China plans to build 4 carriers, including nuclear: report

China plans to build four aircraft carriers in total to boost its naval power and exert its maritime claims, according to a Russian media report.

Official reports in January said that the PLA plans to have at least two aircraft carriers by 2015 or 2016 and said the country's second aircraft carrier is indeed under construction as previous unofficial reports had claimed. The country plans to build four aircraft carriers in total, the state newswire Xinhua citing a Russian weekly newspaper as reporting.

China commissioned the Liaoning, a refitted Soviet-era carrier purchased from Ukraine, in 2012. Future carriers are expected to be built domestically and take the Liaoning as their blueprint, at least initially.

The report further said construction appears to be behind schedule, but Beijing has mapped out a clear plan for its development. China's aircraft carrier program is set to be implemented in two phases, the report said, the aim being to build two carriers to establish carrier battle fleets to operate while two more advanced carriers are developed.

The report said the first two planned conventionally powered aircraft carriers may have a displacement of between 50,000 to 55,000 tonnes. The second phase may see the construction of two nuclear-powered carriers with an electromagnetic catapult system and displacement of 65,000 tonnes. These could possibly enter service by the late 2020s.

In order to carry out the second phase, the government approved a plan in February to build vessels that use nuclear power, the report said.

However, the Ministry of National Defense denied claims that it has plans to build more aircraft carriers at present.

The Communist Party secretary of Liaoning province, Wang Min, had said in January that an aircraft carrier was being built in Dalian, the port city where the Liaoning carrier was refitted. But reports related to Wang's remarks were promptly deleted from the internet for unknown reasons.

Want China Times

Vietnam anti-China activists mark 1979 war

China invaded Vietnam's northernmost provinces in February 1979, angered by Vietnam's ousting of the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.

Protesters in Hanoi shout anti-China slogans in Vietnamese that means "The people has never forgotten, 1979 - 2014" during a rally marking the anniversary of the border war with China on February 16, 2014 (AFP, Hoang Dinh Nam)

-->See more picture

Vietnamese activists have marked the 35th anniversary of a bloody border war with China, chanting slogans, singing patriotic songs and laying flowers at a temple in central Hanoi.

The two communist countries are locked in long-standing territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, and often trade diplomatic barbs over oil exploration and fishing rights in the contested waters.

Beijing's increasingly assertive stance in the South China Sea has triggered public anger and rare protests in authoritarian Vietnam where the demonstrations are sometimes allowed to go ahead and on other occasions forcefully broken up.

China invaded Vietnam's northernmost provinces in February 1979, angered by Vietnam's ousing of the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.

The short but bloody conflict claimed tens of thousands of lives on both sides and ended with Chinese forces withdrawing and both Hanoi and Beijing claiming victory.

Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia until 1989.

Although Vietnam fetes its military victories over the French and American armies, it has not arranged any official events to mark the China border war - much to the chagrin of veterans and activists.

"Vietnamese leaders may have received pressure from China, so they don't want to talk about that war. They seem to want to deny the past," Nguyen Trong Vinh, a former Vietnamese ambassador to China, told AFP.

China has long been one of Vietnam's largest trading partners, state media has said, with bilateral trade at more than $US40 billion ($A45 billion) in 2012.

On Sunday, around 100 activists tried to lay flowers at a statue of Ly Thai To - the founder of Hanoi and a nationalist figurehead - in the centre of the capital.

But dozens of people had been at the monument since early morning, playing loud music and dancing, which prevented the protesters from holding their planned ceremony - in what activists said was a counter protest.

"It was deliberate... they (authorities) hired many people," economist Nguyen Quang told AFP at the protest.

Protesters, wearing red headbands and carrying white roses with black ribbons saying "the people will never forget", then walked around the central Hoan Kiem lake.

They laid their flowers and made brief speeches at the Ngoc Son Temple - a popular tourist destination - before peacefully dispersing.

Plain clothed and uniformed police closely monitored the event but did not make any arrests.

Source AAP

Video: Vietnam's steel forces to protect its northern border with China

With a total length of border land is 4.639km, which borders China is 1.281km, complex terrain, has been through many historical events and tasks firmly safeguard national sovereignty located in the northern frontier on the role of the armed forces is extremely Vietnam glorious but also very heavy.

To accomplish that task, the Vietnam People's Army has built strong shield, elite training, modern equipment, always uphold the spirit of vigilance, ready to overcome all difficulties, hardships, ready to use all the blood and bone minds, youth and enthusiasm to fight and win all enemies.

Vietnam and China: A Dangerous Incident

A new Chinese documentary offers startling revelations from a 2007 confrontation in the South China Sea.

In early January 2014, video of a recent CCTV4 documentary “Blue Frontiers Guard” appeared online, providing a detailed history of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) spanning from roughly 2007 up until the present. The documentary, in Chinese with English subtitles, begins with footage of an incident that occurred on June 30, 2007 between various government vessels from Vietnam and China in the disputed waters off the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The incident, having previously gone largely unreported, is covered in tremendous detail, providing a new frame of reference for analyzing wider debates over Chinese assertiveness and the U.S. “rebalance” to the region. In addition, the video also provides a number of new insights into organizations such as CMS and its parent organization, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), including the tactics and command and control arrangements of their vessels when out at sea.

The 2007 incident apparently resulted from an attempt by a China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) survey vessel to conduct what the documentary termed “normal operations” in the waters off the Western Paracel islands beginning on June 26 of that year. Such operations are seen as anything but normal by the Vietnamese, who continue to claim the islands despite China having forcefully occupied them since 1974. Hanoi dispatched a fleet consisting largely of naval auxiliary vessels to prevent the Chinese from surveying the waters. A tense standoff ensued, culminating in reckless maneuvers by Chinese CMS vessels that led to a number of serious collisions, threatening the safety of all crews.

The Vietnamese vessels initially expelled the CNPC survey vessel from the area, and the China State Oceanic Administration (SOA) responded by promptly organizing a “rights safeguarding and law enforcement” campaign, dubbed Enforcement Action Code 626. According to the documentary, such operations exist outside the scope of regular enforcement patrols, and in addition to CMS ships already in the vicinity, SOA dispatched CMS vessels numbered 83 and 51 to the area as part of the campaign. They arrived on June 29 and formed up in “alert order,” with two ships both fore and aft on either side of the CNPC vessel, attempting to escort it back into the area for the second time.

After failing to verbally persuade the Vietnamese vessels to leave the area and allow the survey to commence, the CMS vessels first initiated a protective cordon around the CNPC ship, then began to initiate a number of offensive naval maneuvers. These maneuvers began at the lower end of the spectrum with shouldering, but subsequently escalated to direct bow to bridge ramming after the Vietnamese naval auxiliary vessel DN 29 broke through the cordon. The offensive actions were undertaken on direct orders from the CMS higher command at SOA, who commanded the captains of the vessels to intentionally initiate collisions with the Vietnamese ships. According to the Deputy Director General of SOA’s South China Sea Bureau, he and other commanding officials were “stressed” over the risk to their own crews’ safety, but nevertheless “asked them to hit other vessels.” Such offensive maneuvers are considered by senior leadership at SOA to be more effective as they preempt possible aggressive maneuvers by the other side. The same SOA official is quoted in the video as stating that “based on our years long operational experience, it is much easier to attack than to defend.” These comments serve as a strong indication that at least some ranking SOA officials have a preference for preemptive action, and that the organization itself, now in charge of the restructured China Coast Guard, could be promoting an offensive operational doctrine.

Rather than rogue or overzealous captains misinterpreting vague guidance, this incident provides conclusive evidence that the impetus for the collisions originated with very specific orders from the upper levels of the organization’s central leadership back on the Chinese mainland. The captains of the CMS vessels view such tactics as tools accessible to them, but only use them following orders from their higher command. As the captain of CMS vessel number 84 states in the video: “as long as the commander gives an order, be it hitting, ramming, or crashing, we will perform our duty resolutely.”

The tactics used in this incident are reminiscent of encounters that took place at sea between the U.S. and USSR in the early years of the Cold War. Recent encounters between the American and Chinese navies elsewhere in the South China Sea, such as that involving the USS Cowpens in December, bring such parallels into stark contrast. While some commentators stressed the role of the activities undertaken by the Cowpens in causing the incident, the 2007 incident off the Paracels begs the question of whether or not the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) shares the same operational doctrine as its ostensibly civilian counterpart. The Cowpens incident reportedly involved the use of similar tactics, with a Chinese amphibious ship shouldering the U.S. destroyer after it was asked but failed to leave the area, eventually leading to a near collision between the two vessels. That there would be doctrinal overlap between the PLAN and SOA is a distinct possibility, with the two organizations continuing to strengthen already close ties as part of plans outlined at a recent annual meeting held between their senior officials.

The CCTV4 documentary is remarkable not only for the level of detail it provides on collisions that occurred in 2007 as a result of Cold War-era tactics, but also because it provides this information in a tone that seemingly condones and even endorses such actions. In addition to comments from SOA officials discussing the “glorious end” to the confrontation, the narrator in the documentary describes it as a “grand battle,” of which the outcome is apparently regarded as successful. The Chinese leadership has reportedly viewed similar incidents as having been settled in China’s favor, including the 2012 standoff at Scarborough Shoal, and may even have begun reformulating a maritime strategy based on the “Scarborough Model.” Yet the CCTV documentary suggests that the “Scarborough Model” is by no means new, and that the operational concept of using civilian maritime law enforcement vessels to conduct maritime “rights safeguarding” or “rights protection” campaigns has quite possibly been in the works for some time, since at least 2007.

These insights also illuminate an important point in the wider debate over what has been referred to as a more assertive or even aggressive Chinese foreign policy, and its relationship to the “pivot” or “rebalancing” policy undertaken by the Obama administration. Despite the initial signs of this newly assertive foreign policy often being traced to the 2009-2010 period, China had already begun as early as 2007 to undertake a series of provocative actions that seemed designed to assert greater authority and jurisdiction over its claims in the South China Sea. The resulting confrontation described above indicates that Chinese assertiveness not only predated the rebalance, but the Obama administration itself.

Scott Bentley is a PHD candidate at the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA), researching maritime security strategies in Southeast Asia.

Brahmos M displayed at Defexpo 14

A model of Brahmos M was displayed at Defexpo 14. As the next generation of the current Brahmos, the missile will have reduced dimmensions, lower weight and higher speed, compared to the current BrahMos. It will be three meter shorter, with a diameter 190mm smaller, compared to the Brahmos. Its weight will be 1500kg, about 500 less than Brahmos. Optimized for airborne and tube-launched submarine applications, Brahmos M will have a range of 300 km (290 for Brahmos) and its speed will be increased to 3.5 Mach (2.8 max in Brahmos). The missile will have stealth features to reduce radar signature and will also have improved electronic counter-countermeasures. The new missile could be operational by 2017, on Indian Su-30MKI, MiG-29 and MiG-29K of the Indian Army and Naval Aviation arm.

More about DefExpo 2014: http://defense-update.com/20140207_defexpo-2014-photo-report-part-ii.html

Document: Vietnam declared victory over China's invasion in 1979

The document of The National Library of Vietnam:

The People newspaper (Nhan Dan newspaper) published on Febrary 18, 1979

- Declaration of the Government of The Socialist Republic of Vietnam about Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

- Editorial: Determined to return the barbaric invaders, firmly safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the sacred fatherland!

- Vietnamese Foreign Ministers emergency sent fax to the Chairman of the UN Security Council and the General secretary of The UN

- To protect every inch of the sacred soil of the Fatherland. Vietnamese army and Vietnamese people severely punished Chinese invaders across the border from Phong Tho to Mong Cai...

The People newspaper published on March 20, 1979:

The newspaper with the article in Vietnamese that means "The resounding and comprehensive victory - 600,000 Chinese invading soldiers defeated"

- On Febrary 17, 1979 to March 18, 1979: 62,500 Chinese soldiers have been killed, destroyed 280 Chinese tanks, 270 military trucks, 115 artillery and mortars, confiscating a lot of vehicles and arrested many war prisoners....

Chinese Marine Corps

Lessons from the Battle of the Paracel Islands

Forty years on, the battle has enduring lessons for Vietnam’s naval modernization.

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By Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin
January 23, 2014

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On January 16, 1974, the Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVN) discovered the presence of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Crescent Group in the western Paracel Islands, which was held by South Vietnam. This was an unexpected development, because notwithstanding the reduced U.S. military assistance to Saigon after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, and subsequent reduction of South Vietnamese garrisons on the islands, the Chinese had not taken unilateral actions to subvert the status quo – by which the Amphitrite Group in the eastern Paracels and the Crescent Group were respectively under Chinese and South Vietnamese control.

Over the next two days, the opposing naval forces jostled with one another in close-proximity maneuvers off the islands, before a firefight erupted as the South Vietnamese troops attempted to recapture Duncan Island. The skirmish subsequently escalated with overwhelming Chinese reinforcements deployed to the clash zone, including close air support staged from nearby Hainan Island and missile-armed Hainan-class patrol vessels. Shorn of American naval support, given that the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet was then scaling down its presence in the South China Sea following the peace accords of 1973, the RVN was utterly defeated. Beijing swiftly exploited the naval victory with an amphibious landing in force to complete its control of all the Paracel Islands.

The Battle of the Paracel Islands has since gone down history as the first Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the quest for control over the South China Sea isles. The Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the nearby Spratly Islands in 1988 was the second and final such instance. Since then, tensions have eased. There have been continued exchanges at the ruling party level and between the countries’ militaries (including the hosting of a PLA Navy South Sea Fleet delegation to a Vietnamese naval base). Beijing and Hanoi have also recently inaugurated mutual consultations on joint marine resource development in the South China Sea.

However, the Battle of Paracel Islands in 1974 yields some useful and enduring lessons for Hanoi and its ongoing naval modernization in the South China Sea, particularly in the face of geopolitical developments.

Enduring Lesson #1: Diplomacy is the First Recourse… But Not the Sole Recourse

No international and regional treaties constitute perfect safeguards against unilateral action, including threat or use of force. The landmark Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea inked in 2002 between China and the Southeast Asian claimants has not been entirely successful. In fact, unilateral actions aimed at subverting the status quo in the South China Sea by threat or use of force has continued to dominate. Recent video footage revealed by China’s CCTV in January 2014 showed a standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement ships off the Paracel Islands back in 2007. More recent, recurring incidents included the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships by Chinese vessels, the Sino-Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and, later, the show of force by Chinese surveillance ships and naval frigates off the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal. These episodes bear an eerie resemblance to the sort of naval jostling that led to the skirmish back in 1974.

Even as the South China Sea claimants engaged in consultations on a Code of Conduct, upon unilaterally declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in December 2013, Beijing declared indisputable rights to create ADIZs in other areas if it so desired. An ADIZ over the South China Sea, if ever established, would undoubtedly strengthen Beijing’s hand over the disputed waters, augmenting regular unilateral fishing bans, an earlier expanded maritime law enforcement authority for the Hainan authorities as well as the latest Chinese fisheries law requiring foreign fishing vessels to seek permission from Beijing to operate in much of the South China Sea. These developments, if they continue unabated, will only heighten the risk of accidental or premeditated clashes in the disputed waters.

Enduring Lesson #2: Extra-regional Powers Neither Always Stay… Nor Always Help

There has been growing interest among extra-regional powers in the South China Sea. Besides the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalancing, Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has intensified its Southeast Asian diplomatic offensive, one of the objectives being to promote Tokyo’s territorial stance in the East China Sea. Vietnam has become one of the major beneficiaries of this development. During the 4th U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue held in Washington in late October 2013, an agreement was reached to enhance maritime security cooperation. In the same month, Tokyo was reportedly keen to supply patrol vessels as part of a plan to bolster Vietnam’s maritime security capacity-building efforts. Also notable, Hanoi is enjoying budding defense ties with New Delhi, having hosted regular Indian Navy port visits in the past decade.

Still, none of the extra-regional powers has taken any side on the South China Sea disputes, preferring to focus only on freedom of navigation. This means that even though Washington or Tokyo have legitimate reasons to intervene if vital sea lines of communications through the South China Sea are threatened by the specter of armed conflict, any extra-regional help is far from certain. For instance, even if the U.S. Pacific Command is able to detect tell-tale signs of unusual Chinese military movements in the South China Sea, it may not be able to react in time. The U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, as part of the rebalancing strategy, has intensified maritime surveillance in the area: the new Littoral Combat Ship U.S.S. Freedom is said to be conducting more than mere training missions in the area while the U.S. Navy was reported to have stepped up maritime aerial surveillance since July 2012.

However, during the skirmish in 1974 Saigon sought assistance from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, but it was under orders not to intervene in the disputes and no help arrived for the RVN off the Paracels. Washington is likely to adopt the same stance today, even if a renewed Sino-Vietnamese naval clash were to erupt, especially in localized contexts that do not necessarily impinge upon freedom of navigation by other users. Moreover, the present and future PLA Navy South Sea Fleet is no longer the same run-down, coastal-oriented force operating Soviet-era small patrol and attack forces it used to be. With its steady accumulation of force projection capabilities, including amphibious assault, the PLA Navy is in a better position than back in 1974 to deploy sizeable forces over sustained durations at greater distances to assert sovereignty, and its overall combat power will be far more potent if ever unleashed in the South China Sea.

Enduring Lesson #3: The Need for At Least Limited Sea Control Capabilities

There is no way for Vietnam to quantitatively match the PLA naval capabilities in the South China Sea. Consistent with Hanoi’s policy pronunciations, an arms race with China is not only impossible in the first place, but is considered potentially detrimental to Vietnam’s ongoing Renovation process. Vietnam’s post-Cold War naval modernization has been predicated on filling capacity shortfalls after previous decades of neglect. In recent years, the Vietnam People’s Navy had made notable strides in acquiring new hardware to replace the ageing Soviet-era equipment. However, the new, mostly Russian-supplied capabilities, such as Gepard-3.9 light frigates, Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2V Flanker multi-role fighters equipped for maritime strike and Yakhont/Bastion coastal defense missile batteries, Dutch-built SIGMA-class corvettes as well as locally-built coastal patrol and attack craft all point to a force modernization pathway based primarily on denying an adversary access to the disputed zone. They do not suggest an ability to secure Vietnam’s own access.

Yet, the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 highlighted the need to not just deny an adversary from blockading the South China Sea features but also to secure Vietnam’s own access to those exposed and vulnerable garrisons. Only a shift from sea denial to sea control can hope to attain that. Given the durable peace along the land borders with her neighbors, Vietnam should logically emphasize air-sea warfighting capabilities. For status quo-oriented Vietnam, much akin to what Saigon was back in 1974, the foreseeable combat scenario in a renewed South China Sea clash will encompass the need for Vietnamese forces to recapture seized features, or at least reinforce existing garrisons in the face of hostile attack. Under this scenario, Vietnam’s defense predicament is perhaps no different from Japan’s with respect to the East China Sea dispute. Tokyo has outlined in its recent new defense strategy the need for robust, integrated mobile defense, which envisaged the need for the Self-Defense Force to recapture the East China Sea isles in times of hostilities. Certainly Vietnam cannot hope to muster the same range of capabilities as Japan could, given economic constraints. To build at least limited sea control capabilities, Hanoi ought to focus on improving early warning and expanding amphibious sealift capacity.

Existing Vietnamese early warning capabilities are vested in a static electronic surveillance network arrayed along the Vietnamese mainland coast and in occupied South China Sea features, augmented only in recent years by maritime patrol aircraft of the Vietnamese navy and coastguard. These planes are mainly designed for surface surveillance, yet are handicapped in endurance and lack adequate anti-submarine warfare capabilities especially in view of the increasing PLA submarine challenge. A high-endurance maritime patrol aircraft fitted with longer-range sensors will be appropriate, and arguably more survivable than static installations. The Vietnam Naval Infantry, which specializes in amphibious assault and has been streamlined over the decades, has become a leaner yet meaner force with the acquisition of better equipment. Still, it remains short on amphibious sealift capacity, given that the Soviet and ex-U.S. vintage landing ships were too old and mostly no longer operational. Hanoi’s fledgling naval shipbuilders have so far produced a small handful of new assault transports ostensibly to fill this gap. However, more such vessels are required to enable the Vietnam Naval Infantry to project more substantial forces with greater rapidity in order to reinforce the South China Sea garrisons or to recapture them from an adversary.

Final Thoughts

The Battle of the Paracel Islands might have happened a long forty years ago. Still, even though the South China Sea has seen relative peace, it pays for Hanoi to remain vigilant by sustaining the pace of its naval modernization attempts. While diplomacy is the preferred recourse and extra-regional powers have become more heavily involved in the region, adequate military power in the form of defense self-help remains necessary, especially when the area continues to be fraught with uncertainty. Compared to the RVN, for now and in the foreseeable future the Vietnam People’s Navy and Air Force faces a challenge far greater than before in preserving the status quo in the South China Sea.

Ngo Minh Tri is Managing Editor of the Thanh Nien newspaper, based in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University based in Singapore. This article reflects the personal viewpoints of the authors and not representative of their respective organizations.

The Diplomat

Vietnam dancing between US alliance and Chinese brotherhood

The last couple of years have witnessed growing animosity between China and the Philippines, while China's relations with Vietnam, another major claimant to the South China Sea islands, remain relatively peaceful. Tensions between China and Vietnam have not escalated, and Vietnam has not shown much eagerness to draw close to the US. However, Vietnam still plays a significant role in the game between China and the US.

In fact, considering the structure and complexity of the contradictions between China and Vietnam, the two might face an even graver situation than that between China and the Philippines.

Among all the claimants, Vietnam claims the widest territory, almost the entire South China Sea. But Vietnam has long been wary of its northern neighbor. Historically, Vietnam was a vassal state of China for a millennium. In addition to this, the 1979 war with China still sticks in Vietnam's craw.

After the rapprochement between Vietnam and the US in 1995, their relationship is on the rise. Although the Vietnam War was calamitous for the nation, it seems that Vietnam does not bear a grudge against its former opponent.

Geopolitical considerations prevail over the pain of war. Located relatively far from Vietnam,Washington neither has a territorial dispute nor poses an imminent threat to the country's interests.

Washington's Vietnam policy has almost gained bipartisan support. Since 1995, two US presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have paid visits to Vietnam. And regardless of who is in the White House, Vietnamese leaders are welcomed as honored guests.

In 2010, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton declared in Hanoi that the US has a "national interest" in the South China Sea. And both countries signed an unprecedented US-Vietnam Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in October 2013. Their bilateral relationship, as these events show, is in a steady process of development.

But it seems Vietnam will not be tamed as the Philippines has been. Compared with the US, Vietnam is also more dependent on China in terms of economic development. Although the US has become Vietnam's biggest export market, China remains Vietnam's biggest import market. Without China, Vietnam's economy may suffer major blows.

And there is an unbreakable barrier between the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam and Washington - a divergence in political regime and ideology.

Although the US is always a realist whose actions are based on its national interests, it never loses its innate enthusiasm for promoting Western democracy and advocating Western values such as human rights and freedom. These actions would jeopardize the governance of Vietnam's ruling party.

This dilemma between Hanoi and Washington will probably turn into a long-standing issue.

Vietnam's ruling party will hold on to its ruling position because of its success in developing the national economy. But meanwhile, subjects such as democracy and human rights will not be wiped off Washington's diplomatic agenda. The game will last a long time.

It is this dilemma that will urge Vietnam to reexamine its relationship with China and see Beijing as a valuable friend. Both are now in a similar situation, where they face the same challenges imposed by the US-led West.

These elements will turn Vietnam into a "two-faced" nation. It embraces the US when it encounters territorial disputes and geopolitical games with its neighbors. But it will give Washington the cold shoulder when the issues of political regime and ideology gain the upper hand. Its attitude toward China will be the reverse.

In the long term, Vietnam's foreign policy will be made under the cover of this "two-faced" approach. It will neither pledge allegiance to Washington as an ally, nor will it constantly maintain a "brotherhood" with China.

Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

PH Military starts deployment of troops in Spratlys

MANILA, Philippines - The military yesterday started its rotation of Air Force and naval contingents for deployments in Pag-Asa Island in the Spratlys.

Originally scheduled before Christmas, the airmen were not immediately relieved by their counterparts at Armed Forces of the Philippines-Western Command (AFP-Wescom) headquarters in Palawan due to the prevailing weather system hovering over the region for the entire month of December.

Kalayaan Mayor Eugenio Bito-onon Jr. confirmed the deployment of fresh troops in the island municipality.

Philippine soldiers take part in a military parade before being deployed to the island of Mindanao. Photo published in 2011.

Since the sea around the island is very rough, Wescom has started shuttling new Air Force troops to the island town using a Navy plane, giving the islanders a chance to visit Palawan aboard the returning Navy aircraft.

Pag-Asa Island is located within the hotly contested Spratlys archipelago area but is closer by several miles to mainland Palawan than from the coastline of Vietnam, which is laying maritime claim over the region along with China, Brunei and Taiwan.

All claimant countries except Brunei have troops deployed in the region, with China becoming more aggressive in pressing its maritime claim to almost 80 percent of the entire South China Sea by deploying its warships and surveillance vessels to conduct regular maritime patrol over the area.

The other day, Beijing announced the completion of the training exercises of its aircraft carrier Liaoning in the region.

The training exercises almost resulted in a naval confrontation between a Chinese frigate and the US warship USS Cowpens in December.

Aside from the airmen who are deployed on rotation basis in Pag-Asa Island, the seat of Kalayaan Island town with a current population of almost 200 civilian inhabitants including children, contingents from the Philippine Navy are also stationed in the area to bolster the country’s territorial hold over the seven islets and two shoals in the region.

“We don’t monitor any naval activities of China out there because of the prevailing weather. The sea is very rough and it is very dangerous for any ship to venture out in the open sea for now,” Bito-onon said.

He added that he has yet to receive reports from local fishermen if the two Chinese maritime vessels have returned to Ayungin Shoal. The vessels left the area last month after taking up position near the shoal for several months.

Ayungin Shoal is located between Pag-Asa Island and mainland Palawan.

China, insisting that the shoal is an integral part of its maritime domain, has tried to dislodge a contingent of Marine troops stationed in the shoal aboard the grounded Navy logistic ship BRP Sierra Madre.

Philstars

HQ-182 Hanoi

On December 31, 2014, the first Russian Project 636 Varshavyanka-class (enhanced Kilo) conventional submarine of Vietnam was delivered, docked at Cam Ranh Bay. The sub was transported from the port of St. Petersburg on the heavy lift vessel Rolldock Sea.

Southeast Asian States Deploy Conventional Submarines

Southeast Asian states continue to procure submarines for a variety of strategic goals.

By Carl Thayer
January 03, 2014

On December 31, Vietnamese media reported the delivery of the first Russian Project 636 Varshavyanka-class (enhanced Kilo) conventional submarine to Cam Ranh Bay. The sub was transported from the port of St. Petersburg on the heavy lift vessel Rolldock Sea.

The submarine was accompanied by experts from Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg who will undertake final work before the formal handover ceremonies. The submarine will be named HQ 182 Hanoi. The last of the remaining five Project 636 Varshavyanka-class submarines is expected to be delivered by 2016.

In late November, during the visit of Vietnam’s party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to India, it was announced that India would provide training for up to 500 submarines as part of its defense cooperation program with Vietnam. Training will be conducted at the Indian Navy’s modern submarine training center INS Satavahana in Visakhapatnam. The Indian Navy has operated Russian Kilo-class submarines since the mid-1980s.

The arrival of HQ 182 Hanoi provides a timely reminder that regional navies are embarking on naval modernization programs that increasingly include the acquisition of conventional submarines.

As long ago as 1967 Indonesia became one of the first Southeast Asian countries to acquire an undersea capability when it took delivery of a batch of Soviet Whiskey-class submarines. These were later replaced in 1978 by two West German diesel submarines.

In 2012 Indonesia’s Defense Ministry announced it was planning to expand its submarine fleet to twelve by 2020. Twelve is the minimum number of submarines required to cover strategic choke points or maritime entry passages into the archipelago.

At present Indonesia has an order for three U-209 submarines that are being built in South Korea by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in cooperation with PT PAL Indonesia. The U-209s are expected to be delivered between 2015 and 2016.

In addition, Indonesia is mulling two options. The first option is to buy and modify used Russian Kilo-class submarines. An Indonesian technical team headed by Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Marsetio will visit Russia this month to inspect the submarines and associated weaponry. It will report on the cost and feasibility of this option.

Indonesian sources report that the Kilo-option is attractive because the submarine can be armed with either the supersonic Yakhont or Klub-S cruise missiles. The latter can be fired underwater and strike surface targets up to 400 kilometers away.

Indonesia’s second option is to purchase new submarines from South Korea. This option is attractive because the new submarines are compatible with existing port infrastructure.

Press reports indicate that Indonesia’s new submarines will be berthed at the recently built Palu Naval Base in Central Sulawesi. These submarines would be able to operate in the deep waters around Indonesia’s eastern islands.

In late November Singapore announced that it had signed a contract for the purchase of two new Type 218SG conventional submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems in Germany. The sales contract included provisions for servicing and crew training in Germany.

Singapore’s submarines will be outfitted with the Air Independent Propulsion system and are expected to be delivered by 2020. The new submarines will replace four older Challenger-class submarines and will join the two refurbished Archer-class (formerly Swedish Västergötland-class) submarines to form Singapore’s undersea fleet.

Malaysia acquired two two Scorpène-class submarines from France following a contract signed in 2002. The two boats, RMN Tunku Abdul Rahman and RMN Tun Abdul Razak entered service in 2007 and 2009, respectively. They are based at Sepanggar, Sabah. In May 2012 Malaysia indicated that any further submarine acquisitions would depend on the availability of funding. That year Malaysia signed a contract for the purchase of a Submarine Escape and Rescue Service vessel to be built in Singapore.

In June 2013, Myanmar Army Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing entered into discussions with Russian officials for the purchase of two-Kilo class submarines. That same month it was reported that twenty officers and ratings began basic submarine familiarization and training in Pakistan at its Submarine Training Center PNS Bahadur. These two developments underscore reports that Myanmar intends to crease a submarine force by 2015.

In April 2011 Thailand entered the market for the purchase of two to six decommissioned German Type 206A diesel submarines for $220 million. Weighing in at 500 tonnes submerged displacement, they are among the world’s smallest attack submarines. A change of government in July 2011 and internal differences between the new Defense Minister and the Navy resulted in the expiration of Thailand’s options and the shelving of this project.

In October 2013 it was reported that the Royal Thai Navy will include the purchase of three submarines as part of its next ten-year procurement process. Meanwhile, Thailand has commenced construction of facilities for a submarine training center and base at the Sattahip Naval Base in Chon Buri. This base is expected to be completed in March this year and will be equipped with a Submarine Command Team Trainer.

Last year the Royal Thai Navy sent eighteen officers for a thirty-two week submarine training course in Germany and another ten officers for an eight-week training course in South Korea.

In the early years of the Aquino Administration in the Philippines, submarines were reportedly included on a Department of National Defense “wish list” for procurement under an armed forces modernization program. The acquisition of submarines appears has been quietly dropped.

Within the next five years to a decade, Southeast Asian waters, and the South China Sea in particular, will witness a marked rise in the deployment of conventional submarines by regional states. This will make the South China Sea even more congested.

The acquisition of submarine forces will add a fourth dimension to regional war-fighting capabilities – air, land, sea and sub-surface. Submarines will be able to engage in reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, mine laying, anti-ship warfare and long-range strikes.

There appears to have been very little discussion by naval chiefs among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about the implications of this development. At the most basic level, few of the ASEAN countries are equipped to assist one of their submarines in distress. Singapore and Malaysia, however, are the exceptions. In late 2008 Singapore launched the MV Swift Rescue, a submarine support vessel equipped with two Deep Search and Rescue vessels.

Singapore has been at the forefront in promoting cooperation in submarine rescue among regional navies in the event of a misadventure. Agreements have been signed with Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

The Diplomat

China's military presence is growing. Does a superpower collision loom?

Who holds the key to the future of East Asia? As US influence recedes, arch-enemies China and Japan are flexing their muscles

Show of power … soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Special Operations Forces. Photograph: Joe Chan/Reuters

Generally speaking, Japanese bureaucrats are not much given to exaggeration. So when a senior government insider in Tokyo, speaking off the record, recently compared the deteriorating security situation in East Asia to Europe in the 1930s amid the rise of fascism, it was time to sit up and take notice.

"Tensions are getting very high in this part of the world," the official said. "The security position is extremely severe. There are huge arms sales from Russia, the US and Europe. China's defence spending has seen double-digit growth each year since 1989. They [Beijing] are not a responsible partner. US influence in the region is receding."

Bad blood between Japan and China runs deep and, in the modern era, dates from the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Following its defeat in 1945 and its adoption of a pacifist constitution, Japan became wholly dependent on the US for its defence. Some analysts claim it has long been in Tokyo's interests to play up the China "threat". But objectively speaking, the threat is real, and it becomes tangibly more worrying by the day.

Extraordinarily rapid economic growth in China in recent decades, which has seen it overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy, and the concomitant expansion of Beijing's political, diplomatic and military might have set alarm bells clanging across the region as never before. Today the talk at embassy cocktail parties is not so much about how to "contain" China – the great, lost conceit of hawkish American geostrategists – as how to appease it.

Tellingly, the Japanese official's warning came days before China unexpectedly declared a new air-defence zone in the East China sea, covering the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu to China) that are viewed in Tokyo as sovereign Japanese territory. The ensuing row saw Japan, the US and South Korea send fighter aircraft into the zone in open, dangerous defiance of Beijing's strictures. A subsequent mediation mission by US vice-president Joe Biden failed to resolve the stand-off, in effect leaving a powder keg smouldering and untended.

Nobody is talking openly about a third world war, not yet at least. But there is a growing awareness that the seeds of a possible future superpower collision are being sown around the islands, rocks and shoals, and in the overpopulated sea lanes and airspace beyond China's historic borders, to which Beijing lays claim with growing political robustness and ever-improving military capacity. The lack of a regional security organisation, the absence of a hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, and the ever-present menace represented by the nuclear-armed, Chinese-backed regime in North Korea all add to the inherent dangers of the current situation.

Like any empire in the past, as China's power grows, that power is ineluctably projected to encompass immediate neighbours and, in time, geographical regions and even whole continents. For Beijing, the final frontier in this reverse engineering of manifest destiny is the Pacific basin itself. But to achieve dominance, it must first displace the US, the world's most militarily powerful nation. This contest has years to run. But it is now kicking off, hence the whispers of war.

Three men currently hold the key to what may happen in 2014. One is Xi Jinping, paramount leader of the Chinese Communist party and People's Liberation Army, who succeeded Hu Jintao as president last March. In a sharp change of tone, Xi has dropped Hu's talk of a magnanimous China's peaceful rise and substituted a tougher, nationalist-sounding message stressing pride in one's country at home and asserting China's rights on the international stage with "indomitable will".

The ideological underpinning for this approach was set out in Xi's "China dream" inaugural speech, an obvious attempt to provide an alternative to the American dream. As the People's Daily commented, his idea was "to construct a more open and charismatic Communism that makes people excited to be Chinese".

At a recent party plenum, Xi successfully pushed through an ambitious reform programme while strengthening his grip on power. "Xi emerged from the plenum as the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping," said analyst William Pesek. "Xi may be especially willing to risk a confrontation with Japan right now in order to distract opponents of his proposed reforms, as well as ordinary Chinese who are growing restless over pollution, income inequality and official corruption. Nothing brings China's 1.3 billion people together so easily as hating the Japanese."

Xi's rise to power has coincided with the emergence of a similarly hard-headed individual as Japan's prime minister. Shinzo Abe, who took office around the same time as Xi, has his own agenda for dealing with China. It sometimes makes his American allies and the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) – China's smaller neighbours – wince with anxiety.

An unrepentant nationalist, Abe says it is past time for Japan to drop its pacifist laws, recognise the many threats to its security, and stand up boldly for its interests and values. To this end he has increased defence spending, created a new national security council, strengthened alliances with countries such as the Philippines (which has its own territorial dispute with China), and plans to buy advanced new US weaponry.

"Japan is back," Abe declared during a visit to Washington last year. For this and other reasons, Xi has refused to meet him, as has South Korea's president. Official media denounce Abe as a revisionist and militarist. This chilly impasse has worsened the strains over China's new air zone.

The third key player in this unfolding drama is Barack Obama, who has bigger guns and more ships and planes than the other two combined. Like the rest of the world, the US administration can think of a thousand reasons why a war in East Asia would be disastrously self-defeating for all concerned, starting with the negative impact on international trade, finance and American debt.

But aware of the perception that US regional influence is receding, and that the smallest spark could cause a conflagration, Obama has shifted his approach. His so-called "pivot" to Asia, giving the area a higher foreign policy priority, is principally aimed (despite denials) at countering Chinese blue-water navy ambitions in the Pacific and other unsettling manifestations of Chinese power projection.

Regional observers question how serious Obama is about the China "threat" and whether, for example, he would really come to Japan's defence if the Senkaku dispute degenerated into a shooting war. Perhaps 2014 will provide the answer.

The Guardian

Vietnam's high speed missile boat fires anti-ship missiles

In a video clip that introduces Hanoi kilo 636 submarine appeared an image showing a Vietnam's high speed missile boat Monilya fires Uran-E X35 anti-ship missiles.

Vietnam receives first Russian-made submarine

Hanoi: A heavy lift vessel carrying Vietnam's first Russian-made submarine arrived in Vietnam late Tuesday after one-and-a half-month voyage from Russia's St. Petersburg city.

The diesel powered submarine named Hanoi is the first of six 636 Kilo-class submarines that Vietnam buys from Russia to modernise its navy, Xinhua reported Wednesday citing Vietnam's official news agency.

The submarines are being built at Admiralty Verfi Shipyards in St. Petersburg.

The submarine is able to operate at a maximum depth of 300 metres and at a range of 6,000-7, 500 nautical miles for 45 days and nights with 52 crew members. It is the best choice for reconnaissance and patrol.

By January 3, all the attached equipment of the submarine will be unloaded before it is released into the sea.

Hanoi Kilo 636 submarine seen on RollDock vessel at Cam Ranh Bay

Hanoi kilo submarine to enter operation on January 3

On January 3, Hanoi Kilo 636 submarine will be launched to sea and anchor in national waters, marking its first official operation.

After a six-week voyage, the mother vessel Rolldock Sea safely brought the Hanoi Kilo-636 submarine to Cam Ranh port.

The handover ceremony is due to take place on January 10 following the completion of technical tests by five Russian submarine experts and Vietnamese agency representatives.