South China Sea drills show Xi Jinping and Donald Trump locked in a dangerous game

The Chinese show of naval force in the South China Sea last week, to warn Taiwan and show support for Russia, shows that President Xi Jinping is giving as good as he gets when it comes to American bellicosity in the world (“China announces surprise live-fire Taiwan Strait drills after massive navy parade,” April 12).

Like President Donald Trump, the Chinese leader is conducting diplomacy wearing a velvet glove on one hand and holding a sword in the other. In this stand-off, it’s a question of who will blink first.

It’s a dangerous game they are playing, and the cost of it going wrong could be high for all of us.

All the more so with tensions rising between East and West in the Middle East, over the atrocious chemical attacks in Syria.

Terry Hewton, Adelaide/ SCMP

Syria: chemical weapons inspectors denied access to Douma site

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons unable to access sites controlled by Russia and Syria.

Syrian forces walk in Douma on the outskirts of Damascus. Photograph: Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images

Inspectors from the global chemical weapons watchdog have been unable to access sites controlled by Russia and the Syrian regime in the town of Douma to investigate an attack on 7 April that killed dozens and prompted US-led missile strikes over the weekend.

The director-general of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons told a meeting of the OPCW executive council that inspectors had not been allowed to visit the town outside Damascus, the UK delegation tweeted. “Unfettered access essential. Russia & Syria must cooperate,” the delegation tweeted.

According to Petter Lycke, Sweden’s representative at the OPCW executive council, Syria and Russia told the inspectors that their safety could not be guaranteed.

In remarks that could indicate an attempt to bog down the OPCW team, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said the inspectors will not be allowed to access the site until they produce an appropriate UN permit.

Russian military officials were at the site of the Douma attack days before the OPCW reached Damascus, leading to fears that the site might have been tampered with.

Kenneth Ward, the US ambassador to the OPCW, raised these fears on Monday, drawing a denial from the Russian foreign minster, Sergei Lavrov, who told the BBC: “I can guarantee that Russia has not tampered with the site.” Lavrov also reiterated the Russian line that any attack on Douma was “staged”.

The US launched military strikes, alongside UK and French forces, in the early hours of Saturday morning local time aimed at reducing the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons facilities.

What you need to know about the Syria strikes – video report:

Over the weekend the OPCW sent inspectors on a fact-finding visit to Douma to search for evidence and interview witnesses. Their arrival coincided with a Syrian military announcement that it had “purified” the region of eastern Ghouta, of which Douma is a part, after a two-month campaign that has killed nearly 2,000 civilians, following years of siege.

Western countries are making a push both at the OPCW in The Hague and the UN in the New York to secure wider diplomatic support for a clampdown on the use of chemical weapons in the Syria. The suspicion is that the Syrian government previously misled inspectors when it declared its entire chemical weapons stockpile had been disclosed and destroyed.

The UN security council’s 15 members will meet on Monday to discuss a call for a wider push to eliminate the covert Syrian government stockpiles.

The British envoy to the OPCW, Peter Wilson, put the Douma attack in a wider context of chemical weapons use in Syria during the war. The OPCW had recorded 390 allegations of the use of banned chemicals in Syria since 2014 he said, and a failure by the OPCW to act risked allowing “further barbaric use of chemical weapons”.

Syria joined the OPCW, the organisation tasked with monitoring adherence to a 1997 convention on chemical weapons, in 2013 after a sarin gas attack that killed hundreds of people in Ghouta. The move was part of a joint Russian-US deal that averted military action threatened by the then US president, Barack Obama.

The OPCW needs a two-thirds majority to take decisions, and faces the threat of being fatally weakened as Russia and the west fight over the OPCW’s mandate to ascribe responsibility for attacks.

A Russian veto at the UN last November means the OPCW is empowered only to state if chemical weapons have been used, and not to attribute responsibility.

Russia is also challenging an OPCW finding that a nerve agent was found in an attack in Salisbury on the Russian double agent Sergei Skripal.

A joint United Nations-OPCW mission concluded the Syrian airforce was responsible for a sarin attack that killed nearly 100 people a year ago in the town of Khan Sheikhoun. The finding led Russia to object to the way in which the joint mission reached its conclusions, and to demand future changes in its methodology before its mandate could renewed.

Wilson told the OPCW executive meeting: “The time has come for all members of this executive council to take a stand. Too many duck the responsibility that comes with being a member of this council. Failure to act to hold perpetrators to account will only risk further barbaric use of chemical weapons, in Syria and beyond.” - The Guardian

Vietnam's Fishing ‘Militia’ to Defend Against China

FILE - A Vietnamese boat (L) which was rammed and then sunk by Chinese vessels near disputed Paracels Islands in 2014.

MP3 Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/14jdugN05tFwMPTfVjV6DkmdYhB_fWsAz/view

Vietnam is reported to be quietly developing a state-supported fishing boat militia to hold off China at sea. The fishing militia is being created at a time when the two sides talk about easing territorial disputes.

That is the opinion of experts who follow those disputes.

Vietnam watchers say the country is asking its commercial fishers to use stronger boats and take military-trained people to sea in case of a clash with Chinese fishers. China has its own fishing militia operating in the same waters.

“I think it’s a good policy to avoid future conflicts where militia fishermen are out in the sea,” said Trung Nguyen. He serves as dean of international relations at the Ho Chi Minh University of Social Sciences and Humanities.

Vietnam has been working to develop the fishing militia since at least 2009. Over that time, the two countries have been holding talks. Just last week, Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary met the visiting Chinese foreign minister. The party official suggested “joint safeguarding (of) maritime peace,” China’s Xinhua News Agency reported.

Vietnam may be trying to appear strong now in case talks fail to produce results, noted Eduardo Araral of the National University of Singapore’s school of public diplomacy.

FILE - A Vietnamese naval soldier stands quard at Thuyen Chai island in the Spratly archipelago.

How the militia works

The Vietnamese fishing militia has not gone to battle with China. If the militia did, it would risk facing the third largest military in the world.

But Vietnamese military forces are arming fishing boats, said Southeast Asia expert Carl Thayer. That may be similar to the deployment of former soldiers to help keep order as needed on land in Vietnam, Thayer noted.

The Vietnamese government requires conscription, he added, so fishermen would already have some military skills.

“Putting them at sea would just be getting people the right age and giving them that training,” he said. “All they did is move what they do on land, how to defend factories … and extend that to sea.

Thayer is emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

Thirteen fishing militia platoons have been helping more than 3,000 fishermen work near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. That information comes from a 2017 study by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. China controls the Paracels, but Vietnam also claims the islands.

The study found that more than 10,000 fishermen and about 2,000 fishing boats in southern Vietnam have received military equipment.

In 2014, Vietnam prepared a list of rules to aid fishermen who build “modern large capacity ships” to expand their reach, the study found. It said Vietnamese banks had lent $176 million to fishermen for improvements to about 400 ships.

South China Sea territorial claims map

Record of clashes

China claims about 90 percent of the 3.5 million-square-kilometer South China Sea. Vietnam says it should control the sea’s waters off its long north-south coastline, extending into the Paracels and Spratly Islands.

Sailors died in clashes between the two countries in 1974 and 1988. In 2014, the deployment of a Chinese oil rig in the South China Sea caused a boat-ramming incident at sea and deadly rioting in Vietnam against Chinese interests.

China has long had its own fishing militia with military support and attention from the Chinese President, notes the United States-based Naval War College. Armed fishing boats help defend China’s maritime claims by pushing away foreign boats, the political intelligence service Stratfor reported in 2016.

Five other governments claim all or parts of the South China Sea. They oppose Chinese efforts to build up and expand islands in the waterway.

Vietnam and China often hold talks about settling maritime problems, but talks often fall short of a decision because of historic distrust, Araral said. He added that Vietnam may be sending China the message that while we talk, we assert our rights.

A Vietnamese fishing militia will not be as large as China's militia, he said, but Vietnam feels it must try.

I'm Susan Shand

Susan Shand adapted this story from VOA. George Grow was the editor.

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Words in This Story

maritime – adj. of or relating to sailing on the sea or doing business (such as trading) by sea

conscription – n. the act of calling citizens to serve in the military

platoon – n. part of a company-sized military force; a group of people who are doing something together

emeritus – ​adj. a person retired from professional life but permitted to retain as an honorary title the rank of the last office held​

capacity – ​n. ​the ability to hold or contain people or things — usually singular​

rig – n. a large structure on the sea

assert – v. to state or declare, often forcefully

ramming – adj. striking something violently

dean – n. the head of a college or school at a university

commercial – adj. related to or used in the buying and selling of products

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Source: https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/vietnams-fishing-militia-to-defend-against-china/4340613.html

U.S.-led allied strike on Syria on April 14th, 2018: Videos

US warships, B-1 Bombers, 4 UK fighter jets Tornado and French fighter jets used in strikes against Assad regime in Syria. The strikes were started at 9 p.m (Washington) on April 13th, 2018 or 8 a.m (Hanoi) on April 14th, 2018.

*‪Syrian air defence systems fired at US missiles. Russian air defence systems also fired. Russia media Sputnik reported that 20 missiles were successfully intercepted.

*Scientific research facility and a number of Syrian army bases in Damascus struck in attack - Syrian Observatory.

*Wave after wave of cruise missiles hitting Syria.

* The first wave of strikes were over at 11 p.m (Washington).

- Video: UK fighter jets Tornado carrying Storm Shadow missiles in operation to strike Syria on April 14th, 2018: https://www.facebook.com/keinews/videos/1451186621657294/

- Video: First operational firing of the French Naval cruise Missile (MdCN) towards Syria on April 14th, 2018: https://twitter.com/i/web/status/985030891411070977

- Video: Reported that US, UK and France to strike Syria on April 14th, 2018: https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1450829555026334&id=1342234429219181

- Video: U.S.-led allied missiles hit targets in Syria and Syrian Air Defense fired on April 14th, 2018: https://www.facebook.com/Vibaynews/videos/353926478450911/

Wonderful: Non Nuoc Cao Bang named second global geopark in Vietnam

Paris (VNA) – Non Nuoc Cao Bang Geopark in the northern border province of Cao Bang was recognised as a global geopark by the UNESCO Global Geoparks Council in Paris on April 12.

This is the second UNESCO-recognised Global Geopark in Vietnam after Dong Van Karst Plateau, which was recognised in 2010.

Non Nuoc Cao Bang is about 300km from Hanoi capital city. It covers more than 3,000 sq.km. in the districts of Ha Quang, Tra Linh, Quang Uyen, Trung Khanh, Ha Lang and Phuc Hoa and part of Hoa An, Nguyen Binh and Thach An districts.

The geopark is home to fossils, ocean sediment, volcanic rocks, minerals, and especially karst landscapes, which can give researchers an insight into an over-500-million-year history of the Earth. It is also well known for rich biodiversity and many indigenous fauna and flora species.

Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Hoai Trung said the Global Geopark title is UNESCO’s recognition of diverse landscapes and spiritual cultural values of the Non Nuoc Cao Bang area. It will also help the province boost sustainable socio-economic development and improve local living standards.

Ambassador Tran Thi Hoang Mai, head of Vietnam’s Permanent Mission to UNESCO, said during the dossier verification process, UNESCO experts highly evaluated the values of the Non Nuoc Cao Bang Geopark.

Aside from natural values, she said, it also contains a number of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, particularly revolutionary relic sites such as special national relic site of Pac Bo, where Nguyen Ai Quoc or President Ho Chi Minh, returned in 1941 to lead the domestic revolution after spending over 30 years in other countries to seek ways to save the country.

It is also home to special national relic site of Tran Hung Dao Forest, where then General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1944 established the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army, the predecessor of the Vietnam People’s Army today.

Chairman of the Cao Bang People’s Committee Hoang Xuan Anh pledged that local authorities and people will associate the conservation and development of Non Nuoc the Cao Bang Global Geopark with local socio-economic development in a sustainable manner.

Non Nuoc Cao Bang was established in 2015. In November 2016, Cao Bang submitted a dossier to UNESCO to seek the global geopark recognition.

A survey team of UNESCO came to the province in July 2017 to make assessment of the park’s values and conservation work.-VNA

Video: Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews naval parade in South China Sea

Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), reviews the People's Liberation Army (PLA) naval parade in the South China Sea on the morning of April 12, 2018. (ChinaMil / Photo by Feng Kaixuan)

How China is quietly increasing its ability to wage war at sea

More intensive naval training is steadily improving the navy’s combat readiness, writes Collin Koh

The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been on a roll over the past month, staging successive air, naval and marine amphibious assault exercises across the Western Pacific.

Most notably, a large naval deployment was observed on satellite imagery in late March – about 40 vessels including what appeared to be the aircraft carrier Liaoning.

It was followed not far astern by a slightly smaller combat support ship, plus other vessels including submarines and two distinct three-aircraft aerial formations.

Clearly, there should be no dispute among naval observers that the formation in which the fleet sailed amounted to what can be termed a photo and PR exercise.

Some dismissed the manoeuvres as a propaganda exercise designed to flaunt the navy’s muscle, but others cautioned this could imply the PLA Navy has intensified its peacetime combat readiness and training.

Neither side is wrong, for both schools of thought encapsulate the meaning of gunboat diplomacy – the limited threat or use of naval force for the attainment of limited political objectives.

Usually some form of photo opportunity is obligatory on major naval exercises and examples are bountiful. Examples include Exercise Malabar in July last year, with all three carriers of the US, Indian and Japanese navies sailing in formation with fighter jets blazing above, plus the Thailand-hosted Asean Multinational Naval Exercise late last year, to name just a few.

The latest huge naval turnout in the South China Sea appears no different. But would it make sense for China to burn expensive fuel, taking so many warships and their crews away from other tasks, only to stage a photo op?

Focusing on the apparent propaganda value of the manoeuvres solely based on the satellite pictures diverts one’s attention away from a more pertinent phenomenon. That is, while much focus has been on the Chinese coastguard and fabled maritime militia in the South China Sea and in other East Asian maritime flashpoints involving China, the PLA Navy has been gradually improving its ability to fight in a high-intensity war. There is nothing radically new about this. The navy has been steadily building new ships over the years. Just over the past two years alone, over 40 new vessels were commissioned or launched.

But combat capability does not just emanate from inducting new hardware. Clearly the navy understands the value of honing its combat readiness through intense training. While one could question the various other factors that contribute to combat readiness – for example, command and control protocols – the fact of the matter is that in recent years, corresponding with the rate of naval shipbuilding efforts, there has also been an upswing in the navy’s training and exercise regimen.

New hardware allows the fleet to maintain a higher level of readiness compared to using older ships simply because of reduced maintenance requirements. Suffice to say, for now the navy has the luxury of utilising its new-built fleet of vessels to intensify training – more sea time for its crews, which translates into more familiarity with operating their vessels under varying conditions and getting acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of their combat systems.

Until laggard maintenance schedules catch up eventually, which nobody can be certain of, one should assume that the navy will remain fixated with building a more proficient fleet capable of undertaking large-scale operations.

Also noteworthy is the growing amount of inter-fleet coordination. This is also nothing new – the PLA Navy South Sea, East Sea and North Sea fleets have mobilised assets to train with each other in the past. What is different this time around and will be in the future is that such inter-fleet exchanges will take place on a larger scale thanks to new ships and equipment available. To add to that, the navy has also been honing its interoperability with both the coastguard and maritime militia.

If one takes seriously the incessant exhortations from Beijing’s political elites to “train as you fight”, large-scale naval manoeuvres similar to the one observed in late March would plausibly not be a one-off event, but represent a new normal, made possible only as the navy gains new capabilities and its personnel acquire new-found confidence.

That could mean two things for peace and stability for the South China Sea and Southeast Asia.

On the one hand, a more capable PLA Navy might contribute towards the promotion of defence diplomacy. On the other, a more capable and overconfident PLA Navy may serve more as a tool of coercion. A navy is such a flexible instrument for foreign policy that it can well perform either of these tasks. It depends on how the navy’s political masters choose to utilise this capability.

The increasing power of China’s navy and its enhanced combat readiness should not be kept off everyone’s radar. It remains a force with an increasingly large shadow, ready to weigh in at any point of confrontation at sea with Beijing’s rivals. While not overexaggerating this threat, we should ignore this growing Chinese naval challenge at our peril.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is a research fellow at the maritime security programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Enjoy Northwestern Grilled Pig in Vietnam

Pork roasting fire, when dry and then heat up, when the skin yellow gold, crispy is the best. Today we are enjoying, very enjoy.

See how indigenous ethnic M'nong people in Dak Lak eat "hot pigs"

This Vietnamese video to introduce the food, culture as well as the tourism of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, specifically about the cuisines of the ethnic District of Lak in Dak Lak province. Thank you for visiting our blog.