Vietnam and China: A Dangerous Incident

A new Chinese documentary offers startling revelations from a 2007 confrontation in the South China Sea.

In early January 2014, video of a recent CCTV4 documentary “Blue Frontiers Guard” appeared online, providing a detailed history of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) spanning from roughly 2007 up until the present. The documentary, in Chinese with English subtitles, begins with footage of an incident that occurred on June 30, 2007 between various government vessels from Vietnam and China in the disputed waters off the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The incident, having previously gone largely unreported, is covered in tremendous detail, providing a new frame of reference for analyzing wider debates over Chinese assertiveness and the U.S. “rebalance” to the region. In addition, the video also provides a number of new insights into organizations such as CMS and its parent organization, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), including the tactics and command and control arrangements of their vessels when out at sea.

The 2007 incident apparently resulted from an attempt by a China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) survey vessel to conduct what the documentary termed “normal operations” in the waters off the Western Paracel islands beginning on June 26 of that year. Such operations are seen as anything but normal by the Vietnamese, who continue to claim the islands despite China having forcefully occupied them since 1974. Hanoi dispatched a fleet consisting largely of naval auxiliary vessels to prevent the Chinese from surveying the waters. A tense standoff ensued, culminating in reckless maneuvers by Chinese CMS vessels that led to a number of serious collisions, threatening the safety of all crews.

The Vietnamese vessels initially expelled the CNPC survey vessel from the area, and the China State Oceanic Administration (SOA) responded by promptly organizing a “rights safeguarding and law enforcement” campaign, dubbed Enforcement Action Code 626. According to the documentary, such operations exist outside the scope of regular enforcement patrols, and in addition to CMS ships already in the vicinity, SOA dispatched CMS vessels numbered 83 and 51 to the area as part of the campaign. They arrived on June 29 and formed up in “alert order,” with two ships both fore and aft on either side of the CNPC vessel, attempting to escort it back into the area for the second time.

After failing to verbally persuade the Vietnamese vessels to leave the area and allow the survey to commence, the CMS vessels first initiated a protective cordon around the CNPC ship, then began to initiate a number of offensive naval maneuvers. These maneuvers began at the lower end of the spectrum with shouldering, but subsequently escalated to direct bow to bridge ramming after the Vietnamese naval auxiliary vessel DN 29 broke through the cordon. The offensive actions were undertaken on direct orders from the CMS higher command at SOA, who commanded the captains of the vessels to intentionally initiate collisions with the Vietnamese ships. According to the Deputy Director General of SOA’s South China Sea Bureau, he and other commanding officials were “stressed” over the risk to their own crews’ safety, but nevertheless “asked them to hit other vessels.” Such offensive maneuvers are considered by senior leadership at SOA to be more effective as they preempt possible aggressive maneuvers by the other side. The same SOA official is quoted in the video as stating that “based on our years long operational experience, it is much easier to attack than to defend.” These comments serve as a strong indication that at least some ranking SOA officials have a preference for preemptive action, and that the organization itself, now in charge of the restructured China Coast Guard, could be promoting an offensive operational doctrine.

Rather than rogue or overzealous captains misinterpreting vague guidance, this incident provides conclusive evidence that the impetus for the collisions originated with very specific orders from the upper levels of the organization’s central leadership back on the Chinese mainland. The captains of the CMS vessels view such tactics as tools accessible to them, but only use them following orders from their higher command. As the captain of CMS vessel number 84 states in the video: “as long as the commander gives an order, be it hitting, ramming, or crashing, we will perform our duty resolutely.”

The tactics used in this incident are reminiscent of encounters that took place at sea between the U.S. and USSR in the early years of the Cold War. Recent encounters between the American and Chinese navies elsewhere in the South China Sea, such as that involving the USS Cowpens in December, bring such parallels into stark contrast. While some commentators stressed the role of the activities undertaken by the Cowpens in causing the incident, the 2007 incident off the Paracels begs the question of whether or not the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) shares the same operational doctrine as its ostensibly civilian counterpart. The Cowpens incident reportedly involved the use of similar tactics, with a Chinese amphibious ship shouldering the U.S. destroyer after it was asked but failed to leave the area, eventually leading to a near collision between the two vessels. That there would be doctrinal overlap between the PLAN and SOA is a distinct possibility, with the two organizations continuing to strengthen already close ties as part of plans outlined at a recent annual meeting held between their senior officials.

The CCTV4 documentary is remarkable not only for the level of detail it provides on collisions that occurred in 2007 as a result of Cold War-era tactics, but also because it provides this information in a tone that seemingly condones and even endorses such actions. In addition to comments from SOA officials discussing the “glorious end” to the confrontation, the narrator in the documentary describes it as a “grand battle,” of which the outcome is apparently regarded as successful. The Chinese leadership has reportedly viewed similar incidents as having been settled in China’s favor, including the 2012 standoff at Scarborough Shoal, and may even have begun reformulating a maritime strategy based on the “Scarborough Model.” Yet the CCTV documentary suggests that the “Scarborough Model” is by no means new, and that the operational concept of using civilian maritime law enforcement vessels to conduct maritime “rights safeguarding” or “rights protection” campaigns has quite possibly been in the works for some time, since at least 2007.

These insights also illuminate an important point in the wider debate over what has been referred to as a more assertive or even aggressive Chinese foreign policy, and its relationship to the “pivot” or “rebalancing” policy undertaken by the Obama administration. Despite the initial signs of this newly assertive foreign policy often being traced to the 2009-2010 period, China had already begun as early as 2007 to undertake a series of provocative actions that seemed designed to assert greater authority and jurisdiction over its claims in the South China Sea. The resulting confrontation described above indicates that Chinese assertiveness not only predated the rebalance, but the Obama administration itself.

Scott Bentley is a PHD candidate at the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA), researching maritime security strategies in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam dancing between US alliance and Chinese brotherhood

The last couple of years have witnessed growing animosity between China and the Philippines, while China's relations with Vietnam, another major claimant to the South China Sea islands, remain relatively peaceful. Tensions between China and Vietnam have not escalated, and Vietnam has not shown much eagerness to draw close to the US. However, Vietnam still plays a significant role in the game between China and the US.

In fact, considering the structure and complexity of the contradictions between China and Vietnam, the two might face an even graver situation than that between China and the Philippines.

Among all the claimants, Vietnam claims the widest territory, almost the entire South China Sea. But Vietnam has long been wary of its northern neighbor. Historically, Vietnam was a vassal state of China for a millennium. In addition to this, the 1979 war with China still sticks in Vietnam's craw.

After the rapprochement between Vietnam and the US in 1995, their relationship is on the rise. Although the Vietnam War was calamitous for the nation, it seems that Vietnam does not bear a grudge against its former opponent.

Geopolitical considerations prevail over the pain of war. Located relatively far from Vietnam,Washington neither has a territorial dispute nor poses an imminent threat to the country's interests.

Washington's Vietnam policy has almost gained bipartisan support. Since 1995, two US presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have paid visits to Vietnam. And regardless of who is in the White House, Vietnamese leaders are welcomed as honored guests.

In 2010, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton declared in Hanoi that the US has a "national interest" in the South China Sea. And both countries signed an unprecedented US-Vietnam Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in October 2013. Their bilateral relationship, as these events show, is in a steady process of development.

But it seems Vietnam will not be tamed as the Philippines has been. Compared with the US, Vietnam is also more dependent on China in terms of economic development. Although the US has become Vietnam's biggest export market, China remains Vietnam's biggest import market. Without China, Vietnam's economy may suffer major blows.

And there is an unbreakable barrier between the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam and Washington - a divergence in political regime and ideology.

Although the US is always a realist whose actions are based on its national interests, it never loses its innate enthusiasm for promoting Western democracy and advocating Western values such as human rights and freedom. These actions would jeopardize the governance of Vietnam's ruling party.

This dilemma between Hanoi and Washington will probably turn into a long-standing issue.

Vietnam's ruling party will hold on to its ruling position because of its success in developing the national economy. But meanwhile, subjects such as democracy and human rights will not be wiped off Washington's diplomatic agenda. The game will last a long time.

It is this dilemma that will urge Vietnam to reexamine its relationship with China and see Beijing as a valuable friend. Both are now in a similar situation, where they face the same challenges imposed by the US-led West.

These elements will turn Vietnam into a "two-faced" nation. It embraces the US when it encounters territorial disputes and geopolitical games with its neighbors. But it will give Washington the cold shoulder when the issues of political regime and ideology gain the upper hand. Its attitude toward China will be the reverse.

In the long term, Vietnam's foreign policy will be made under the cover of this "two-faced" approach. It will neither pledge allegiance to Washington as an ally, nor will it constantly maintain a "brotherhood" with China.

Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

PH Military starts deployment of troops in Spratlys

MANILA, Philippines - The military yesterday started its rotation of Air Force and naval contingents for deployments in Pag-Asa Island in the Spratlys.

Originally scheduled before Christmas, the airmen were not immediately relieved by their counterparts at Armed Forces of the Philippines-Western Command (AFP-Wescom) headquarters in Palawan due to the prevailing weather system hovering over the region for the entire month of December.

Kalayaan Mayor Eugenio Bito-onon Jr. confirmed the deployment of fresh troops in the island municipality.

Philippine soldiers take part in a military parade before being deployed to the island of Mindanao. Photo published in 2011.

Since the sea around the island is very rough, Wescom has started shuttling new Air Force troops to the island town using a Navy plane, giving the islanders a chance to visit Palawan aboard the returning Navy aircraft.

Pag-Asa Island is located within the hotly contested Spratlys archipelago area but is closer by several miles to mainland Palawan than from the coastline of Vietnam, which is laying maritime claim over the region along with China, Brunei and Taiwan.

All claimant countries except Brunei have troops deployed in the region, with China becoming more aggressive in pressing its maritime claim to almost 80 percent of the entire South China Sea by deploying its warships and surveillance vessels to conduct regular maritime patrol over the area.

The other day, Beijing announced the completion of the training exercises of its aircraft carrier Liaoning in the region.

The training exercises almost resulted in a naval confrontation between a Chinese frigate and the US warship USS Cowpens in December.

Aside from the airmen who are deployed on rotation basis in Pag-Asa Island, the seat of Kalayaan Island town with a current population of almost 200 civilian inhabitants including children, contingents from the Philippine Navy are also stationed in the area to bolster the country’s territorial hold over the seven islets and two shoals in the region.

“We don’t monitor any naval activities of China out there because of the prevailing weather. The sea is very rough and it is very dangerous for any ship to venture out in the open sea for now,” Bito-onon said.

He added that he has yet to receive reports from local fishermen if the two Chinese maritime vessels have returned to Ayungin Shoal. The vessels left the area last month after taking up position near the shoal for several months.

Ayungin Shoal is located between Pag-Asa Island and mainland Palawan.

China, insisting that the shoal is an integral part of its maritime domain, has tried to dislodge a contingent of Marine troops stationed in the shoal aboard the grounded Navy logistic ship BRP Sierra Madre.

Philstars

China's military presence is growing. Does a superpower collision loom?

Who holds the key to the future of East Asia? As US influence recedes, arch-enemies China and Japan are flexing their muscles

Show of power … soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Special Operations Forces. Photograph: Joe Chan/Reuters

Generally speaking, Japanese bureaucrats are not much given to exaggeration. So when a senior government insider in Tokyo, speaking off the record, recently compared the deteriorating security situation in East Asia to Europe in the 1930s amid the rise of fascism, it was time to sit up and take notice.

"Tensions are getting very high in this part of the world," the official said. "The security position is extremely severe. There are huge arms sales from Russia, the US and Europe. China's defence spending has seen double-digit growth each year since 1989. They [Beijing] are not a responsible partner. US influence in the region is receding."

Bad blood between Japan and China runs deep and, in the modern era, dates from the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Following its defeat in 1945 and its adoption of a pacifist constitution, Japan became wholly dependent on the US for its defence. Some analysts claim it has long been in Tokyo's interests to play up the China "threat". But objectively speaking, the threat is real, and it becomes tangibly more worrying by the day.

Extraordinarily rapid economic growth in China in recent decades, which has seen it overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy, and the concomitant expansion of Beijing's political, diplomatic and military might have set alarm bells clanging across the region as never before. Today the talk at embassy cocktail parties is not so much about how to "contain" China – the great, lost conceit of hawkish American geostrategists – as how to appease it.

Tellingly, the Japanese official's warning came days before China unexpectedly declared a new air-defence zone in the East China sea, covering the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu to China) that are viewed in Tokyo as sovereign Japanese territory. The ensuing row saw Japan, the US and South Korea send fighter aircraft into the zone in open, dangerous defiance of Beijing's strictures. A subsequent mediation mission by US vice-president Joe Biden failed to resolve the stand-off, in effect leaving a powder keg smouldering and untended.

Nobody is talking openly about a third world war, not yet at least. But there is a growing awareness that the seeds of a possible future superpower collision are being sown around the islands, rocks and shoals, and in the overpopulated sea lanes and airspace beyond China's historic borders, to which Beijing lays claim with growing political robustness and ever-improving military capacity. The lack of a regional security organisation, the absence of a hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, and the ever-present menace represented by the nuclear-armed, Chinese-backed regime in North Korea all add to the inherent dangers of the current situation.

Like any empire in the past, as China's power grows, that power is ineluctably projected to encompass immediate neighbours and, in time, geographical regions and even whole continents. For Beijing, the final frontier in this reverse engineering of manifest destiny is the Pacific basin itself. But to achieve dominance, it must first displace the US, the world's most militarily powerful nation. This contest has years to run. But it is now kicking off, hence the whispers of war.

Three men currently hold the key to what may happen in 2014. One is Xi Jinping, paramount leader of the Chinese Communist party and People's Liberation Army, who succeeded Hu Jintao as president last March. In a sharp change of tone, Xi has dropped Hu's talk of a magnanimous China's peaceful rise and substituted a tougher, nationalist-sounding message stressing pride in one's country at home and asserting China's rights on the international stage with "indomitable will".

The ideological underpinning for this approach was set out in Xi's "China dream" inaugural speech, an obvious attempt to provide an alternative to the American dream. As the People's Daily commented, his idea was "to construct a more open and charismatic Communism that makes people excited to be Chinese".

At a recent party plenum, Xi successfully pushed through an ambitious reform programme while strengthening his grip on power. "Xi emerged from the plenum as the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping," said analyst William Pesek. "Xi may be especially willing to risk a confrontation with Japan right now in order to distract opponents of his proposed reforms, as well as ordinary Chinese who are growing restless over pollution, income inequality and official corruption. Nothing brings China's 1.3 billion people together so easily as hating the Japanese."

Xi's rise to power has coincided with the emergence of a similarly hard-headed individual as Japan's prime minister. Shinzo Abe, who took office around the same time as Xi, has his own agenda for dealing with China. It sometimes makes his American allies and the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) – China's smaller neighbours – wince with anxiety.

An unrepentant nationalist, Abe says it is past time for Japan to drop its pacifist laws, recognise the many threats to its security, and stand up boldly for its interests and values. To this end he has increased defence spending, created a new national security council, strengthened alliances with countries such as the Philippines (which has its own territorial dispute with China), and plans to buy advanced new US weaponry.

"Japan is back," Abe declared during a visit to Washington last year. For this and other reasons, Xi has refused to meet him, as has South Korea's president. Official media denounce Abe as a revisionist and militarist. This chilly impasse has worsened the strains over China's new air zone.

The third key player in this unfolding drama is Barack Obama, who has bigger guns and more ships and planes than the other two combined. Like the rest of the world, the US administration can think of a thousand reasons why a war in East Asia would be disastrously self-defeating for all concerned, starting with the negative impact on international trade, finance and American debt.

But aware of the perception that US regional influence is receding, and that the smallest spark could cause a conflagration, Obama has shifted his approach. His so-called "pivot" to Asia, giving the area a higher foreign policy priority, is principally aimed (despite denials) at countering Chinese blue-water navy ambitions in the Pacific and other unsettling manifestations of Chinese power projection.

Regional observers question how serious Obama is about the China "threat" and whether, for example, he would really come to Japan's defence if the Senkaku dispute degenerated into a shooting war. Perhaps 2014 will provide the answer.

The Guardian

The Navy’s Amazing Ocean-Powered Underwater Drone

If Santa can harness reindeer to fly the globe, the Navy can use "hydraulic buoyancy" to wage underwater war

While you were out shopping Sunday for those last-minute holiday gifts, the Navy pushed ahead with its own vision of an underwater sugar plum: a fleet of “long endurance, transoceanic gliders harvesting all energy from the ocean thermocline.”

And you thought Jules Verne died in 1905.

Fact is, the Navy has been seeking—pretty much under the surface—a way to do underwater what the Air Force has been doing in the sky: prowl stealthily for long periods of time, and gather the kind of data that could turn the tide in war.

The Navy’s goal is to send an underwater drone, which it calls a “glider,” on a roller-coaster-like path for up to five years. A fleet of them could swarm an enemy coastline, helping the Navy hunt down minefields and target enemy submarines.

Unlike their airborne cousins, Navy gliders are not powered by aviation fuel. Instead, they draw energy from the ocean’s thermocline, a pair of layers of warm water near the surface and chillier water below.

The glider changes its density, relative to the outside water, causing the 5-foot (1.5m)-long torpedo-like vehicle to either rise or sink—a process called hydraulic buoyancy. Its stubby wings translate some of that up-and-down motion into a forward speed of about a mile (1.6 km) an hour in a sawtooth pattern. As it regularly approaches the surface, an air bladder in the tail inflates to stick an antenna out of the water so it can transmit what it has learned to whatever Captain Nemo dispatched it to the depths.

Much of the work such gliders do is oceanographic in nature, collecting data about the water’s temperature, salinity, clarity, currents and eddies. Such information is critical for calibrating sonar to ensure it provides the most accurate underwater picture possible. But there are additional efforts underway to convert such data into militarily-handy information.

Slocum Gliders rise and fall as they traverse the ocean’s depths, transmitting what they learn via tail-mounted antennas that periodically break through the water’s surface.

The Navy’s Sunday contract announcement added a scant $203,731 to a contract it has with Teledyne Benthos, Inc., for continued “research efforts” into its Slocum Gliders (named for Captain Joshua Slocum, who sailed alone around the world in a 37-foot sloop between 1895 and 1898). “Carrying a wide variety of sensors, they can be programmed to patrol for weeks at a time, surfacing to transmit their data to shore while downloading new instructions at regular intervals, realizing a substantial cost savings compared to traditional surface ships,” the company’s Webb Research division says. The Webb unit is located in East Falmouth, Mass., and its Slocum Glider is the brainchild of Douglas Webb, a former researcher at the nearby Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

In 2009, the Navy issued a $56.2 million contract for up to 150 of the “Littoral Battlespace-Sensing” gliders to be delivered by 2014. The Navy has said it is investing in the field because such information could prove vital “for mine countermeasures and other tasks important to expeditionary warfare. . .ultimately reducing or eliminating the need for sailors and Marines to enter the dangerous shallow waters just off shore in order to clear mines in preparation for expeditionary operations.”

A NATO report last year examined the feasibility of launching Slocum Gliders from torpedo tubes instead of T-AGS oceanographic surveillance ships. “Operating gliders from submarines represents a step forward to embedding this technology into naval operations,” it said. “Unlike surface ships, submarines are stealth platforms that could transit denied areas while releasing a glider fleet.”

Navy Captain Walt Luthiger, a submariner, said an exercise using such gliders proved their mettle in yet another arena. “The environmental information provided by the gliders has proved valuable,” he told NATO public affairs in 2011, “and helped everyone in that very difficult job of finding submarines that don’t want to be found.”

Time

Video: Vietnam People's Army flexes its muscles

The above clip posted on YouTube on Dec 21, 2013 showing the training and exercises of Vietnam People's Army in 2013.

Today, the Vietnam People's Navy is responsible for protecting the nation's sovereignty and economic activities at sea, and to repulse unauthorized foreign vessells intruding into Vietnamese waters. In general, Vietnam's policy has considered the modernization the Navy a priority task in the overall military modernization plan.

The Vietnam People's Navy and the Vietnam People's Air Force are the branches with the fatest modernization rates, constantly upgrading weapons, ammunition and combat capacity, the ability to master the equipment.

As stated on August 5, 2011 by Minister of Defense Phung Quang Thanh: "The direction of building up the armed forces is one to follow the revolutionary spirit, regularization and effectiveness and gradual modernization. Within this context, the Navy, the Air Force, the Signal Corps and Electronic Warfare will proceed directly into modernization to protect the country".

Indo- Japan strategic axis formed for encircling China ?

(Vndata- Dec 21, 2013) The first Japan - India joint naval exercise, is ongoing in the Indian Ocean, showing signs of forming a new strategic military alliance in Asia.

The four-day long exercise in the Bay of Bengal will include anti-piracy operations, gun firing, cross-deck helicopter operations and anti-submarine warfare. The war-game seeks to enhance inter-operability, enabling the two navies to undertake maritime security operations in future.

The Indian Navy will be represented by the indigenous built stealth frigate “INS Satpura”, guided missile destroyer the “INS Ranvijay” and missile corvette “INS Kuthar”. From the Japan side, two guided missile destroyers, “JS Ariake” and “JS Setogiri” will participate.

The mock war drill has harbour and sea phases of two days each. The sea phase includes Visit, Board, Search and Seizure drills frequently undertaken during anti-piracy operations and operations in anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air threat scenarios.

Although Indian media said that the aim of this exercise is to form a new strategic axis, but in fact, this is not only once the two countries to held joint exercise. During Defence Minister A K Antony’s visit to Tokyo in 2011, India and Japan agreed on holding regular bilateral naval exercises. The maiden exercise was conducted off Japan in January 2012, which is being followed by this exercise off Chennai. And earlier in 2007, the Japanese Self-Defense Force have been involved in international maritime exercise "Marabel-07" hosted by India .

INS Satpura

In addition to conducting exercises at sea, in recent years military cooperation between the two countries is increasing.

According to the newspaper "News of Russia" (Известия), the Indian Army is proposing to buy Japanese- made high- range meteorological radar, fire control systems and photovoltaic systems on ships. Indian Army said that Japan will likely agree to sell their military equipment. If acquisitions are successful, India will install these systems in Ladakh region of Indian- controlled Kashmir.

It is the high and long range realm radar, India will use this system to not only for spying China, Pakistan and Afghanistan near the Himalayan region. This radar system is not only used for scientific research, but also for enhancing the ability to observe missiles of the nations around India, especially China and Pakistan.

Also, according to the "The Times of India", once said, military cooperation relation of the two countries (India and Japan) is continuously developing, in future, all seaports of India will open for Japan's ships, by that the shared strategic geopolitical and military resources between the two countries will be performed, opening up a new strategic axis for encircling China - the increasingly combative nation in the territorial disputes.

Israeli AirMule successfully completes series of automated test flights

All unmanned aerial vehicles have a futuristic feel to them, but if you want something that looks like it came straight out of a science fiction film, you can’t beat a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft.

The AirMule, an unmanned VTOL developed by Israeli company Tactical Robotics, certainly fits that bill, and it recently achieved a milestone by completing several fully automated test flights. According to the company, the flights involved “take-offs, flights to and from a specified location and landing back at its point of origination.” Full mission demonstrations are scheduled for next year.

The AirMule is unique because it has no exposed rotors, which allows it to fly in air space that is inaccessible to traditional helicopters, including mountainous, wooded and urban terrain. Its designers say it is also quite a bit less noisy than a similarly powered helicopter.

During its test flights, AirMule’s height is maintained by two laser altimeters, which will soon be joined by a radar altimeter for dusty conditions. Position is maintained using GPS, INS data and optical reference to markers on the ground.

The Businiess Of Robotics

The Coming Sino-Japanese War: Pick a Scenario

China's recent declaration creating an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over a large portion of the East China Sea, including the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, has been a feast day in Japan for arm-chair strategists, would-be thriller writers, retired generals and other assorted defense analysts and pundits.

In the wake of China's declaration, five of Japan's seven national weekly magazines published articles proposing various scenarios for a new Sino-Japanese war breaking out over the disputed islands. Can a book, or several books on the coming Sino-Japanese war of 2014, be that far behind?

The blog War is Boring postulates a swirling, high-tech dogfight over the East China Sea, involving Japanese F-15 Eagles, American F-22 Raptors and Chinese fighters. Several Japanese fighters -- and one American -- are shot down, but the Chinese lose several more. Round One goes to the Japanese-American team.

Shukan Gendai, a weekly tabloid, speculates that war would break out after China's President Xi Jinping orders that a Japanese civilian jetliner be shot down after declining to identify itself while crossing the Chinese ADIZ on a flight to Japan. Currently, civilian airliners are supposed to file flight plans and respond to inflight directions.

The Sunday Mainichi, one of Japan's national newspapers, ran an article with the ominous headline: "Sino-Japanese War to Break Out in January." It goes on to postulate that a collapsing Chinese economy might convince Beijing's autocrats that war against the despised Japanese might take people's attention away from their troubles.

Many serious military analysts have been sounding off on strengths and weaknesses of the two- (or three-) sided conflict. In their collective view, China has the advantage of holding numerous air bases or potential bases relatively close to the prospective battlefield, while Japan has a qualitative edge on Beijing's aircraft and naval vessels.

The Japanese air force at the moment maintains only one squadron of 20 F-15s at Naha, the capital and largest city of Okinawa, and aircraft and pilots must be getting worn down through the almost daily scrambles to investigate intruders over the Senkaku air space. They will be reinforced next year by a second squadron of 20 aircraft.

Japan can call on aerial reinforcements from other parts of the country, but they would still be constrained by lack of bases near the combat zone. That weakness would, of course, be easily filled by one or more American aircraft carriers, each of which has about 70 aircraft, should the United States be drawn into the conflict.

And it is likely that the U.S. will be drawn in, too. Washington's official position is illogical in that it professes to be neutral about who owns the Senkakus, while at the same time asserting that they, like the rest of Japan, would fall under the protection of the Japan-U.S. security treaty that obliges America to defend the country.

It is almost absurd to think that the U.S. could be drawn into a shooting war with a nuclear-armed China over a bunch of uninhabited and essentially useless islands that not one in ten thousand Americans have likely ever heard of. Yet for 60 years Tokyo has lived up to its side of the bargain, providing bases in Japan for American forces; it might be inclined to call in the chips, demanding the U.S. uphold its side.

While most of these prospective war scenarios are fiction or imaginative, there are plenty of real life incidents to build on, many of them have occurred during the past twelve months. Chinese fisheries protection and coast guard ships now regularly enter Japanese-claimed territorial waters around the Senkakus. So far these incursions have been made with only quasi-warships and answered by the Japanese coast guard and not the regular navy, but Chinese intrusions into Japanese-claimed airspace have been met with fighters from the regular air force.

The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is seen in China and elsewhere as being unusually hawkish. This year the parliament passed legislation creating a new National Security Council, patterned after the American version, and a new official secrets act to allay Washington's concerns of leaking secret defense information.

Other indicators this past year:

- In January a Chinese frigate's radar "locked on" a Japanese destroyer. This is usually perceived as an indicator that the frigate will fire its weapons. The Japanese vessel took evasive action.

- The Japanese navy launched its largest warship, the Izumo, what the Japanese term a "helicopter destroyer," and what the rest of the world might call a light aircraft carrier.

- About a 1,000 Japanese infantry took part in the Dawn Blitz exercise with U.S. Marines at Camp Pendleton training to defend or if necessary retake one or more of the string of islands south of Okinawa.

- As part of an exercise, Japan recently placed anti-ship missiles on Miyako island, which stands beside the Miyako Channel, a strategic waterway wide and deep enough to permit warships to pass through and is sometimes used by the Chinese Navy to exercise in the broader Pacific.

- The Ministry of Defense said it is studying shooting down any Chinese drones that encroach on Japanese sir space after one reportedly hovered near the disputed islands. It reasons that, unlike regular aircraft, unmanned drones cannot respond to warning shots.

Needless to say, there's more than enough to worry about in the new year ahead.

By Todd Crowell who is a freelance writer based in Tokyo.

(AP Photo)

After Near-Collision in S China Sea, China tests New Long-Range Missile

DF-41 is second test of road-mobile, likely MIRV-capable ICBM

China’s military conducted the second flight test of its newest long-range missile that is capable of hitting targets in the United States with a nuclear warhead, according to defense officials.

The flight test of the new Dong Feng-41, or DF-41, took place Friday from the Wuzhai missile launch center in Shanxi province to an impact range in western China, said officials familiar with details of the tests.

It was the second test of the new, road-mobile, long-range ICBM that U.S. intelligence agencies assess will be outfitted with up to 10 multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs.

DF-41D Launcher

Prior to Friday’s flight test, the last DF-41 flight test took place July 24, 2012.

Pentagon spokesmen did not return emails seeking comment on the missile test.

The most recent test indicates that China’s long-range missile development is continuing, and the missile is raising new concerns about China’s professed nuclear doctrine of not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.

Disclosure of the nuclear missile flight test comes as tensions remain heightened between the United States and China over the near collision between the USS Cowpens, a guided missile cruiser, and a Chinese navy tank landing ship in the South China Sea on Dec. 5.

The State Department and Pentagon protested the incident, which involved the Chinese ship stopping in the path of the Cowpens, forcing the cruiser to make an abrupt maneuver to avoid a collision. The incident took place near China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning.

The DF-41, with its range of between 6,835 miles and 7,456 miles and expected multiple-warhead capability, is viewed as a potential “first strike” weapon, or a weapon capable of carrying out a surprise nuclear attack that would knock out an enemy’s arsenal and limit its counterstrike capability.

A report by the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center made public in May referred to China’s development of a new long-range missile with multiple warheads, in addition to current long-range DF-31 and DF-31A mobile ICBMs.

“China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world,” the NASCI report said. “It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.”

“The Chinese ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles.”

Without mentioning the DF-41, the report said, “China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying a MIRV payload, and the number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to well over 100 in the next 15 years.”

Defense officials said the report was referring to the DF-41.

Rick Fisher, a China military affairs expert and senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said reports of the latest DF-41 test coincide with disclosures on Chinese military enthusiast websites showing a new 18-wheel transporter erector launcher for the new DF-41.

“It appears that this new large MIRV-capable ICBM is making progress toward achieving an operational status,” Fisher said.

Fisher said there are reports that the Second Artillery Corps, as China’s missile service is called, includes at least one reload missile for each mobile missile-launcher system.

If the new DF-41 is deployed in the future with a reload missile per launcher, it would vastly increase the numbers of nuclear warheads in the Chinese arsenal, as many as 120 to 240 warheads for each DF-41 unit.

“What this means is that Obama administration suggestions that the United States can continue to reduce its number of deployed warheads, perhaps to 1,000 or less, is simply irrational,” Fisher said.

“What we know and don’t know about China’s ability to rapidly increase its warhead numbers points to an unacceptable level of risk for the United States.”

In addition to the DF-41, China also has begun to deploy its submarine-launched ballistic missile called the JL-2 and may develop a follow-on JL-2A with up to three warheads.

“Inasmuch as the U.S. Navy estimates there will be up to five of the 12-missile carrying Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, this at least indicates that [missile submarines] could become another source for fast Chinese warhead growth,” he said.

The publication Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems reported in 2012 that the Chinese were developing the DF-41, also designated the CSS-X-10, and that it is intended to replace easy-to-target silo-based DF-5 and DF-5A missiles.

Larry Wortzel, a former military intelligence officer and member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, told the House Armed Services Committee in testimony last month that the new DF-41 is part of China’s growing nuclear missile arsenal.

“China is enhancing its nuclear deterrent capability by modernizing its nuclear force,” Wortzel said Nov. 20. “It is taking measures such as developing a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-41. This missile could be equipped with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), allowing it to carry as many as 10 nuclear warheads.”

Wortzel said the Chinese, in addition to MIRVs, could outfit their missiles with “penetration aids” designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses. China also may be developing rail-mobile ICBMs, he said.

The Chinese nuclear buildup could have a profound impact on regional security. China recently has been bullying its neighbors, specifically Japan and Philippines, over islands and maritime claims.

“When China achieves a position of nuclear parity or even superiority, we can expect that it will make far more vigorous demands on the United States that could diminish the security of America and its friends and allies,” Fisher said.

Mark Stokes, a former Pentagon official and specialist on China’s strategic nuclear systems has said the DF-41 has been mentioned in Chinese military writings and appears to involve a larger, solid fuel rocket motor derived from the DF-31 series ICBMS.

Ground tests of the DF-41 motor have been detected over the past several years.

There are suspicions among U.S. intelligence analysts that the DF-41 is based on Russia’s mobile ICBM known as the SS-27 and that the DF-41 will incorporate Russian missile guidance technology.

China in August conducted two flight tests of the DF-31A ICBM and in November 2012, another DF-31A was flight-tested.

Tsai The-sheng, Taiwan’s director of the National Security Bureau, as the intelligence service for the island nation is called, told Taiwan’s legislature that China is still developing the DF-41 and the sub-launched JL-2.

“Neither of them has been deployed at any Chinese military base yet,” Tsai said, the official Central News Agency reported April 15.

Tsai said that China’s fast pace of military technology development makes it very likely the People’s Liberation Army will deploy a multi-warhead DF-41 in the future.

by Bill Gertz

Freebeacon

How China's Weapons Technology Snatchers Are Penetrating US Defenses

OAKLAND, California (Reuters) - Agents from Homeland Security sneaked into a tiny office in Oakland's Chinatown before sunrise on December 4, 2011. They tread carefully, quickly snapping digital pictures so they could put everything back in place. They didn't want Philip Chaohui He, the businessman who rented the space, to learn they had been there.

Seven months had passed since they'd launched an undercover operation against a suspected Chinese arms-trafficking network - one of scores operating in support of Beijing's ambitious military expansion into outer space.

The agents had allowed a Colorado manufacturer to ship He a type of technology that China covets but cannot replicate: radiation-hardened microchips. Known as rad-chips, the dime-sized devices are critical for operating satellites, for guiding ballistic missiles, and for protecting military hardware from nuclear and solar radiation.

It was a gamble. This was a chance to take down an entire Chinese smuggling ring. But if He succeeded in trafficking the rad-chips to China, the devices might someday be turned against U.S. sailors, soldiers or pilots, deployed on satellites providing the battlefield eyes and ears for the People's Liberation Army.

Entering He's office at 2:30 that December morning, the agents looked inside the FedEx boxes. The microchips were gone. The supervisor on the case, Greg Slavens, recoiled.

"There are a bunch of rad-chips headed to China," Slavens recalls thinking, "and I'm responsible.'"

In the past 20 years, the United States has spent trillions of dollars to create and deploy the world's best military technology. It also has enacted laws and regulations aimed at keeping that technology away from potential adversaries such as Iran, North Korea and the nation that poses perhaps the most significant long-term threat to U.S. military supremacy, China.

China's efforts to obtain U.S. technology have tracked its accelerated defense buildup. The Chinese military budget - second only to America's - has soared to close to $200 billion.

President Xi Jinping is championing a renaissance aimed at China's asserting its dominance in the region and beyond. In recent weeks, Beijing has declared control over air space in the contested East China Sea and launched China's first rover mission to the moon.

IMMEDIATE THREAT

As China rises to challenge the United States as a power in the Pacific, American officials say Beijing is penetrating the U.S. defense industry in ways that not only compromise weapons systems but also enable it to secure some of the best and most dangerous technology. A classified Pentagon advisory-board report this year, for instance, asserted that Chinese hackers had gained access to plans for two dozen U.S. weapons systems, according to the Washington Post.

But the smuggling of technology such as radiation-hardened microchips out of America may present a more immediate challenge to the U.S. military, Reuters has found. If China hacks into a sensitive blueprint, years might pass before a weapon can be manufactured. Ready-made components and weapons systems can be - and are - used immediately.

Beijing says its efforts to modernize its military are above-board. "China has mainly relied on itself for research and development and manufacturing," the Chinese defense ministry said in a statement to Reuters. "China always complies with relevant laws and cooperation agreements and protects intellectual property rights."

How often the Chinese succeed at acquiring U.S.-made weaponry or components is unclear. U.S. government officials say they don't know, in part because the problem is too widespread and difficult to track. By its very definition, black market smuggling is hard to monitor and quantify. Quite often, sensitive U.S. technology is legally shipped to friendly nations and then immediately and illegally reshipped to China.

China also presents a special challenge: It is both the largest destination for legally exported American-made goods outside North America and the most or second-most frequent destination for smuggled U.S. technology. A 2010 classified Pentagon assessment showed a spike in legal shipments to China of "dual-use" technology - products that have civilian and military purposes, a person involved in the study said.

The technology products the Chinese military seeks tend to be miniaturized, and thus aren't easily identifiable to U.S. border agents - unlike drugs, for example. And trafficking in these goods isn't technically illegal until someone tries to export them.

"When you think about how many legitimate transactions go to a place like China, it makes it very difficult to track," said Craig Healy, a senior Homeland Security official who directs the U.S. export enforcement center.

Officially published U.S. estimates of how frequently American arms technology gets smuggled are incomplete. By one Pentagon calculation, suspicious queries to U.S. defense manufacturers by entities linked to China increased 88 percent from 2011 to 2012. The government won't disclose the number of cases that underlie that percentage.

U.S. defense and intelligence officials said that although they closely monitor the Chinese buildup, they believe China remains at least a decade behind America. "They still have a long way to go," said one senior U.S. defense official.

Reuters analyzed court records from 280 arms-smuggling cases brought by the U.S. government from October 1, 2005 to October 1, 2013. Reporters also interviewed two dozen counter-proliferation agents and reviewed hundreds of internal Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security and Commerce Department documents.

The number of counter-proliferation arrests related to all countries quadrupled from 54 to 226 from 2010 to 2012, internal law enforcement records show. Since 2008, the number of China-related space-technology investigations - like the undercover case against the Oakland man - has increased approximately 75 percent, U.S. law enforcement sources said. Since late 2012, federal agents say they have begun nearly 80 space-and-satellite-related investigations.

"I think we're getting better at this, but this stuff is rampant," said FBI assistant director for counter-intelligence Robert Anderson Jr. Anderson was referring to cases involving all potentially hostile nations, not just China. "The more you dig in these cases," he said, "the more potential investigations you find."

Said a U.S. diplomat based in China: "I think we do a good job on the cases that we learn about, but it's really just a finger in the dike."

A MAN NAMED "HOPE"

U.S. counter-proliferation agents say the 2011 Oakland sting is typical of dozens launched recently against people trying to acquire space and missile technology for China. It also demonstrates the difficulty in dismantling smuggling networks, even when a target appears patently suspicious from the outset.

The Oakland investigation began in spring 2011. The manufacturer, Aeroflex of Colorado Springs,Colorado, received an email from a man who called himself Philip Hope of Oakland. The man wanted to buy two kinds of rad-chips - 112 of one type and 200 of the other. The total cost:

$549,654.

The initial email triggered suspicion.

People and companies who buy these kinds of rad-chips are usually well-established, repeat customers - more multinational corporation than mom & pop. Aeroflex salesmen had never heard of "Philip Hope" or his company, "Sierra Electronic Instruments."

Most suspicious of all, just days after placing the order, Hope sent Aeroflex a certified check for the full amount, $549,654. That was rare. Buyers were expected to make a deposit, but nobody paid up front.

The suspicious Aeroflex employees contacted Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which keeps a special counter-proliferation office in the space technology hub of Colorado Springs.

Based on quick record checks, the HSI agents drew a portrait of "Philip Hope." The man was a Chinese immigrant and legal permanent resident, Philip Chaohui He, an engineer for the state of California assigned to a Bay Bridge renovation project. Sierra Electronic Instruments was a start-up run from the one-room office in Chinatown.

The HSI agents concluded that He was buying the rad-chips on behalf of someone else. Someone rich. Someone who couldn't legally acquire them. Probably someone in China - likely the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, a state-run entity that operates nearly all of China's military and civilian space projects.

China Aerospace officials did not respond to requests for comment. An official at a Shanghai subsidiary said he was unaware of the He purchases.

The rad-chips He ordered from Aeroflex are not the most powerful on the market, and could not operate a sophisticated military satellite on their own. But experts say they have few uses other than as one of the many components of a sophisticated satellite.

"You wouldn't spend that kind of money on those microchips unless you intended to use them in much bigger satellites," said Alvar Saenz-Otero, associate director of the Space Systems Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "They fit the design of a satellite that you'd want to stay in space for a reasonably long time, and therefore are likely small parts of a bigger satellite."

Despite the concerns about where and how the components might be used, He's order of 312 rad-chips violated no law. These chips may be legally sold domestically, and to foreign buyers who obtain a State Department license. They may not be exported outside the United States to certain nations, including China. He had the chips sent to his office address in Oakland, making the deal legal. If He tried to take them abroad, he'd be breaking the law.

THE AGENTS' DILEMMA

The agents faced the key question that comes in almost every counter-proliferation case: Could they lure the suspect into a sting? If so, would it be worth the trouble?

Undercover operations are time-consuming, expensive and risky. If agents dangled rad-chips in front of the suspect and he got away, the components would probably end up on Chinese satellites. If they delivered the chips and watched him closely, he might lead them to a network traceable to Beijing.

The agents in the case faced another complication: At the time, Aeroflex - the very manufacturer enlisted to help with the sting - was itself under civil investigation for sending rad-chips to China.

Although that investigation was still under way, Aeroflex had already admitted that it sent more tha n14,500 rad-chips to China between 2003 and 2008. Aeroflex exported more than half of those chips even after U.S. officials had directed it to stop doing so.

The company declined to comment. But documents show two mitigating factors - Aeroflex voluntarily disclosed the transgressions, and it blamed them in part on misreading complex and sometimes competing Commerce Department and State Department regulations.

Even so, State Department regulators would ultimately conclude: "The exports directly supported Chinese satellites and military aircraft, and caused harm to U.S. national security."

Thus, if the HSI agents wanted to attempt a sting against the man in Oakland, they would have to trust a company that had admitted aiding a potential enemy on a much larger scale.

On July 28, 2011, a federal agent posing as a Federal Express driver arrived at He's office building in Oakland. The agent handed He's wife a package containing the first order, 112 rad-chips. She leaned it against a wall.

The undercover agent wore a hidden camera that recorded the office's 10-by-12-foot interior. The place had sleeping bags and mattresses on the floor. There was no satellite research equipment.

The agent departed, but not before leaving a tiny surveillance device. For the next five weeks, the device indicated that the box didn't move. Agents also put a camera outside the office door, placed a keystroke-logger on He's computer and monitored his movements based on his cell phone location. They placed his name on an automated watch list at airports and border crossings.

But they didn't have the manpower to tail him. He slipped out of the country on September 6, taking a flight to San Diego and driving across the border at Tijuana.

The agents received an automated security alert only the following day, September 7. They also learned that He was booked on a flight from Tijuana to Shanghai that evening. It was too late. They'd missed him.

Was China about to receive 112 military-grade microchips for its space program? There was no way to know for sure.

The agents had two options: Drop the case, or send He the second batch of chips and try to catch him exporting those.

ANOTHER SURPRISE

On October 6, an undercover agent helped FedEx deliver the second shipment, 200 radiation-hardened chips. Once again, the agents waited and watched.

When two months passed with no indication that He had moved the microchips, Slavens sought the sneak-and-peak warrant. The late night search, on December 4, turned up empty boxes. Slavens then sought a warrant for He's home and renewed the airport and border look-outs.

On the morning of December 10 - before the agents could complete the search warrants - the smuggler surprised them again. An agent noticed He's cell phone on the move, far south of Oakland, heading toward Los Angeles - presumably to Tijuana again, and then on to China. Slavens scrambled Homeland Security Investigations agents near Los Angeles.

The L.A. agents followed the cell-tracker to a Best Western hotel south of the city. In the early evening, they located He's Honda sedan in the hotel parking lot. They confirmed that He had checked in, and they settled in for surveillance.

At about 8:45 a.m. on December 11, 2011, He left his hotel room with an unidentified traveling companion and pulled the Honda onto Interstate 110, driving south. Tijuana was two hours away. The HSI agents planned to stop him at the Mexico border.

But after just 3 miles, He pulled into the Port of Long Beach. Then, he used a Transportation Safety Administration pass - a badge he carried for his Bay Bridge repair assignment - to swiftly get through port security.

The agents caught up as the Honda drew near a red and white cargo ship flying a Chinese flag. Stenciled on the mast were the letters ZPMC. This was the same company with the Bay Bridge repair contract to which He had been assigned by the California transit agency. A coincidence? The agents couldn't be sure. (ZPMC did not respond to requests from Reuters for comment.)

HSI agents stopped He and his friend as they approached the ship captain. An agent opened the trunk. Stuffed inside a tub of Similac infant formula, authorities found 200 radiation-hardened Aeroflex microchips.

The agents say the captain told them that he expected to receive "household goods" and other consumer purchases from He for delivery to friends in China. The captain and He's driving companion were permitted to leave. He was handcuffed.

Under questioning, He told the agents that he'd started his Oakland business at the behest of a Shanghai electronics broker who promised to reward him with a condominium in China for his assistance.

THE MISSING CHIPS

In August, more than five years after Aeroflex admitted wrongdoing, the State Department announced an $8 million fine for the company's 2003 to 2008 satellite microchip shipments to China. If Aeroflex completes remedial measures, such as training employees to follow rules the company already should have been following, half of the fine will be suspended.

In September, He pleaded guilty in federal court in Colorado. He is scheduled to be sentenced Wednesday. Federal guidelines call for a sentence of 46 to 57 months.

In a court filing, his lawyer disputed the government's assertion that He knew the rad-chips were destined for use by the Chinese government. Assistant federal defender Robert Pepin said He believed they would be used for commercial mining satellites. Pepin said He deserves a sentence of no more than 24 months, noting that He faces certain deportation when his sentence concludes, and potential separation from his children, who are U.S.-born citizens.

"The life he knew and enjoyed is destroyed," Pepin said.

Despite the scope of the investigation, no one else was charged. The others in the suspected network - the ship captain, the Shanghai broker, the traveling partner and another Oakland suspect - were not arrested.

The fate of the first shipment of 112 radiation-hardened chips - the ones that got away - is unknown. U.S. officials strongly suspect they are either in China or orbiting the Earth aboard one of Beijing's satellites.

(Edited by Blake Morrison)

This post originally appeared at Reuters. Copyright 2013.

U.S. announces new maritime security aid to Vietnam

HANOI, Vietnam -- The United States will boost maritime security assistance to China's smaller neighbours amid rising tensions over disputed territories in the South China Sea, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on Monday during a visit to Vietnam, where he also pressed the communist government on human rights and democratic and economic reforms.

The U.S. will provide an additional $32.5 million to help Southeast Asian nations protect their territorial waters and secure navigational freedom, Kerry said. Vietnam alone will receive up to $18 million, including five fast patrol-boats that will be given to the Vietnamese Coast Guard, he said. With the new contribution, U.S. maritime security assistance to the region will exceed $156 million over the next two years, the State Department said.

At a news conference Monday with Vietnam's Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, Kerry said the assistance was not a "quickly conceived reaction to any events in the region" but rather part of a "gradual and deliberate expansion" in such aid. But he made clear that the aid is designed to help nations defend their waters from encroachment.


"Peace and stability in the South China Sea is a top priority for us and for countries in the region," Kerry said. "We are very concerned by and strongly opposed to coercive and aggressive tactics to advance territorial claims."

Kerry's visit to Vietnam, to be followed by a stop in the Philippines on Tuesday, comes as tensions over conflicting claims to territory in the South China Sea have risen dramatically, and many of China's neighbours are seeking assurances from Washington that it will remain a guarantor of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Both Vietnam and the Philippines are involved in disputes with China. Monday's announcement was likely to rankle Beijing and calm concerns in Vietnam and other countries that the United States might be acquiescing to China's shows of strength.

China's growing assertiveness in the region -- including the establishment of a new air defence zone over parts of the East China Sea over strenuous U.S. objections -- has alarmed many, including Vietnam.
China and Vietnam fought a bloody border war in 1979, and in 1988 a naval battle close to disputed islands in the seas left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. Disputes over fishing rights in the region have triggered occasional violent incidents and hiked up diplomatic tensions since then.

Hanoi is especially worried about nationalist anger toward its giant neighbour and nominal ideological ally morphing into protests against its own authoritarian rule.

At Monday's news conference, Kerry had harsh words for China over the East China Sea defence zone, saying it increased the risk of "miscalculation" and possible conflict between China and Japan.
The United States is "very concerned about recent actions that have increased tensions between China and Japan and we call for intensified negotiations and diplomatic initiatives. This move clearly increases the risk of a dangerous miscalculation or an accident, and it could escalate tensions even further," he said.

"The zone should not be implemented, and China should refrain from taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea," Kerry said, reiterating that zones would not affect U.S. military operations in the region.

Beijing regards the entire South China Sea and island groups within it as its own and interprets international law as giving it the right to police foreign naval activity there. The Chinese navy is operating with increasing frequency in the South China Sea and around Japan as part of China's development of its blue water navy.

Kerry said the U.S. was "very concerned by" and opposed to any kind of coercive action in the South China Sea disputes, and he urged China and Japan to engage in "intensive diplomatic" discussions to ease tension and resolve their dispute over territories in the East China Sea.
Tensions were highlighted earlier this month when a Chinese warship nearly collided with an American cruiser in the South China Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet has said the USS Cowpens was operating in international waters and had to manoeuvr to avoid hitting China's lone aircraft carrier, Liaoning, on Dec. 5.
However, China's Global Times newspaper reported on Monday that the U.S. ship had first harassed the Liaoning and its group of support ships, getting too close to a Chinese naval drill and entering within 30 miles of the Chinese fleet's "inner defence layer."

China vigorously opposes all U.S. Naval activity and intelligence gathering in the region. The Pacific Fleet says it's not uncommon for navies to operate in close proximity, and that's why it is paramount they all follow international standards for maritime "rules of the road."

The U.S. has said repeatedly that it does not have a position on the competing sovereignty claims, but it has said that freedom of navigation in one of the world's busiest commercial maritime shipping zones is a national security interest and insists on its Navy's right to transit the area and collect surveillance data.

The Obama administration has been urging China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to adopt binding rules of conduct for activity in the South China Sea.

In addition to maritime security, Kerry, who is on his 14th visit to Vietnam since the end of the war in 1975 but his first as secretary of state, pressed Vietnamese officials to release political prisoners and improve its human rights record, particularly on religious and Internet freedoms.

Kerry said the United States was pleased that limited progress had been made in those areas but wanted to see more.

"Vietnam needs to show continued progress on human rights and freedoms, including freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of association," he said.

Kerry noted that without reforms, members of Congress would likely oppose expanded engagement with Vietnam, including its participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership and the implementation of a recently concluded civilian nuclear agreement.

Kerry added that he had raised the cases of specific political prisoners and had a "very direct and healthy" exchange.

Minh, the foreign minister, allowed that there are differences between Hanoi and Washington on human rights but said they would be addressed through dialogue.

Free-market economic reforms will also be critical to overall improvement in U.S.-Vietnamese relations as well as to Hanoi reaping full benefits of a the Trans Pacific Partnership, which the U.S. is negotiating with 11 Asia-Pacific nations, including Vietnam, according to American officials.
Associated Press writer Chris Brummit contributed to this report.

ctvnews

Face-offs between Indian, Chinese troops can occur: Antony

NEW DELHI: Not ruling out the possibility of incidents such as face-offs between their troops, defence minister AK Antony said on Monday India and China have now decided to resolve such issues amicably through the existing mechanisms.

On the incident where five Indian nationals were apprehended by Chinese troops inside Indian territory, he said the Indians apprehended by PLA troops were civilians and not Army personnel and the matter was resolved amicably.

"Now our decision is to maintain peace and tranquility. Whenever any incident takes place, that possibility cannot be ruled out as the boundary is very long ... both sides should come together and resolve it amicably," the defence minister said.

He was asked to comment on the situation along the Line of Actual Control in the sidelines of the Vijay Diwas to mark Indian victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan.

On the boundary talks with China, the minister said the country should not "expect miracles" in these parleys.

"Don't expect miracles in resolving the issue. What we are trying is that till a satisfactory solution on boundary issue is found, whenever incidents take place on border, through discussions and official mechanism, resolve those issues. Of late, we have been able to resolve the issues without much delays. That is an improvement," he said.

On the impact of the newly-signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, he said, "After the agreement, by and large, whenever any issue arises, we are able to resolve it as quickly as possible. It does not mean that there would not be any issues as long as the India-China border issue is unsettled, there can always be a possibility..."

He said during his and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China, both the countries had decided to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC.

"We have been able to take a decision, till we find a peaceful solution to the boundary issue, " he said.

Video: India commemorates 42nd anniversary of its 1971 war victory



Times Of India

Russia Resumes Weapons Sales to China

From Russia Without Love: Russia Resumes Weapons Sales to China
(Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dec 12, 2013)

In March 2013, Russian and Chinese media reported that Beijing was acquiring significant quantities of advanced military equipment from Russia. Among the multi-billion dollar systems to be bought by the Chinese military are six Lada-class attack submarines and 35 SU-35 fighter jets.

These acquisitions are significant because they are sophisticated systems and it has been more than a decade since China purchased any significant weapon systems from Moscow.

India To Train Vietnamese Sailors, Expand Ties

An Indian Kilo-class submarine will be used to train Vietnamese sailors in submarine warfare. (Sebastian D'Douza/Agence France-Presse)

NEW DELHI — India will train Vietnamese sailors in submarine warfare as part of its effort to reinforce defense ties with countries across the Asia-Pacific region.

The development is expected to disturb Beijing, analysts and officials said, and will be closely watched by Pakistan.

Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class subs from the Russian Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg to add to its of two South Korean-made Yugo-class midget submarines. India has operated Kilos since 1986.

Like India, Vietnam has fought with China and is fast emerging as an economic power in the region, said an Indian Navy official, who said New Delhi should aid Vietnam in any way it can.

“The Sino-Indian ties are poised in a very delicate phase with many ups and downs,” said Probal Ghosh, a senior fellow with the Observer Research Foundation. “This will definitely affect the ties, even though China is well aware that we are supporting Vietnam for strategic gains against China.

“There is a likelihood that it may prove to be the impetus for China to consider giving Pakistan a nuclear submarine,” Ghosh added. “Such a move will really up the ante and will affect India’s security calculus considerably.”

However, analysts agree that India should warm ties with Vietnam, despite Beijing’s response.

“It is important that we engage with Vietnam,” defense analyst Anil Jai Singh said. “It is an emerging country in the region; we have always had good relations with it and we must engage economically, politically and militarily to develop a strong bilateral relationship. We are doing this independent of the US, but they would not be averse to our growing relationship. If China gets disturbed, well, so be it.”

A diplomat from the Vietnamese Embassy here said defense cooperation is a pillar of strategic partnership between the two coun­tries, which he said will increase further to include joint development of defense projects but declined to specify details.

India will train Vietnamese sailors to operate submarines and to engage in underwater warfare, said the Indian Navy source, adding that the training would take place on a Russian-made Kilo sub.

India has also decided to give a $100 million credit line to Vietnam to buy military equipment, including offshore patrol vessels, an Indian Defence Ministry source said, but a deal hasn’t been formalized.

The extension of military credit would be the first India has given to any country.

India and Vietnam are jointly exploring for oil in the Phu Kanh basin of the South China Sea, which Vietnam says is within its zone of influence, a claim China disputes.

Vietnam has been negotiating with India to acquire the supersonic anti-ship cruise missile BrahMos, which is built jointly here by India and Russia. No deal has been finalized to sell the missile, which has land and sea versions, with an air version under development.

Sale of the BrahMos is questionable because Russia has friendly relations with China, and there could be issues relating to international controls. The BrahMos’ 290-kilometer range could be extended beyond 300 kilometers, putting it under Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions.

“I think the restrictive regimes would preclude any such thing happening in the near future. India itself would consider such a possibility very carefully,” Singh said.

As their ties strengthen, “India could ... consider ... including Vietnam in the future network-centric warfare program,”defense analyst Nitin Mehta said.

By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, Defense News