. military assistance to Saigon after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, and subsequent reduction of South Vietnamese garrisons on the islands, the Chinese had not taken unilateral actions to subvert the status quo – by which the Amphitrite Group in the eastern Paracels and the Crescent Group were respectively under Chinese and South Vietnamese control.

Over the next two days, the opposing naval forces jostled with one another in close-proximity maneuvers off the islands, before a firefight erupted as the South Vietnamese troops attempted to recapture Duncan Island. The skirmish subsequently escalated with overwhelming Chinese reinforcements deployed to the clash zone, including close air support staged from nearby Hainan Island and missile-armed Hainan-class patrol vessels. Shorn of American naval support, given that the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet was then scaling down its presence in the South China Sea following the peace accords of 1973, the RVN was utterly defeated. Beijing swiftly exploited the naval victory with an amphibious landing in force to complete its control of all the Paracel Islands.

The Battle of the Paracel Islands has since gone down history as the first Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the quest for control over the South China Sea isles. The Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the nearby Spratly Islands in 1988 was the second and final such instance. Since then, tensions have eased. There have been continued exchanges at the ruling party level and between the countries’ militaries (including the hosting of a PLA Navy South Sea Fleet delegation to a Vietnamese naval base). Beijing and Hanoi have also recently inaugurated mutual consultations on joint marine resource development in the South China Sea.

However, the Battle of Paracel Islands in 1974 yields some useful and enduring lessons for Hanoi and its ongoing naval modernization in the South China Sea, particularly in the face of geopolitical developments.

Enduring Lesson #1: Diplomacy is the First Recourse… But Not the Sole Recourse

No international and regional treaties constitute perfect safeguards against unilateral action, including threat or use of force. The landmark Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea inked in 2002 between China and the Southeast Asian claimants has not been entirely successful. In fact, unilateral actions aimed at subverting the status quo in the South China Sea by threat or use of force has continued to dominate. Recent video footage revealed by China’s CCTV in January 2014 showed a standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement ships off the Paracel Islands back in 2007. More recent, recurring incidents included the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships by Chinese vessels, the Sino-Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and, later, the show of force by Chinese surveillance ships and naval frigates off the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal. These episodes bear an eerie resemblance to the sort of naval jostling that led to the skirmish back in 1974.

Even as the South China Sea claimants engaged in consultations on a Code of Conduct, upon unilaterally declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in December 2013, Beijing declared indisputable rights to create ADIZs in other areas if it so desired. An ADIZ over the South China Sea, if ever established, would undoubtedly strengthen Beijing’s hand over the disputed waters, augmenting regular unilateral fishing bans, an earlier expanded maritime law enforcement authority for the Hainan authorities as well as the latest Chinese fisheries law requiring foreign fishing vessels to seek permission from Beijing to operate in much of the South China Sea. These developments, if they continue unabated, will only heighten the risk of accidental or premeditated clashes in the disputed waters.

Enduring Lesson #2: Extra-regional Powers Neither Always Stay… Nor Always Help

There has been growing interest among extra-regional powers in the South China Sea. Besides the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalancing, Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has intensified its Southeast Asian diplomatic offensive, one of the objectives being to promote Tokyo’s territorial stance in the East China Sea. Vietnam has become one of the major beneficiaries of this development. During the 4th U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue held in Washington in late October 2013, an agreement was reached to enhance maritime security cooperation. In the same month, Tokyo was reportedly keen to supply patrol vessels as part of a plan to bolster Vietnam’s maritime security capacity-building efforts. Also notable, Hanoi is enjoying budding defense ties with New Delhi, having hosted regular Indian Navy port visits in the past decade.

Still, none of the extra-regional powers has taken any side on the South China Sea disputes, preferring to focus only on freedom of navigation. This means that even though Washington or Tokyo have legitimate reasons to intervene if vital sea lines of communications through the South China Sea are threatened by the specter of armed conflict, any extra-regional help is far from certain. For instance, even if the U.S. Pacific Command is able to detect tell-tale signs of unusual Chinese military movements in the South China Sea, it may not be able to react in time. The U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, as part of the rebalancing strategy, has intensified maritime surveillance in the area: the new Littoral Combat Ship U.S.S. Freedom is said to be conducting more than mere training missions in the area while the U.S. Navy was reported to have stepped up maritime aerial surveillance since July 2012.

However, during the skirmish in 1974 Saigon sought assistance from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, but it was under orders not to intervene in the disputes and no help arrived for the RVN off the Paracels. Washington is likely to adopt the same stance today, even if a renewed Sino-Vietnamese naval clash were to erupt, especially in localized contexts that do not necessarily impinge upon freedom of navigation by other users. Moreover, the present and future PLA Navy South Sea Fleet is no longer the same run-down, coastal-oriented force operating Soviet-era small patrol and attack forces it used to be. With its steady accumulation of force projection capabilities, including amphibious assault, the PLA Navy is in a better position than back in 1974 to deploy sizeable forces over sustained durations at greater distances to assert sovereignty, and its overall combat power will be far more potent if ever unleashed in the South China Sea.

Enduring Lesson #3: The Need for At Least Limited Sea Control Capabilities

There is no way for Vietnam to quantitatively match the PLA naval capabilities in the South China Sea. Consistent with Hanoi’s policy pronunciations, an arms race with China is not only impossible in the first place, but is considered potentially detrimental to Vietnam’s ongoing Renovation process. Vietnam’s post-Cold War naval modernization has been predicated on filling capacity shortfalls after previous decades of neglect. In recent years, the Vietnam People’s Navy had made notable strides in acquiring new hardware to replace the ageing Soviet-era equipment. However, the new, mostly Russian-supplied capabilities, such as Gepard-3.9 light frigates, Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2V Flanker multi-role fighters equipped for maritime strike and Yakhont/Bastion coastal defense missile batteries, Dutch-built SIGMA-class corvettes as well as locally-built coastal patrol and attack craft all point to a force modernization pathway based primarily on denying an adversary access to the disputed zone. They do not suggest an ability to secure Vietnam’s own access.

Yet, the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 highlighted the need to not just deny an adversary from blockading the South China Sea features but also to secure Vietnam’s own access to those exposed and vulnerable garrisons. Only a shift from sea denial to sea control can hope to attain that. Given the durable peace along the land borders with her neighbors, Vietnam should logically emphasize air-sea warfighting capabilities. For status quo-oriented Vietnam, much akin to what Saigon was back in 1974, the foreseeable combat scenario in a renewed South China Sea clash will encompass the need for Vietnamese forces to recapture seized features, or at least reinforce existing garrisons in the face of hostile attack. Under this scenario, Vietnam’s defense predicament is perhaps no different from Japan’s with respect to the East China Sea dispute. Tokyo has outlined in its recent new defense strategy the need for robust, integrated mobile defense, which envisaged the need for the Self-Defense Force to recapture the East China Sea isles in times of hostilities. Certainly Vietnam cannot hope to muster the same range of capabilities as Japan could, given economic constraints. To build at least limited sea control capabilities, Hanoi ought to focus on improving early warning and expanding amphibious sealift capacity.

Existing Vietnamese early warning capabilities are vested in a static electronic surveillance network arrayed along the Vietnamese mainland coast and in occupied South China Sea features, augmented only in recent years by maritime patrol aircraft of the Vietnamese navy and coastguard. These planes are mainly designed for surface surveillance, yet are handicapped in endurance and lack adequate anti-submarine warfare capabilities especially in view of the increasing PLA submarine challenge. A high-endurance maritime patrol aircraft fitted with longer-range sensors will be appropriate, and arguably more survivable than static installations. The Vietnam Naval Infantry, which specializes in amphibious assault and has been streamlined over the decades, has become a leaner yet meaner force with the acquisition of better equipment. Still, it remains short on amphibious sealift capacity, given that the Soviet and ex-U.S. vintage landing ships were too old and mostly no longer operational. Hanoi’s fledgling naval shipbuilders have so far produced a small handful of new assault transports ostensibly to fill this gap. However, more such vessels are required to enable the Vietnam Naval Infantry to project more substantial forces with greater rapidity in order to reinforce the South China Sea garrisons or to recapture them from an adversary.

Final Thoughts

The Battle of the Paracel Islands might have happened a long forty years ago. Still, even though the South China Sea has seen relative peace, it pays for Hanoi to remain vigilant by sustaining the pace of its naval modernization attempts. While diplomacy is the preferred recourse and extra-regional powers have become more heavily involved in the region, adequate military power in the form of defense self-help remains necessary, especially when the area continues to be fraught with uncertainty. Compared to the RVN, for now and in the foreseeable future the Vietnam People’s Navy and Air Force faces a challenge far greater than before in preserving the status quo in the South China Sea.

Ngo Minh Tri is Managing Editor of the Thanh Nien newspaper, based in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University based in Singapore. This article reflects the personal viewpoints of the authors and not representative of their respective organizations.

The Diplomat

Indo- Japan strategic axis formed for encircling China ?

(Vndata- Dec 21, 2013) The first Japan - India joint naval exercise, is ongoing in the Indian Ocean, showing signs of forming a new strategic military alliance in Asia.

The four-day long exercise in the Bay of Bengal will include anti-piracy operations, gun firing, cross-deck helicopter operations and anti-submarine warfare. The war-game seeks to enhance inter-operability, enabling the two navies to undertake maritime security operations in future.

The Indian Navy will be represented by the indigenous built stealth frigate “INS Satpura”, guided missile destroyer the “INS Ranvijay” and missile corvette “INS Kuthar”. From the Japan side, two guided missile destroyers, “JS Ariake” and “JS Setogiri” will participate.

The mock war drill has harbour and sea phases of two days each. The sea phase includes Visit, Board, Search and Seizure drills frequently undertaken during anti-piracy operations and operations in anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air threat scenarios.

Although Indian media said that the aim of this exercise is to form a new strategic axis, but in fact, this is not only once the two countries to held joint exercise. During Defence Minister A K Antony’s visit to Tokyo in 2011, India and Japan agreed on holding regular bilateral naval exercises. The maiden exercise was conducted off Japan in January 2012, which is being followed by this exercise off Chennai. And earlier in 2007, the Japanese Self-Defense Force have been involved in international maritime exercise "Marabel-07" hosted by India .

INS Satpura

In addition to conducting exercises at sea, in recent years military cooperation between the two countries is increasing.

According to the newspaper "News of Russia" (Известия), the Indian Army is proposing to buy Japanese- made high- range meteorological radar, fire control systems and photovoltaic systems on ships. Indian Army said that Japan will likely agree to sell their military equipment. If acquisitions are successful, India will install these systems in Ladakh region of Indian- controlled Kashmir.

It is the high and long range realm radar, India will use this system to not only for spying China, Pakistan and Afghanistan near the Himalayan region. This radar system is not only used for scientific research, but also for enhancing the ability to observe missiles of the nations around India, especially China and Pakistan.

Also, according to the "The Times of India", once said, military cooperation relation of the two countries (India and Japan) is continuously developing, in future, all seaports of India will open for Japan's ships, by that the shared strategic geopolitical and military resources between the two countries will be performed, opening up a new strategic axis for encircling China - the increasingly combative nation in the territorial disputes.

Philippines plans further upgrades to ex-US Coast Guard cutters

The BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PF 16), the newest vessel of the Philippine navy, leaves the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Charleston, S.C., following simple ceremonies attended by members of the Filipino community on June 10, 2013. Philippine Embassy photo by Elmer G. Cato

The Philippine Navy (PN) is planning further upgrades for its two ex-US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters, PN spokesman Lieutenant Commander Gregory Fabic told IHS Jane's on 17 December.

Contracts to modernise the two vessels, which are described by the PN as patrol frigates, are expected to be tendered next year and will feature upgrades for navigation, propulsion, communication, surveillance, and weapons systems.

IHS Jane's understands that the PN is also seeking to equip the vessels with an anti-submarine warfare capability and surface-to-surface missiles, although funding restrictions are likely to determine the full extent of the modernisation programme.

Lt Cdr Fabic said the planned upgrade will enhance the PN's capability to protect and secure its assets in and around the country's exclusive economic zone, in which tension has remained high in recent years due to territorial disputes between the Philippines and China.

Jane's

Face-offs between Indian, Chinese troops can occur: Antony

NEW DELHI: Not ruling out the possibility of incidents such as face-offs between their troops, defence minister AK Antony said on Monday India and China have now decided to resolve such issues amicably through the existing mechanisms.

On the incident where five Indian nationals were apprehended by Chinese troops inside Indian territory, he said the Indians apprehended by PLA troops were civilians and not Army personnel and the matter was resolved amicably.

"Now our decision is to maintain peace and tranquility. Whenever any incident takes place, that possibility cannot be ruled out as the boundary is very long ... both sides should come together and resolve it amicably," the defence minister said.

He was asked to comment on the situation along the Line of Actual Control in the sidelines of the Vijay Diwas to mark Indian victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan.

On the boundary talks with China, the minister said the country should not "expect miracles" in these parleys.

"Don't expect miracles in resolving the issue. What we are trying is that till a satisfactory solution on boundary issue is found, whenever incidents take place on border, through discussions and official mechanism, resolve those issues. Of late, we have been able to resolve the issues without much delays. That is an improvement," he said.

On the impact of the newly-signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, he said, "After the agreement, by and large, whenever any issue arises, we are able to resolve it as quickly as possible. It does not mean that there would not be any issues as long as the India-China border issue is unsettled, there can always be a possibility..."

He said during his and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China, both the countries had decided to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC.

"We have been able to take a decision, till we find a peaceful solution to the boundary issue, " he said.

Video: India commemorates 42nd anniversary of its 1971 war victory



Times Of India

Japan plans to raise military spending to 240 bln US dollars

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe says he wants to raise his military spending budget by around 6 percent over the next five years, that’s according to Kyodo news agency.

Abe’s government is requesting a defense budget of more than 240 billion US dollars. The Japanese government says it’s in response to a number of growing security concerns, including nuclear development in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

However, the Finance Ministry has previously asked the Defense Ministry to CUT its budget. The budget request will be discussed at a cabinet meeting on December the 17th. Local media reports say the government wants to make air defense a priority, and is planning to buy a guided-missile cruiser.
If the budget is approved, it will be Japan’s first increase in defense spending in over a decade.

CNTV

Meet The Tiny Rock That Could Start World War III

Sunday morning, South Korea announced that it was extending its air defense zone to include a tiny reef off its coast. Now China, Japan, and South Korea’s flight zones overlap for the first time, upping military tensions in a region already rife with them.

Socotra Rock, known as Ieodo in Korea and Suyan Rock in China, is a submerged reef that houses a Korean research station. Both Korea and China claim it as part of their “exclusive economic zones,” (EEZ) a legal term for the maritime region in which the country has special development rights.

South Korea’s expansion of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) to include Socotra is a direct response to China doing the same. An ADIZ denotes the area in which another country can’t fly its planes safely without identifying themselves, and, in late November, China expanded its zone to include Socotra. At the time, China’s play for Socotra was overshadowed by its move for the Senkaku-Diayou island chain, which Japan also claims. But South Korea’s counter has brought the simmering Socotra dispute to the fore.

After China’s move, South Korea military officials asked China to peacefully remove Socotra from its ADIZ, perhaps in exchange for taking China’s side in its dispute with Japan. But China refused, prompting Sunday’s escalation.

Many Koreans believe Socotra is critically important to their nation’s security. “Ieodo itself has a huge significance,” Koh Choong-suk president of the Ieodo Research Society, said. “Waters near it are part of key shipping routes through which some 90 percent of Korea’s inbound and outbound shipments pass.” Korean control over Socotra also limits China’s maneuvering room in the East China Sea, where the islands it disputes with Japan lie, and the reef is believed to house natural gas and mineral deposits.

The real danger in the overlapping Korean-Chinese ADIZ is accidental war. When another country’s aircraft, civilian or military, fly into a foreign ADIZ, they have to identify themselves or risk being fired on. Japanese planes that fly in the Senkaku-Diayou chain refuse to identify themselves beforehand to Beijing in protest of China’s claim, upping the chance that China might blow them out of the sky. If Korean or Chinese aircraft do the same in Socotra, it’ll increase the risk of a deadly accident. That could very well escalate to war between the Asian powers, a war that could pull in the United States.

“The issue of the air defense identification zone is making the already difficult regional situations even more difficult to deal with,” South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se said after China’s initial ADIZ announcement. “Things can take a dramatic turn for the worse if territorial conflicts and historical issues are merged with nationalism.”

Of course, a war between China and South Korea (perhaps aided by the United States and Japan) would be a catastrophe for all parties. Socotra is important, but not nearly important enough to pay the cost in blood and treasure necessary to wrest it from another party through force — to say nothing of the nuclear risk posed by conflict between an American ally and China.

Under these conditions, accidental war is unlikely. “Historians have demonstrated that most wars initially deemed ‘accidental,” University of Kentucky political scientist Robert Farley writes, “have in actuality resulted from deliberative state policy, even if the circumstances of the war were unplanned.” Accidental wars do happen, but they tend to occur in cases where there is poor communication between the warring nations and a lot to gain from decisive, rapid military action — conditions that do not hold in the Socotra dispute.

Regardless, the conflict over Socotra is yet another complication in the fraught, ever-shifting relations between South Korea, Japan, and China. According to John Delury, an assistant professor at Yonsei University whose research focuses on East Asian politics, relations between China and South Korea haven’t been this close in over 100 years. “The kerfuffle over the overlap between China’s new ADIZ and Korea’s old ADIZ should not distract too much attention from the deeper strategic shift taking shape,” he wrote three days before the Korean announcement. Delury sees as-of-yet improving relations between South Korea and China as part of a broader Chinese strategy to peacefully weaken the American-made alliance system that has set the terms of East Asian politics since the 50s.

South Korean research station in Ieodo

South Korea’s initial attempt to deescalate the ADIZ situation through diplomacy fits Delury’s thesis, but China’s refusal to play ball doesn’t. “Now, the [Korean] government has no choice but to stand with the United States, Australia, and Japan in staunch opposition to the ADIZ,” Victor Cha, an expert on the Koreas at Georgetown and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, concludes. “Perhaps this was not Seoul’s first choice, but it is the smarter long-term strategic play. Cutting an individual ‘deal’ with China only further isolates the ROK from its allies and sets it up to be dominated by China.”

It’d also be a mistake to think of Korean-Chinese-Japanese relations as being governed solely by the dictates of power politics. There are economic reasons to think they’d avoid conflict; war is bad for business, after all. And don’t discount the power of historical grievances and ideology to shift a nation’s thinking. South Korea and Japan have been at loggerheads recently over another territorial dispute and the legacy of Japan’s colonial conquest of Korea in the early 20th century, tensions China has been cannily exploiting.

Socotra may be an opportunity for the two American allies to make up, but the only durable solution to the long-simmering tensions in the region is some kind of compromise between the three countries and the United States. Sheila Smith, a Japan expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that a formal “code of conduct,” a model pioneered elsewhere in Asia, could calm things down. Until something like that happens, though, expect continued rockiness over Socotra Rock.

Taiwan thinking of building its own submarines

Taiwan is evaluating the feasibility of building submarines on its own with technical assistance from the United States, according to a local newspaper.

The U.S. government approved the sale of eight diesel-powered submarines to Taiwan in 2001, but no progress has been made on the project since then.

Frustrated by the country's inability to procure submarines, Taiwan's military has gradually changed its attitude from "waiting for U.S. approval" to considering building submarines on its own with U.S. technological support, the United Daily News (UDN) said in a special report Monday.

The shift became even more evident after Yen Ming became defense minister and Adm. Chen Yung-kang took over the helm of the Navy Command Headquarters, according to the paper.

The following are excerpts from the UDN special report on the submarine-related issues:

Both the military and local shipbuilding community are assessing the feasibility of building conventional diesel-powered submarines at home instead of procuring them from the U.S.

A shipbuilding industry association is scheduled to come up with a comprehensive assessment report by June 2014.

Sources familiar with the Navy's submarine procurement project cited several reasons why the potential deal with the United States has remained stalemated.

First, the U.S. asked Taiwan to pay a contract design fee of more than NT$10 billion (US$338.36 million) even before the type of submarine to be sold to Taiwan was determined.

Partisan wrangling over the issue at the time prompted Taiwan's Legislature to balk at making the upfront payment.

A more critical obstacle to progress lies in the U.S. Navy's reluctance to build diesel-electric submarines at a U.S. shipyard because it fears that Congress would ask it to buy the conventional submarines to save money if an American shipyard had the capability to build such a ship.

Acting on the instructions of Defense Minister Yen, the Navy sponsored a closed-door seminar at the Armed Forces Club in Taipei in late November to discuss the feasibility of building submarines in Taiwan.

Adm. Chen chaired the meeting, which was attended by representatives from government agencies as well as academia and the private sector.

All participants reportedly agreed to list "building submarines locally" as an option.

Military and shipbuilding industry executives admitted that Taiwan still cannot build torpedoes, sonar, propulsion systems, combat systems and submarine periscope lenses.

Taiwan also needs to upgrade its blueprint design technology, they said.

Against this backdrop, they said Taiwan should seek U.S. technology transfer in those fields if it wants to build submarines at home.

A model used in Taiwan's building of Ching-kuo indigenous defense fighters (IDFs) in the past could be applied to the submarine building project, they said. U.S.-based General Dynamics had helped with IDF design. (Dec. 9, 2013).

focustaiwan.tw

Hà Nội Submarine, The First Kilo class Project 636 Varshavyanka of Vietnam

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to visit and inspect Hanoi Kilo 636 submarine of Vietnam. Photo: VNA

Hanoi submarine, the first improved Kilo class submarine in a series of six vessels of Project 636 Varshavyanka (NATO named Kilo) that Russia built on order of Vietnam, has been transferred to the Vietnam Navy coming to Cam Ranh port scheduled in January 2014.

The contract that Russia provides for Vietnam six Kilo submarines signed in 2009 including crew training as well as providing equipment, supplies and techniques. The training crew for Vietnam began in late July of 2013 in Saint Petersburg.

Combat capability of the Project 636 submarine was significantly increased by the use of anti-ship missiles 3M-54E1 Club-S that is supported by advanced electronic systems. With the effective range reaches 290 km and carrying 450 kg warheads, Project 636 allows fast attack, remote. To increase survival, it not need to dig into the detection and attack range of enemy ships or to overcome the region where has been the trap by enemy mines or torpedoes. In addition, the ship also has a mechanism for anti-aircraft missile launcher of 8 missiles Strela-3 ( SA-N-8 Gremlin, a maximum range of 6 km ) or 8 Igla missiles ( SA-N-10 Gimlet, shot range up to 5 km ).

The original design of the Kilo 636 submarines without arming missiles to destroy targets on land (sea-to-surface/ sea-to-ground missile). But Vietnam's Russian- built Kilo 636MV submarines are equipped with 3M-14E missiles for ground attack.

The 3M-14E missile, a range of 290 km, warhead weighed 400 kg

The Vietnam's Russian built Kilo class submarines are signed to export for 7 countries including China, India, Iran, Poland, Romania, Algeria and Vietnam. Vietnam's Kilo submarines will be installed cruise missiles for land attack with 3M-14E1 latest type, has a range of 290 km. The missiles are not approved to export to China by the Russian Ministry of Defence. Only 3 countries that Russia exported this missile to are India and Algeria.

It should be noted that the weapons on the Russian Kilo-636 is equipped with the review and requirement of customers. Because of the specific requirements so the price of Vietnam's Kilo Submarines is much higher than China's ones. Thus it can be stated that 3M-14E missiles equipped for Vietnam's Kilo Submarines are the requirement of Vietnam.

The steel punch

In the disputed islands issue in the South China Sea, China falls into a disadvantage in terms of geography, they try to switch weapons facilities near the disputed islands as possible. Instances of this is that China has built a giant military bases in Sanya (Hainan Island), priority is the most modern weapons and facilities. Besides strengthening forces on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands that Chinese invasions of Vietnam, China wants to turn Sanya and Paracel Islands into the place of rallying the Air Force and Navy when conflicts occur.

In this context, Vietnam called to equip itself with the weapons that can stop the Chinese forces in Hainan Island. And the 3M-14E missile, a range of 290 km, 400 kg warhead was chosen. The vessel for carrying this missile is the Kilo 636MV submarine which can reach and launch the steel punches to paralyze the enemy bases. With the lack of support from the Air Force as well as logistics resupply techniques, Chinese forces fighting in the South China Sea will fall into difficult situations.

Then Vietnam will use Air Force aircrafts including the Su-30MK2, Su-30MK2V, Su-27,... and Navy surface ships with submarines sorties from Central Coast aided by anti-aircraft and ground-to-sea missiles (S-300, K-300P Bastion-P, 4K44B Redut, Uran E,...) Vietnam will fully control the South China Sea.

http://petrotimes.vn/news/vn/bien-dong/thoi-su-bien-dong/tau-ngam-kilo-viet-nam-la-chan-phong-thu-bien.html

http://soha.vn/quan-su/trang-bi-ten-lua-doi-dat-cho-kilo-636-canh-cao-danh-thep-cua-viet-nam-20130613160430712.htm

Japan explores 3 war scenorios with China amid ADIZ concerns

A Japanese F-15J fighter. (Photo/CNS)

Japan has responded to China's Nov. 23 announcement of its air defense indification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea by holding a television conference to discuss the possibility of dealing with China on three fronts — Taiwan, the Miyako waterway and the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku or Diaoyu) islands — within the next 10-15 years, according to the Toyko-based Sankei Shimbun.

Commanders from the Japan Air Self Defense (JASDF) Northern Air Defense Force, Central Air Defense Force, Southern Air Defense Force and Southwestern Composite Air Division were called up by the Air Defense Command HQ stationed at Yokota for the television conference on Dec. 5, the paper said.

During the conference, the JASDF said that from the beginning of this year, its F-15J fighters had conducted drills to test the capability of the Chinese radar system. The JASDF concluded that Chinese radar system is able to detect the movement of aircraft in high altitude only.

Commanders attending the conference pointed out that the Japanese early warning radar system in Kyoto prefecture — based in the western part of the nation — can cover the entire airspace over the disputed Diaoyutai islands, which Japan, China and Taiwan all lay claim to (called the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China). It can also cover the Miyako waterway, which lies between the Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa, and is thus an advantage in a potential conflict against China and its military aircraft.

Realizing that this advantage will be lost if the disputed islands were to fall into Chinese hands, the meeting focused on three war scenarios. The first scenario examined the possibility that China may only attack the island chain. The second explored the possibility that China may launch an attack against both the Diaoyutai islands and Miyako waterway simultaneously, while in the third scenario, the Diaoyutai islands, Miyako waterway and Taiwan were all potential targets.

The meeting concluded that tensions and the risk of conflict between the two nation's military aircraft will increase in the future as China will now send fighters to regularly patrol its new ADIZ, the Sankei Shimbun said.

Want China Times

Why a Pacific War Is Possible

From the long-distance perspective of an American, Asia looks like one of the world’s most peaceful places. And it is — for the moment. But when Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Tokyo on Monday, he stepped into what has suddenly become a dangerous diplomatic crisis between China and Japan. On the surface, it’s a dull dispute over a string of uninhabited Pacific islands. Underneath, as I realized on a recent visit to China, it’s a story reaching back some 75 years that involves war, brutality, rape and historical reckoning. And now threatens to drag in the U.S.

The immediate cause of the crisis is Beijing’s recent declaration of an air-defense zone over the disputed islands, a string of rocks about 200 miles southeast of China’s coast, not far from Taiwan. No one will ever vacation on the islands, but there’s a good incentive to claim them, given that they sit in an area of the Pacific that may contain enough oil to fuel China for 45 years.


Far more than a story about energy, however, this is a story about national pride and historical grievance. The showdown over the islands — whose very name the two countries disagree about: China calls them the Diaoyu and Japan the Senkaku — touches one of the most sensitive nerves in Chinese culture: the Japanese occupation of China from 1937 to ’45.

“It may be hard for you to understand,” an expert at Beijing’s Academy of Military Science told me in October, echoing several others to whom I spoke. “The nationalist feeling, the emotion toward Japan, is very strong.”

It’s true that China has been flexing its muscles in recent years, by many accounts “bullying” regional neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam. That’s one reason for the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy. But the rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo is much deeper, and darker.

Americans tend to think of World War II’s Pacific theater as a fight between the U.S. and Japan in places like Midway and Okinawa, lasting from 1942 to the atomic bombs of 1945. But for China, practically speaking, there was no “world” war — only a brutal invasion and occupation by Japan that began more than four years before Pearl Harbor. That fight cost 20 million Chinese lives, and included some of the worst atrocities of the entire war in the now infamous city of Nanjing, where up to 300,000 Chinese were massacred.

Few people with clear memories of those years are still alive today. But China has not forgotten. One Beijing-based American blogger calls the subject of Japan’s wartime conduct “radioactive … capable of eliciting such white-hot rage from seemingly normal people.” A few years ago, TIME’s then Beijing correspondent Matthew Forney captured how that rage is sustained:

Chinese kids can be forgiven for thinking Japan is a nation of “devils,” a slur used without embarrassment in polite Chinese society. They were raised to feel that way, and not just through cartoons. Starting in elementary school children learn reading, writing and the “Education in National Humiliation.” This last curriculum teaches that Japanese “bandits” brutalized China throughout the 1930s and would do so today given half a chance. Although European colonial powers receive their share of censure, the main goal is keeping memories of Japanese conquest fresh. Thousands of students each day, for instance, take class trips to the Anti-Japanese War Museum in Beijing to view grainy photos of war atrocities—women raped and disemboweled, corpses of children stacked like cordwood. As one 15-year-old girl in a blue and yellow school uniform, Ji Jilan, emerged from a recent visit to the gallery, she told a TIME correspondent: “After seeing this, I hate Japanese more than ever.”

Compounding the anger is a sense that Japan has never truly never reckoned with its atrocities the way Germany did after World War II. Japanese officials have issued statements of remorse over the years, but it’s typical to hear the Chinese say Japan has never really admitted to, or apologized for, its actions. China especially resents Japan’s lack of public contrition about the thousands of sex slaves known as “comfort women.”

Japanese officials inflame these wartime wounds every time they visit a notorious shrine to the country’s war dead that includes 14 wartime leaders convicted as war criminals by an allied tribunal; a government-linked Chinese newspaper recently described one such visit as an “attempt to deny and glorify the militarism and history of aggression.” Further stoking China’s paranoia is Japan’s recent move away from its postwar pacifist stance and toward a more potent military: “It is one of the greatest concerns for China if Japan tries to revise its constitution and have a normal military force,” said the military-academy expert.

Japan’s recent militarization is driven, in part, because the feeling is mutual: polling shows that the animus in Japan toward China runs about as high as it does on the other side of the East China Sea. The “unfavorable feelings” of each side toward the other runs poisonously above 90%. It’s certainly hard to argue that China has done anything to Japan comparable to the 1937–45 occupation. But one scholar on Sino-Japanese relations argues the animus is about envy and anxiety toward the roaring Chinese dragon:

… with its economic miracle stunted and political reform stagnating, many Japanese politicians played to nationalist groups in order to boost national confidence and win popular votes. While pacifism and the Japanese feeling of war guilt used to keep anti-Chinese nationalism marginal, the old culture has gradually faded, much due to people’s anxiety about an increasingly powerful and assertive China in East Asia.

How does all this affect the U.S.? In part because a conflict between Asia’s two great economic powers could be a disaster for the global economy; but also because of America’s security treaty with Japan, which, in return for basing rights, guarantees the U.S. will defend Japan against attack. And while Washington has not taken an official position on the sovereignty of the disputed islands, it does, somewhat confusingly, consider them covered by the security pact — a fact not appreciated by China, which is already wary about America’s intentions in the region.

“It just seems absurd that the U.S. would commit itself to the defense of a few small islands that it has no position about,” the military-academy expert told me. Most Americans would likely agree — if they even understood what the fuss was about to begin with.

http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/02/why-a-pacific-war-is-possible-china-and-japan-despise-each-other/?iid=sl-main-lead

China’s Aggressive Expansionism Hits Archaeology

China Has Begun Asserting Ownership of Thousands of Shipwrecks in the South China Sea
By JEREMY PAGE

A replica of a treasure ship sailed by Zheng He about 600 years ago at a museum in Nanjing. 
Underwater archaeologist Franck Goddio's team was exploring the wreckage of a 13th-century Chinese junk off the coast of the Philippines when it made an unwelcome discovery about China's maritime muscle in the 21st century.

As a twin-prop plane swooped overhead, a Chinese marine-surveillance vessel approached the team's Philippines-registered ship and began broadcasting instructions in English over a loudspeaker.
"They said this area belonged to the People's Republic of China, and they told us to scram," recalls one of the people on board last year. 

"It was pretty scary." 

Chinese officials confirm the incident took place but say the archaeologists' mission was illegal.

A boatman paddles away from the Sarangani, a ship on which archaeologists became embroiled in a standoff with China, in Manila Bay.

With territorial disputes escalating in the waters off China, the Chinese government has begun asserting ownership of thousands of shipwrecks within a vast U-shaped area that covers almost all of the South China Sea, which it says has been part of its territorial waters for centuries.
China has ordered its coast guard to prevent what it considers illegal archaeology in the waters it claims, and it is pouring money into a state-run marine-archaeology program. 

Chinese archaeologists are preparing their first comprehensive survey of undersea sites, including in disputed areas.
Chinese officials say their efforts will curb the theft and treasure hunting they say has destroyed numerous sites and flooded the global market with looted Chinese antiquities.

There is a political dimension to China's plans. 

Chinese archaeologists openly aspire to bolster their country's historical claims to the contested South China Sea, which overlap with those of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
"We want to find more evidence that can prove Chinese people went there and lived there, historical evidence that can help prove China is the sovereign owner of the South China Sea," says Liu Shuguang, head of the Chinese government's Center of Underwater Cultural Heritage, set up in 2009 to oversee underwater archaeology in the country.
Tensions have been running high in the region over China's intensifying campaign to assert territorial claims, not only in the South China Sea, but in the East China Sea, which is contested by Japan. 

On Nov. 23, China proclaimed a new air-defense identification zone over Japanese Senkaku islands.
The South China Sea, one of the world's busiest trading routes, is littered with wrecks from the last two millennia, including Chinese junks, Indian and Arab dhows, Dutch and British trading schooners and World War II warships. 

Chinese archaeologists say they have gathered coordinates for 70 shipwrecks in those waters but estimate there are at least 2,000, and possibly many more.

A team working with French underwater archaeologist Franck Goddio, shown in 2010, was exploring the wreckage of a 13th-century Chinese junk off the coast of the Philippines when a Chinese marine-surveillance vessel ordered them to leave the area. 

Mr. Goddio, a Frenchman who is one of the world's leading marine archaeologists, had worked in the area since the 1980s, excavating 15th-century Chinese junks, 16th-century Spanish galleons and 18th-century British merchant ships. 

In addition to the trip last year, his team had visited the cluster of reefs and rocks off the Philippines, called the Scarborough Shoal, in 2011. 

Both expeditions were part of a joint research project with the National Museum of the Philippines, which collaborates with foreign archaeologists because of a shortage of state funding.
Different countries refer to the disputed islands by different names.
People involved in the project say it has no political or commercial agenda. 

During last year's trip, they say, they were examining pieces of celadon, a form of green-glazed ceramic, from a wreck that long ago broke apart on the sharp coral.
Chinese officials see ulterior motives.
"The Philippines sent some French archaeologists to do what? To drag away this shipwreck," says Mr. Liu of China's Center of Underwater Cultural Heritage. 

"Because this was material evidence that Chinese people first found the Scarborough Shoal, they wanted to destroy evidence that was beneficial to China." 

The archaeologists deny that.
Chinese archaeologists haven't started excavating sites at the Scarborough Shoal, but they have begun work on Chinese wrecks around the Paracel Islands, which lie about 200 miles from the coasts of China and Vietnam and are claimed by both countries. 

China has controlled the islands since 1974, when it defeated Vietnam in a brief naval battle.

Mike Hatcher prepares to dive from his ship in the South China Sea in 1986. On the expedition he found the 'Nanking cargo,' a haul of Chinese porcelain and gold from the wreck of the Geldermalsen, an 18th-century Dutch East India Co. ship that raised more than $20 million at auction in Amsterdam. 

"Marine archaeology is an exercise that demonstrates national sovereignty," Li Xiaojie, the vice minister of culture, was quoted as saying by state media in September 2012 as he examined porcelain retrieved from a wreck off the Paracels.
Chinese archaeologists say the survey encompassing other disputed areas will begin this year or next.
They also say they hope to support the government's efforts to re-establish China as a world maritime power, by focusing their research on the "Maritime Silk Road," which connected China by sea with India and Africa beginning in about the second century B.C.
China's five-year plan for 2011 to 2015 calls for the government to promote a seafaring heritage embodied by Zheng He, a eunuch admiral who sailed an armada of treasure ships as far as Africa about 600 years ago. 

The admiral is celebrated in China as the face of an era when it projected power far beyond its shores.
Xi Jinping, China's new president, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of maritime power—at times invoking Zheng He—as part of a vision to reclaim China's world prominence.
Zhang Wei, one of China's first underwater archaeologists, says the nation is "extremely focused on being a great and strong maritime power," which he calls the "grand backdrop" to China's marine-archaeology program. 

The program was launched, he says, under the auspices of President Xi's father, who served as vice premier under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.

Two enameled globular teapots painted with peony and bamboo below a border of trellis-pattern; the porcelain survived the wreck and lasted more than two centuries under the sea so well because it was packed inside the tea, which in turn was in wooden chests.

Mr. Zhang says interest was kindled by commercial treasure hunters who operated in the South China Sea. Among the most famous was Mike Hatcher, a Briton whose haul of Chinese porcelain from the wreck of the Geldermalsen, an 18th-century Dutch East India Co. ship that sank in the South China Sea, raised more than $20 million at auction in Amsterdam in 1986.
Chinese leaders dispatched two officials to that auction to try to buy some of the items with cash, according to Mr. Zhang. 

"They only took about $30,000, and they couldn't buy a single thing," he says.
China's National Museum established its Underwater Archaeology Center the following year and appointed Mr. Zhang to head it—mainly, he says, because he was one of the few Chinese archaeologists who could swim.
The first big find in Chinese waters—a roughly 800-year-old merchant ship named the Nanhai One—was made in 1987 while a British salvage company was searching for a Dutch East India Co. wreck. 

The British team was forced to withdraw after the Nanhai One was identified as a Chinese ship.
Since then, there has been almost no foreign participation in marine archaeology in China, according to Chinese and foreign archaeologists. 

And only Chinese wrecks have been excavated in Chinese waters.
Chinese authorities, meanwhile, have trained more than 100 marine archaeologists, built at least three underwater-archaeology museums and invested millions of dollars in research. 

On Thursday, they announced a new project to remove up to 80,000 artifacts from the Nanhai One, which was lifted off the seabed in 2007 and placed in a water tank in a museum.
Next year, China plans to launch a 184-foot ship designed for marine archaeology, the first of its kind in the country, according to state-media reports.
China also is funding joint projects in other countries' waters, focusing mostly on locating wrecks linked to Zheng He. 

Last year, Chinese archaeologists using sonar identified five wrecks they believe were part of his fleet in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, according to Chinese state media.
One reason Chinese authorities are so interested in tracing Zheng He's travels is that he is said to have visited several rocks and islands in the South China Sea.

Chinese archaeologists work with porcelain artifacts from the Nanhai One shipwreck, which dated back to the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279), in a structure in Yangjiang, China, in 2009.

Foreign experts say they welcome China's new willingness to invest in underwater archaeology and relish the prospect of learning more about sites in China's waters.
But they are concerned that a political agenda might be driving China's choice of sites, its exclusion of foreign archaeologists and its relative lack of openness about its research.
"There's this strong sense of nationalism that flows through the Chinese program," says Jeffrey L. Adams, an anthropologist at the University of Minnesota who has written about Chinese archaeology.
Foreign archaeologists mostly agree that Chinese-built ships and cargo account for many of the sites in the South China Sea because of the international trade in Chinese porcelain and silk.
But many of the wrecks lie far from the Chinese mainland, around the reefs and rocks off the coast of Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, because ships used to hug those shores to help with navigation and avoid bad weather.
Even if a wreck isn't in a disputed area, tracing its national "ownership" is often complicated. 

A ship, its owner, its cargo and its crew all may have originated in different countries.
Internationally, the trend in recent years has been toward acknowledging "common heritage," pursuing joint excavation and sharing results among academics from different nations. 

A 2001 Unesco convention on underwater cultural heritage encouraged states to cooperate when they had a shared interest in a site, but offered no guidance on jurisdiction and no mechanism for dealing with sites in disputed areas.
"If there's a disputed site, what we recommend is just get together and don't get into a fight over it," says Ulrike Guerin, who oversees protection of underwater cultural heritage at Unesco, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 

"If you look around the world now, the majority of projects are multinational ones."
None of the countries involved in the South China Sea disputes have ratified the Unesco convention. 

Only China has the resources to enforce its claims to wrecks in the area and to excavate them.
China did little to enforce those claims until March 2012, when the government announced its first-ever crackdown on illegal salvage and archaeological work in China's territorial waters.
The incident at the Scarborough Shoal occurred less than a month later.
China says the standoff stemmed from an incident that April when a Philippines navy ship detained some Chinese fishermen near the Scarborough Shoal. 

But Chinese officials also have made it clear they regarded Mr. Goddio's project as illegal.
The Chinese marine-surveillance ship that approached the archaeologists was one of three Chinese vessels that took turns monitoring them over the next week or so, according to two people on board the archaeologists' ship and accounts in Chinese state media.
A Philippines coast guard ship was sent to the area but kept its distance. 

A tense standoff ensued as Chinese and Filipino officials accused one another of violating territorial boundaries.
Eventually, on April 18, the archaeologists' ship was forced to leave, prompting a formal protest from the Philippines' government. 

China has had effective control of the area since then.
The team abandoned its project. Mr. Goddio declined to comment.

Neither he nor the National Museum of the Philippines has a track record of using finds to justify territorial or ownership claims. 

"We don't really care who owns the ship," says Sheldon Clyde B. Jago-on, the head of underwater archaeology at the National Museum of the Philippines. 

"It's our shared heritage. It should be about collaboration. We care about the trade patterns, the trade routes, the cargo, the boat building."
Some experts say the overlap between politics and archaeology is neither surprising nor unique to China. Vietnam is expanding investment in its state-run archaeological program, and this year its Institute of Archaeology opened an underwater-archaeology department.
One of Vietnam's first projects has obvious political resonance—excavation of the site of a naval battle in which Vietnamese forces defeated a Chinese army in 938 A.D., bringing an end to centuries of Chinese rule over Vietnam. 

That site is on a river inside Vietnam.
The Scarborough Shoal incident, by contrast, marked the first time a country in the region used force to stop another nation's underwater archaeological project, experts say.
"China has the largest navy and the ability to chase people off, and then follow up with archaeological work," says Mark Staniforth, a marine archaeologist at Australia's Monash University who is working with Vietnam's Institute of Archaeology. 

"There's no sense they want to cooperate or collaborate with anyone."

More Chinese Air ID Zones Predicted

TAIPEI, SEOUL AND TOKYO — China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) last week over the East China Sea has given the US an unexpected challenge as Vice President Joseph Biden prepares for a trip to China, Japan and South Korea beginning this week.

The trip was scheduled to address economic issues, but the Nov. 23 ADIZ announcement raised a troubling new issue for the US and allies in the region. China’s ADIZ overlaps the zones of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Sources indicate China’s ADIZ could be part of its larger anti-access/area-denial strategy designed to force the US military to operate farther from China’s shorelines.

China might also be planning additional identification zones in the South China Sea and near contested areas along India’s border, US and local sources say.

China’s ADIZ might be an attempt by Beijing to improve its claim to disputed islands in the East China Sea also claimed by Japan, sources said. These islands — known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China — are under the administrative control of Japan.

Mike Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said this is part of a larger Chinese strategy beyond disputes over islands.

“This should be viewed as a part of a Chinese effort to assert greater denial capacity and eventual pre-eminence over the First Island Chain” off the coast, he said.

Green, who served on the US National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, said China’s Central Military Commission in 2008 “promulgated the ‘Near Sea Doctrine,’ and is following it to the letter, testing the US, Japan, Philippines and others to see how far they can push.”

June Teufel Dreyer, a veteran China watcher at the University of Miami, Fla., said “salami slicing” is a large part of China’s strategic policy. “The salami tactic has been stunningly successful, so incremental that it’s hard to decide what Japan, or any other country, should respond forcefully to. No clear ‘red line’ seems to have been established,” Dreyer said.

The Chinese refer to it as “ling chi” or “death from a thousand cuts.”

For example, China’s new ADIZ overlaps not only Japan’s zone to encompass disputed islands, but South Korea’s zone by 20 kilometers in width and 115 kilometers in length to cover the Socotra Rock (Ieodo or Parangdo). Socotra is under South Korean control but claimed by China as the Suyan Rock.

Seoul decided to expand its ADIZ after China refused to redraw its declared zone covering the islands. Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and related government agencies are consulting on how to expand the South Korean ADIZ, drawn in 1951 by the US military, officials said.

“We’re considering ways of expanding [South] Korea’s air defense identification zone to include Ieodo,” said Wi Yong-seop, vice spokesman for the MND.

During annual high-level defense talks between Seoul and Beijing on Nov. 28, South Korean Vice Defense Minister Baek Seung-joo demanded that Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, modify China’s ADIZ.

“We expressed regret over China’s air defense identification zone that overlaps our zone and even includes Ieodo,” Wi said after the bilateral meeting. “We made it clear that we can’t recognize China’s move and jurisdiction over Ieodo waters.”

Amid these growing tensions, South Korea’s arms procurement agency announced Nov. 27 it would push forward on procurement of four aerial refueling planes. Currently, South Korea’s F-15 fighter jets are limited to flying missions over Ieodo for 20 minutes. New tankers will extend that time to 80 minutes.

“With midair refueling, the operational range and flight hours of our fighter jets will be extended to a greater extent, and we will be able to respond to potential territorial disputes with neighboring countries,” a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration said.

In the southern part of China’s ADIZ, which overlaps Taiwan’s ADIZ, Beijing was careful not to cover Taiwan’s Pengjia Island, which is manned by a Taiwan Coast Guard unit.

“The exclusion of the Pengjia Islet indicates that mainland China respects our stance,” said Chinese Nationalist Party legislator Ting Shou-chung. Relations across the Taiwan Strait have been improving over the past several years.

“We’re all waiting for the other shoe to drop,” said Peter Dutton, an ADIZ expert and director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

“We’re looking to see how China will now behave,” he said. “Hopefully, they will not try to fly inside the airspace over the Senkaku Islands, since that is under Japanese sovereign administration and would therefore be a highly provocative act.”

Dutton downplayed fears of another civilian airliner being shot down, as was the case in 1983, when a Soviet Su-15 fighter shot down a South Korean airliner that strayed into Soviet airspace, killing 269.

In 1988, a US Navy Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the USS Vincennes, shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Arabian Gulf, killing 290. The Vincennes mistook the airliner for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter jet.

“For civilian aircraft, this is really not a major issue,” he said. “Those aircraft almost always file flight plans in advance and follow the directions of ground controllers. This means that their route through the ADIZ would already by pre-approved, and this is not a problem for the Chinese.”

Dutton said the real concern is the freedom of military flights.

“But both the US and Japan have said they do not intend to alter their behavior or to abide by the ADIZ procedures, no matter what they are, for military flights,” he said.

In 2001, a Chinese J-8 fighter collided with a US Navy EP-3 Aries signals intelligence aircraft near Hainan Island. Bonnie Glaser, a China specialist at CSIS, said she does not expect China to “back down” from its ADIZ policy, and anticipates more intercepts by Chinese fighters of US reconnaissance aircraft.

“The risk of accident will undoubtedly increase, especially [with] fighters [flown at] Mach 1 by young, inexperienced pilots,” she said.

Alessio Patalano, a lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, said the Chinese move might have been prompted by the current tensions in the East China Sea, and recent discussions in Japan about how the military can deal with Chinese drones and manned patrol aircraft that intrude into Japan’s air defense space.

“Chinese authorities are seeking to force Japan to accept the existence of the dispute challenging Japanese control of the islands,” Patalano said. “The problem with this is that Chinese authorities are using military and paramilitary tools to force a change of status quo to what is a political issue.

“Of course, a more robust response could see the US and Japan deploy air assets in the overlapping areas of the ADIZ to challenge the Chinese position,” Patalano said. “US and Japanese aircraft flying together in the Chinese ADIZ would present a serious dilemma to Chinese authority.”

Green said the US should at least send a “joint US-Japan patrol into the area to prove the point that coercion does not work.”

The announcement of the ADIZ also affects the Chinese military, likely adding to the Air Force’s status over the traditional role the Army has played as national defender. - Defense News

US, Japan monitor Liaoning's course to South China Sea

China's aircraft carrier Liaoning sailed through the Taiwan Strait to enter the South China Sea on Nov. 28, escorted by two destroyers and two frigates. Although the fleet did not pass the waters close to the disputed Diaoyutai (Diaoyu or Senkaku) islands, its maiden journey to the South China Sea has put the United States and Japan on alert.

Sources close to the Chinese military told China's Global Times that the Liaoning kicked off its training mission as soon as it left the Taiwan Strait. "The training has become more like active combat since it was closely followed by American and Japanese scouting vessels and aircraft," a source said.

In Taiwan, Ministry of National Defense spokesman Luo Shou-he noted that the Liaoning and its escorts maintained a course on the western side of the center line of the Strait. A newspaper photo showed that all ships at the military base in Keelung, northern Taiwan, were on stand-by while the Chinese fleet made its way south.

Taiwan's United Daily News, a government-leaning daily, reported the ROC military were closely monitoring the fleet's movements and that it had deployed missiles as a precaution.

A source close to the Chinese military said a US Los Angeles-class submarine from Guam has also appeared in the East China Sea, where tensions have run high over the past week after Beijing announced a new air defense identification zone which covers the contested islands claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan. "It is believed to be tasked with collecting electronic signals from our ships," he remarked.

At present, a combat group led by the carrier USS George Washington is engaged in a joint marine exercise with Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force off Okinawa, Global Times reported.

Want China Times

China using ADIZ as test for South China Sea issues: scholars

Taipei, Nov. 30 (CNA) China recently claimed a broad air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, but local scholars consider the move to be simply a test for South China Sea issues.

Three days after its sudden proclamation of the ADIZ Nov. 23, China sent its Liaoning aircraft carrier battle group to the South China Sea.

China's move demonstrates its influence on the international stage, said Wong Ming-hsien, director of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.

"The ADIZ might just be a tester, the South China Sea will be the real problem," Wong told CNA.

Song Yann-huei, an Academia Sinica researcher, said China is aiming to tell the United States: "Your military aircraft can fly through our ADIZ and we have our right to sail in the South China Sea."

"China uses such diplomatic strategies to echo the U.S. strategy of 're-balance to Asia,'" Song said, adding that it is a strength-matching game between the two sides.

(By Tsai Su-jung and James Lee)/ Focus Taiwan

Is China adopting a new maritime security policy?

By Jayadeva Ranade

Its growing assertiveness is a source of worry for the neighbours.

Several countries are concerned about China’s growing sensitivity and assertiveness on issues of sovereignty and territorial — including maritime — integrity, especially in the past five years. China’s actions have heightened tensions in the South China Sea and with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. China has neither hesitated to warn off Indian Navy and survey ships while they are in Vietnamese territorial waters.

China turned Chinese marine surveillance (CMS) ship and fishery patrol vessels into China Coast Guard to boost armed patrols in the South China Sea. In picture, China fishery patrol vessel 302 is renamed "China Coast Guard 3102" Photo: Thanhnien.com.vn

Interesting in this context is a recent (May 28, 2013) article in the People’s Daily, written by Mian Yang, dean of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) and younger brother of Chinese state councillor and former foreign minister Yang Jiechi. Written prior to the recent summit (June 7-8, 2013) between Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Obama, he quite candidly stated that the increase in China’s comprehensive national strength had given its “new leaders” more confidence in dealing with the international community.

Mian Yang emphasised that this “self-confidence” has enabled China’s leaders to be “very firm” in safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity while simultaneously being flexible in dealings with smaller countries. He revealed that China’s new leaders will focus more on the neighbourhood and travel oftener in the region.

Reflecting this firmness on sovereignty and territorial issues, Chinese president Xi Jinping, according to the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun (June 12), used the term “core interests” at the recent summit with Obama while referring to the dispute with Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkakus, which China calls the Diaoyu islands. China had referred to the islands as its “core interest” for the first time this April during a routine weekly news conference by a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson. The US has, incidentally, briefed Japan on the talks at the summit.

Earlier this January, China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation (NASMG) announced that Sinomaps Press had published new maps of China. These identify more than 130 islands and islets in the South China Sea, most of which have not featured on previous official Chinese maps. The earlier maps featured only some of the larger islands. The new maps also have an enlarged inset of the Diaoyu (or Senkaku) islands.

Predictably, the new map shows the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and a large chunk of Jammu and Kashmir, mainly comprising Aksai Chin, as part of China. Pages of China’s new passports contain similar maps.

A major irritant for Beijing is, however, the maritime and aerial surveillance regularly carried out by US ships and aircraft inside China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and along China’s air-space off its coast. China has voiced its objections and in recent years intermittently shown its ire by confronting US aircraft and vessels, probably becoming the only country to do so.

A major accident was averted in April 2001 when a Chinese Air Force J-8 jet brushed wing-tips with a US Air Force EP-3 spy plane which was flying near China’s secret submarine base at Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island. The US pilot crash-landed his aircraft, but the Chinese pilot lost his life. Since 2009, several close confrontations have been reported between Chinese submarines, frigates and US navy vessels like the USS Impeccable and USS Victorious and the unarmed hydrographic vessel USS Bowditch. Chinese fishing ships reportedly harassed the USS Bowditch at least half a dozen times in China’s EEZ.

After one such incident ‘hawkish’ retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force senior colonel Dai Xu, who is a regular commentator on Chinese TV channels and author of a book from which Xi Jinping often quotes, told the Chinese media that “concrete military actions should be taken.” He said “First warning, second expulsion. And if that does not work, the invading vessels can be directly surrounded and sunk.” Chinese military officers have also raised the issue at international conferences and on the sidelines of sessions of the National People’s Congress — China’s version of a parliament.

The issue resurfaced this May at a working session on maritime security during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

Articulating long-held objections to the surveillance of China’s coastline and EEZ by US aircraft and ships, PLA senior colonel Zhou Bo disclosed that China had “thought of reciprocating” by “sending ships and planes to the US EEZ”, and had actually done so “a few times”. This is the first occasion when a Chinese military official has confirmed reports in circulation for some time that PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels had been detected around Okinawa and Guam.

The disclosure is significant for countries in the region as it suggests that Beijing’s maritime policy is set to shift towards increased assertiveness. It implies that as China’s military might rises and its economic and strategic interests expand, China will copy US behaviour. It will accord to itself the right to carry out surveys and gather intelligence inside the EEZs of other countries. China’s actions will initially affect South Korea, Japan and countries with competing claims in the South China Sea. As China’s navy extends its reach and capabilities, this policy will directly impact countries like India.

Ni Lexiong, director of the Sea Power and Defence Policy Research Institute at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, confirmed that the PLA senior colonel’s remarks reflected the “changing concept of maritime affairs” of China’s leaders “following the rapid development of China’s maritime industry and rising strength of its naval force in the past decade”. The remarks also suggest that Beijing’s interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could be under review.

The author is a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and former additional secretary in the cabinet secretariat, Government of India. Views expressed are personal.

DNA India

India Adding 40,000 Mountain Troops at China Border

NEW DELHI — Shortly after new Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited here, India has decided to proceed with a plan to add more than 40,000 troops in the form of a mountain corps to bolster its strength on the Chinese border.

Indian soldiers keep watch at Bumla pass at the India-China border. India plans to develop a mountain corps to boost its presence in the area. (Agence France-Presse)

The Ministry of Defence prepared the plan two years ago and has awaited consideration by the Ministry of Finance, which has given approval. Now, it must be cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security, an MoD source said.

About US $12 billion will be spent to raise the additional troops, and the new corps is expected to be functioning within 10 years, an Army official said. Additional weapons and equipment will be purchased.

“The elite mountain corps will be able to fill this gap in preparedness, thereby adding to the conventional stability in the medium to long term, though in the short term it may be perceived as destabilizing,” defense analyst Rahul Bhonsle said.

Last month, China’s Li visited New Delhi, his first foreign visit after taking office, amid reports that Chinese troops had intruded into Indian territory. The issue was discussed during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, though the point was passed off as “an incident,” an Indian External Affairs Ministry source said.

“The raising of additional troops to be deployed along the border with China is bound to raise tempers in Beijing,” the source said.

Analysts here, however, are unanimous that India and China can ill afford to go to war in the immediate future as both are building themselves economically.

“Given the track record of handling their military and diplomatic showdown ... China and India are not likely to go to war anytime soon,” said Swaran Singh, professor for diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru Univer­sity. “It’s not a strong possibility even in their medium-term trajectories. It is not in their interest and the interest of the international community, which will ensure it does not occur.

“The strongest incentive against war is their historic chance to achieve their peaceful rise followed by greater recognition and participation in world decision-making bodies.”

But Bhonsle said New Delhi must manage the issue carefully.

“India will certainly have to make extensive efforts to manage concerns that may be raised by China; [otherwise], the move will prove counterproductive and will only lead to increases in force levels on both the sides,” he said. “Confidence-building measures on the boundary and greater transparency in raising the force, including the fact that it is being positioned in the interior, should assuage Beijing.”

The Army official welcomed the new, because the service is operating at only 60 percent of its required capability level.

As the troops will be deployed in hilly terrain, new purchases will include light tanks, specialized vehicles, light artillery guns and advanced infantry equipment.

The Army also will buyammunition and small arms, hand-held thermal imagers, UAVs, aerostat-based radar, portable missiles, air-defense artillery and lightweight radar.

The service will establish network-centric warfare systems for the elite troops, including advanced C4ISR equip­ment, and information warfare systems, Army sources said.

On the composition of the weapons required, Bhonsle said, “the weapons and equipment will include the whole gamut from reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, firepower, tactical and logistics mobility including helicopters, communications and so on. Five years for forming up and almost eight to 10 years for full-spectrum effectiveness may be reasonable to assume.”

The 4,057-kilometer Line of Actual Control is India’s current border with China. The eastern sector, bordering the states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, is the most contentious, where China claims 90,000 square kilometers of territory that India occupies.

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