Hiển thị các bài đăng có nhãn Asia rising. Hiển thị tất cả bài đăng
Hiển thị các bài đăng có nhãn Asia rising. Hiển thị tất cả bài đăng

Thứ Bảy, 2 tháng 3, 2013

Southeast Asian countries stock up on arms as they face off with China

Southeast Asian countries are stocking up on the latest military gadgets, expanding an international arms web as they seek to counter China’s rise

Vietnam's Kilo class Submarine named 'TP. Hồ Chí Minh'
Vietnam stocks up on two Russian-built Kilo submarines (in 2013). In picture, the second of Vietnam's Kilo class submarine named "TP. Hồ Chí Minh" ("Ho Chi Minh City") was launched on December, 2012.

Vietnam is stocking up on two Russian-built Kilo submarines in 2013

Two Russian-built Kilo submarines cruise the dark, frigid waters of the North Sea out of Kaliningrad, being readied for delivery later this year to Vietnam, where Indian technicians are already helping to train Vietnamese crews.

Down in the Philippines, meanwhile, final preparations are under way to seal a deal to buy a squadron of jet fighters from South Korea and receive three naval helicopters from Italy.

As Southeast Asia's military build-up intensifies to counter China's military rise, it is increasingly clear that it has an international dimension, tying China's neighbours to a widening range of relationships that could complicate Beijing's strategic environment.

"There is certainly a strong international component to these developments in Southeast Asia," said Richard Bitzinger, a senior fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, who is tracking a growing list of acquisitions across the region. "Southeast Asia is a very open arms market compared to other parts of the world like the Middle East … there is no shortage of potential sellers, and plenty of interested buyers.

"And in this business, you don't want to be dependent on any one supplier, so that explains all the shopping around. Price is, of course, another factor."

Vietnam has long attempted to diversify its sources as it rebuilds its once-formidable military, reflecting a marked internationalist cast to its foreign policy, avoiding alliances and over- reliance on any one major actor.


Hanoi has looked to Moscow - its cold war-era patron - for key elements of its state-of-the-art kit, including frigates and Sukhoi jet fighters, as well as the Kilos. But it is also tapping India for anti-ship cruise missiles and talking to various European nations, including France, for ships and radars and has lobbied Washington hard about lifting restrictions on weapons sales - a legacy of the Vietnam war.

One representative of a major US weapons manufacturer said there was considerable US interest in potential business from Vietnam, but State Department officials have told them they must wait for improvements in the Communist Party-ruled nation's human rights situation.

For the Philippines, however, its move into the international arms market is something new - and a factor that is surprising analysts. A US ally tied to Washington by a decades-old security treaty, Philippines' leaders have long ignored calls to update its tiny and creaking armed forces, relying on the occasional infusion of surplus US materiel.

President Benigno Aquino is determined to challenge that perception, pushing ahead with bold plans to gradually increase defence spending after years of atrophy. The US$443 million deal to buy the South Korean FA-50 light fighter jets will give the Philippines its first meaningful air attack capability in the best part of two decades. The planes are also a perfect training platform for more advanced F-16s from the US – another deal in the frame.

The Philippines is buying 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets to boost its poorly armed military. Photo: AFP
The Philippines is buying 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets to boost its poorly armed military. Photo: AFP

The jet purchase is being matched by other moves, including buying 10 coastguard ships from Japan under an aid deal, and talks with a host of other nations about possible purchases. The significance of a Russian naval task force visit to Manila Bay a year ago - the first such mission in 96 years - was not lost on military analysts.

"The amazing thing is not just that they are buying from a range of countries, but it is amazing that they are buying at all," Bitzinger said.

And then there is Indonesia. Southeast Asia's largest nation has been active as well, purchasing submarines from South Korea, anti-ship missiles from China, Sukhoi jets from Russia and F-16s from the US.

Bitzinger noted that Indonesian defence spending rose 200 per cent in the decade to 2010, reaching US$6 billion and boosting regional figures that saw spending across Southeast Asia rise more than 50 per cent during the same period.

The trend looks set to expand. Bitzinger said he expected Indonesia, Vietnam and possibly oil-rich Brunei to significantly increase defence spending, with Indonesia overtaking traditional military heavyweight Singapore as the biggest player.

Officially, of course, it is not targeted at China. As Aquino spokesman Edwin Lacierda said last week: "The military upgrade was already a priority before our incident with China … It is not aimed at any particular country. It is our obligation to modernise our military hardware."

But speak privately with military brass and strategists across the region and the spectre of China's vaunted military ambitions - fuelled by two decades of double-digit spending rises - looms large. Vietnam and the Philippines, of course, are locked in increasingly tense territorial disputes over the South China Sea, along with fellow claimants Malaysia and Brunei. Philippine officials have described their sovereignty as being under direct threat as Chinese ships maintain a permanent presence in the disputed Scarborough Shoal, within the Philippines' claimed exclusive economic zone.

Given the reach of China's controversial "nine-dash line" claim deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, countries such as Singapore and Indonesia look on nervously.

"No one of us is ever going to be in a position to challenge China militarily," one Vietnamese strategist said. "What we can do is create a strategic deterrent that would make them think very long and hard before contemplating even a limited conflict to enforce their claims. That's what we are doing … as well as reminding China now and then that we would be prepared to fight to defend our sovereignty."

Vietnam's dynamic deputy defence minister, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, has already stated, in a clear nod to China, that if any party escalated the dispute, "we would not stand by and watch".

While Vietnam is well on the way to such a position, the Philippines still has a long way to go, as the Scarborough Shoal situation suggests. In creating that deterrent, countries are effectively trying to do to China what China is trying to do to the US, whose military remains the most powerful in the wider Asian region.

Through the use of so-called asymmetric weapons such as a submarines and anti-ship missiles, a larger foe can be deterred - as China hopes the US would be in case of a conflict over Taiwan

Professor Carl Thayer, who has been monitoring the build-up at the Australian Defence Force Academy, recently described it as a "cycle of action-reaction", driven in large part by China's military rise and assertiveness. It is not about ultimate supremacy, so it can not be seen as a classic arms race.

"But neither Vietnam nor Indonesia are straining their economic resources to develop their armed forces," he said. "And to both Vietnam and Indonesia, China creates a security dilemma but it is not an adversary."

Major international weapons manufacturers and exporters have been increasingly active across the region, appearing behind the scenes at high-profile gatherings such as the informal Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, an annual gathering of defence ministers, top military brass and scholars.

"In the last year or so, I've noticed the smiles on the faces of my peers working the region are getting broader, and their cigars bigger," said one regional representative of a large US weapons and systems manufacturer.

"It's nice to be in a growth industry."

This article was originally posted on SCMP on February 9th, 2013.

SCMP

China's dream of rebirth

John Lee says China's mission of national renewal is founded on resurrecting its days of glory, and the US and Japan need to understand that this implies a reworking of the current regional order.


In a speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe informed the audience of officials, experts and journalists that Japan is "back" and will not stand down in its ongoing sovereignty dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With Chinese provocations on the rise, US President Barack Obama, Abe's host, appealed for calm and restraint on both sides.

Japan is likely to accede - grudgingly - to America's request, as it remains dependent on its alliance with the US for its security. But it will be much more difficult to persuade China that it should stand down.

China's assertiveness over its sovereignty claim reflects more than a desire to exploit seabed resources, or to gain a widened strategic gateway into the western Pacific. It is also about national renewal and rejuvenation - the core of the Chinese Communist Party's raison d'être. Turning away from a fight with its former occupier and historical rival would be a step backwards in this six-decade-long quest.

The idea of Chinese renewal or rejuvenation was popularised by then premier Zhao Ziyang in the late 1980s, and frequently promoted by presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao . Most recently, incoming president Xi Jinping , visiting the National Museum of China's "Road Towards Renewal" exhibition, pledged to continue the "great renewal of the Chinese nation".

What does "renewal" or "rejuvenation" mean to Chinese? All nations - great and small - embody a combination of historical fact and myth. In this case, the Communist Party's view of rejuvenation is built on the belief that the zenith of Chinese power under the Ming and Qing dynasties represents the natural, just and permanent state of affairs for a 5,000-year-old civilisation.

When Mao Zedong took power in 1949, his immediate goal was to re-establish the "greater China" of the Qing dynasty, insisting that the Manchu-led empire was the permanent and enduring China. But, while the assault on the Qing dynasty by foreign powers is a historical fact, the notion that there has been one enduring China struggling against avaricious outsiders across several millennia is false and self-serving.

Mao achieved his goal following the so-called peaceful liberation of the East Turkestan Republic, now Xinjiang , in 1949 and of Tibet in 1950, which promptly increased China's size by more than one-third. And every Communist Party leader since has carried forward his vision of a greater China, adjusting and expanding it as the country's power grows. For example, China showed little interest in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands prior to 1968 - the year a geographical study pointed to vast oil reserves beneath the seabed.

The same can be said for China's growing stridency with respect to its claims in the South China Sea. In 2009, relying heavily on a dubious historical claim, China formally tabled its "nine-dotted line" map to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and has since referred to almost all of the South China Sea as being under its "indisputable sovereignty".

Having dominated East and Southeast Asia for all but the last two centuries of the past two millennia, China is chafing at the current US-led regional order of sovereign states, in which even the smallest enjoys the same rights, privileges and protection as the largest.

Modern China has benefited enormously from this arrangement; none-theless, there is keen resentment that the Chinese civilisation-state's vast achievements over several thousand years offer China no special status.

To a people imbued with a deep sense of superior moral worth, historical achievement, and victimisation by foreign powers, this state of affairs is unjust and unnatural. It follows that pulling back from any territorial dispute with smaller and inferior states would be seen as a humiliating defeat, rather than a step towards ensuring long-term regional stability.

Moreover, an expanding view of greater China implies that a resolution of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in China's favour would be likely to embolden rather than satisfy its ambitions. Making good on its claim to the South China Sea could be next.

As Obama and Abe forge a common strategy aimed at helping to manage China's rise peacefully, they must understand that China's conception of renewal seeks to resurrect a glorious past, and that this implies revision, not affirmation, of the existing regional order.

This means they will have to limit China's strategic and military options, even if they cannot constrain its ambitions.

John Lee is a fellow and professor at the Centre for International Security Studies, the University of Sydney. He is also a non-resident scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC, and a director of the Kokoda Foundation in Canberra. Copyright: Project Syndicate.

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